HRVATSKI SABOR

21

Na temelju članka 89. Ustava Republike Hrvatske, donosim

ODLUKU

O PROGLAŠENJU ZAKONA O POTVRĐIVANJU SPORAZUMA IZMEĐU KRALJEVINE BELGIJE, KRALJEVINE DANSKE, SAVEZNE REPUBLIKE NJEMAČKE, IRSKE, TALIJANSKE REPUBLIKE, VELIKOG VOJVODSTVA LUKSEMBURGA, KRALJEVINE NIZOZEMSKE, EUROPSKE ZAJEDNICE ZA ATOMSKU ENERGIJU I MEĐUNARODNE AGENCIJE ZA ATOMSKU ENERGIJU O PROVEDBI ČLANKA III. STAVAKA 1. I 4. UGOVORA O NEŠIRENJU NUKLEARNOG ORUŽJA I
DODATNOG PROTOKOLA UZ SPORAZUM IZMEĐU REPUBLIKE AUSTRIJE, KRALJEVINE BELGIJE, KRALJEVINE DANSKE, REPUBLIKE FINSKE, SAVEZNE REPUBLIKE NJEMAČKE, HELENSKE REPUBLIKE, IRSKE, TALIJANSKE REPUBLIKE, VELIKOG VOJVODSTVA LUKSEMBURGA, KRALJEVINE NIZOZEMSKE, PORTUGALSKE REPUBLIKE, KRALJEVINE ŠPANJOLSKE, KRALJEVINE ŠVEDSKE, EUROPSKE ZAJEDNICE ZA ATOMSKU ENERGIJU I MEĐUNARODNE AGENCIJE ZA ATOMSKU ENERGIJU O PROVEDBI ČLANKA III. STAVAKA 1. I 4. UGOVORA O NEŠIRENJU NUKLEARNOG ORUŽJA

Proglašavam Zakon o potvrđivanju Sporazuma između Kraljevine Belgije, Kraljevine Danske, Savezne Republike Njemačke, Irske, Talijanske Republike, Velikog Vojvodstva Luksemburga, Kraljevine Nizozemske, Europske zajednice za atomsku energiju i Međunarodne agencije za atomsku energiju o provedbi članka III. stavaka 1. i 4. Ugovora o neširenju nuklearnog oružja i Dodatnog protokola uz Sporazum između Republike Austrije, Kraljevine Belgije, Kraljevine Danske, Republike Finske, Savezne Republike Njemačke, Helenske Republike, Irske, Talijanske Republike, Velikog Vojvodstva Luksemburga, Kraljevine Nizozemske, Portugalske Republike, Kraljevine Španjolske, Kraljevine Švedske, Europske zajednice za atomsku energiju i Međunarodne agencije za atomsku energiju o provedbi članka III. stavaka 1. i 4. Ugovora o neširenju nuklearnog oružja, koji je Hrvatski sabor donio na sjednici 18. svibnja 2016. godine.

Klasa: 011-01/16-01/25

Urbroj: 71-06-01/1-16-2

Zagreb, 23. svibnja 2016.

Predsjednica

Republike Hrvatske

Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović, v. r.

ZAKON

O POTVRĐIVANJU SPORAZUMA IZMEĐU KRALJEVINE BELGIJE, KRALJEVINE DANSKE, SAVEZNE REPUBLIKE NJEMAČKE, IRSKE, TALIJANSKE REPUBLIKE, VELIKOG VOJVODSTVA LUKSEMBURGA, KRALJEVINE NIZOZEMSKE, EUROPSKE ZAJEDNICE ZA ATOMSKU ENERGIJU I MEĐUNARODNE AGENCIJE ZA ATOMSKU ENERGIJU O PROVEDBI ČLANKA III. STAVAKA 1. I 4. UGOVORA O NEŠIRENJU NUKLEARNOG ORUŽJA I
DODATNOG PROTOKOLA UZ SPORAZUM IZMEĐU REPUBLIKE AUSTRIJE, KRALJEVINE BELGIJE, KRALJEVINE DANSKE, REPUBLIKE FINSKE, SAVEZNE REPUBLIKE NJEMAČKE, HELENSKE REPUBLIKE, IRSKE, TALIJANSKE REPUBLIKE, VELIKOG VOJVODSTVA LUKSEMBURGA, KRALJEVINE NIZOZEMSKE, PORTUGALSKE REPUBLIKE, KRALJEVINE ŠPANJOLSKE, KRALJEVINE ŠVEDSKE, EUROPSKE ZAJEDNICE ZA ATOMSKU ENERGIJU I MEĐUNARODNE AGENCIJE ZA ATOMSKU ENERGIJU O PROVEDBI ČLANKA III. STAVAKA 1. I 4. UGOVORA O NEŠIRENJU NUKLEARNOG ORUŽJA

Članak 1.

Potvrđuju se Sporazum između Kraljevine Belgije, Kraljevine Danske, Savezne Republike Njemačke, Irske, Talijanske Republike, Velikog Vojvodstva Luksemburga, Kraljevine Nizozemske, Europske zajednice za atomsku energiju i Međunarodne agencije za atomsku energiju o provedbi članka III. stavaka 1. i 4. Ugovora o neširenju nuklearnog oružja, sastavljen u Bruxellesu 5. travnja 1973., u izvorniku na engleskom i francuskom jeziku i Dodatni protokol uz Sporazum između Republike Austrije, Kraljevine Belgije, Kraljevine Danske, Republike Finske, Savezne Republike Njemačke, Helenske Republike, Irske, Talijanske Republike, Velikog Vojvodstva Luksemburga, Kraljevine Nizozemske, Portugalske Republike, Kraljevine Španjolske, Kraljevine Švedske, Europske zajednice za atomsku energiju i Međunarodne agencije za atomsku energiju o provedbi članka III. stavaka 1. i 4. Ugovora o neširenju nuklearnog oružja, sastavljen u Beču 22. rujna 1998., u izvorniku na danskom, nizozemskom, engleskom, finskom, francuskom, njemačkom, grčkom, talijanskom, portugalskom, španjolskom i švedskom jeziku.

Članak 2.

Tekst Sporazuma iz članka 1. ovoga Zakona, u izvorniku na engleskom jeziku i u prijevodu na hrvatski jezik, glasi:

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE KINGDOM OF BELGIUM, THE KINGDOM OF DENMARK, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, IRELAND, THE ITALIAN REPUBLIC, THE GRAND DUCHY OF LUXEMBOURG, THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS, THE EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY IN IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE III, (1) and (4) OF THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

WHEREAS the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and the Kingdom of the Netherlands (hereinafter referred to as «the States») are signatories of the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (hereinafter referred to as «the Treaty») opened for signature at London, Moscow and Washington on 1 July 1968 and which entered into force on 5 March 1970;

RECALLING that pursuant to Article IV (1) of the Treaty nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of the Treaty;

RECALLING that according to Article IV (2) of the Treaty all the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy;

RECALLING further that under the terms of the same paragraph the Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty;

WHEREAS Article III (1) of the Treaty provides that each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter referred to as «the Agency») in accordance with the Statute of the Agency (hereinafter referred to as «the Statute») and the Agency’s safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

WHEREAS Article III (4) provides that non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the Agency to meet the requirements of the said Article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute;

WHEREAS the States are Members of the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) (hereinafter referred to as «the Community») and have assigned to institutions common to the European Communities regulatory, executive and judicial powers which these institutions exercise in their own right in those areas for which they are competent and which may take effect directly within the legal systems of the Member States;

WHEREAS, with this institutional framework, the Community has in particular the task of ensuring, through appropriate safeguards, that nuclear materials are not diverted to purposes other than those for which they were intended, and will, from the time of the entry into force of the Treaty within the territories of the States, thus be required to satisfy itself through the system of safeguards established by the EURATOM Treaty, that source and special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territories of the States is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

WHEREAS these safeguards include notification to the Community of the basic technical characteristics of nuclear facilities, maintenance and submission of operating records to permit nuclear materials accounting for the Community as a whole, inspections by officials of the Community, and a system of sanctions;

WHEREAS the Community has the task of establishing with other countries and with international organizations relations which may promote progress in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and is expressly authorized to assume special safeguard obligations in an agreement with a third State or an international organization;

WHEREAS the Agency’s international safeguards system referred to in the Treaty comprises, in particular, provisions for the submission of design information to the Agency, the maintenance of records, the submission of reports on all nuclear material subject to safeguards to the Agency, inspections carried out by the Agency’s inspectors, requirements for the establishment and maintenance of a system of accounting for and control of nuclear material by a State, and measures in relation to verification of non-diversion;

WHEREAS the Agency, in the light of its statutory responsibilities and its relationship to the General Assembly and the Security Council of the United Nations, has the responsibility to assure the international Community that effective safeguards are being applied under the Treaty;

NOTING that the States, which were members of the Community when they signed the Treaty, made it known on that occasion that safeguards provided for in Article III (1) of the Treaty would have to be set out in a verification agreement between the Community, the States and the Agency and defined in such a way that the rights and obligations of the States and the Community would not be affected;

WHEREAS the Board of Governors of the Agency (hereinafter referred to as «the Board») has approved a comprehensive set of model provisions for the structure and content of agreements between the Agency and States required in connection with the Treaty to be used as the basis for negotiating safeguards agreements between the Agency and non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty;

WHEREAS the Agency is authorized under Article III (A) (5) of the Statute, to apply safeguards, at the request of the Parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State’s activities in the field of atomic energy;

WHEREAS it is the desire of the Agency, the Community and the States to avoid unnecessary duplication of safeguards activities;

NOW, THEREFORE, the Agency, the Community and the States have agreed as follows:

PART I

BASIC UNDERTAKING

Article 1

The States undertake, pursuant to Article III (1) of the Treaty, to accept safeguards, in accordance with the terms of this Agreement, on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within their territories, under their jurisdiction or carried out under their control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS

Article 2

The Agency shall have the right and the obligation to ensure that safeguards will be applied, in accordance with the terms of this Agreement, on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territories of the States, under their jurisdiction or carried out under their control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Article 3

(a) The Community undertakes, in applying its safeguards on source and special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territories of the States, to cooperate with the Agency, in accordance with the terms of this Agreement, with a view to ascertaining that such source and special fissionable material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

(b) The Agency shall apply its safeguards, in accordance with the terms of this Agreement, in such a manner as to enable it to verify, in ascertaining that there has been no diversion of nuclear material from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, findings of the Community’s system of safeguards. The Agency’s verification shall include inter alia independent measurements and observations conducted by the Agency in accordance with the procedures specified in this Agreement. The Agency, in its verification, shall take due account of the effectiveness of the Community’s system of safeguards in accordance with the terms of this Agreement.

CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE AGENCY, THE COMMUNITY AND THE STATES

Article 4

The Agency, the Community and the States shall co-operate, in so far as each Party is concerned, to facilitate the implementation of the safeguards provided for in this Agreement and shall avoid unnecessary duplication of safeguards activities.

IMPLEMENTATION OF SAFEGUARDS

Article 5

The safeguards provided for in this Agreement shall be implemented in a manner designed:

(a) To avoid hampering the economic and technological development in the Community or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including international exchange of nuclear material;

(b) To avoid undue interference in the peaceful nuclear activities in the Community, and in particular in the operation of facilities ; and

(c) To be consistent with prudent management practices required for the economic and safe conduct of nuclear activities.

Article 6

(a) The Agency shall take every precaution to protect commercial and industrial secrets and other confidential information coming to its knowledge in the implementation of this Agreement.

(b) (i) The Agency shall not publish or communicate to any State, organization or person any information obtained by it in connection with the implementation of this Agreement, except that specific information relating to the implementation thereof may be given to the Board and to such Agency staff members as require such knowledge by reason of their official duties in connection with safeguards, but only to the extent necessary for the Agency to fulfil its responsibilities in implementing this Agreement.

(ii) Summarized information on nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement may be published upon decision of the Board if the States directly concerned or the Community, in so far as either Party is individually concerned, agree thereto.

Article 7

(a) In implementing safeguards under this Agreement, full account shall be taken of technological development in the field of safeguards, and every effort shall be made to ensure optimum cost-effectiveness and the application of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points to the extent that present or future technology permits.

(b) In order to ensure optimum cost-effectiveness, use shall be made, for example, of such means as:

(i) Containment as a means of defining material balance areas for accounting purposes;

(ii) Statistical techniques and random sampling in evaluating the flow of nuclear material ; and

(iii) Concentration of verification procedures on those stages in the nuclear fuel cycle involving the production, processing, use of storage of nuclear material from which nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices could readily be made, and minimization of verification procedures in respect of the nuclear material, on condition that this does not hamper the implementation of this Agreement.

PROVISION OF INFORMATION TO THE AGENCY

Article 8

(a) In order to ensure the effective implementation of safeguards under this Agreement, the Community shall, in accordance with the provisions set out in this Agreement, provide the Agency with information concerning nuclear material subject to such safeguards and the features of facilities relevant to safeguarding such material.

(b) (i) The Agency shall require only the minimum amount of information and data consistent with carrying out its responsibilities under this Agreement.

(ii) Information pertaining to facilities shall be the minimum necessary for safeguarding nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement.

(c) If the Community so requests, the Agency shall be prepared to examine, on premises of the Community, design information which the Community regards as being of particular sensitivity. Such information need not be physically transmitted to the Agency provided that it remains readily available for further examination by the Agency on premises of the Community.

AGENCY INSPECTORS

Article 9

(a) (i) The Agency shall secure the consent of the Community and the States to the designation of Agency inspectors to the States.

(ii) If the Community, either upon proposal of a designation or at any other time after a designation has been made, objects to the designation, the Agency shall propose to the Community and the States an alternative designation or designations.

(iii) If, as a result of the repeated refusal of the Community to accept the designation of Agency inspectors, inspections to be conducted under this Agreement would be impeded, such refusal shall be considered by the Board, upon referral by the Director General of the Agency (hereinafter referred to as «the Director General»), with a view to its taking appropriate action.

(b) The Community and the States concerned shall take the necessary steps to ensure that Agency inspectors can effectively discharge their functions under this Agreement.

(c) The visits and activities of Agency inspectors shall be so arranged as:

(i) To reduce to a minimum the possible inconvenience and disturbance to the Community and the States and to the peaceful nuclear activities inspected; and

(ii) To ensure protection of industrial secrets or any other confidential information coming to the knowledge of Agency inspectors.

PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES

Article 10

Each State shall apply to the Agency, including its property, funds and assets, and to its inspectors and other officials, performing functions under this Agreement, the relevant provisions of the Agreement on the privileges and immunities of the International Atomic Energy Agency [3][1].

CONSUMPTION OR DILUTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL

Article 11

Safeguards under this Agreement shall terminate on nuclear material upon determination by the Community and the Agency that the material has been consumed, or has been diluted in such a way that it is no longer usable for any nuclear activity relevant from the point of view of safeguards, or has become practically irrecoverable.

TRANSFER OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL OUT OF THE STATES

Article 12

The Community shall give the Agency notification of transfers of nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement out of the States, in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement. Safeguards under this Agreement shall terminate on nuclear material when the recipient State has assumed responsibility therefore as provided for in this Agreement. The Agency shall maintain records indicating each transfer and, where applicable, the re-application of safeguards to the transferred nuclear material.

PROVISIONS RELATING TO NUCLEAR MATERIAL TO BE USED IN NON-NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES

Article 13

Where nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement is to be used in non-nuclear activities, such as the production of alloys or ceramics, the Community shall agree with the Agency, before the material is so used, on the circumstances under which the safeguards under this Agreement on such material may be terminated.

NON-APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS TO NUCLEAR MATERIAL TO BE USED IN NON-PEACEFUL ACTIVITIES

Article 14

If a State intends to exercise its direction to use nuclear material which is required to be safeguarded under this Agreement in a nuclear activity which does not require the application of safeguards under this Agreement, the following procedures shall apply:

(a) The Community and the State shall inform the Agency of the activity, and the State shall make it clear:

(i) That the use of the nuclear material in a non-prescribed military activity will not be in conflict with an undertaking the State may have given and in respect of which Agency safeguards apply, that the material will be used only in a peaceful nuclear activity ; and

(ii) That during the period of non-application of safeguards under this Agreement the nuclear material will not be used for the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

(b) The Agency and the Community shall make an arrangement so that, only while the nuclear material is in such an activity, the safeguards provided for in this Agreement will not be applied. The arrangement shall identify, to the extent possible, the period or circumstances during which such safeguards will not be applied. In any event, the safeguards provided for in this Agreement shall apply again as soon as the nuclear material is reintroduced into a peaceful nuclear activity. The Agency shall be kept informed of the total quantity and composition of such material in the State or in the States concerned and of any transfer of such material out of that State or those States ; and

(c) Each arrangement shall be made in agreement with the Agency. Such agreement shall be given as promptly as possible and shall relate only to such matters as inter alia temporal and procedural provisions and reporting arrangements, but shall not involve any approval or classified knowledge of the military activity or relate to the use of the nuclear material therein.

FINANCE

Article 15

The Agency, the Community and the States will bear the expenses incurred by each of them in implementing their respective responsibilities under this Agreement. However, if the Community, the States or persons under their jurisdiction, incur extraordinary expenses as a result of a specific request by the Agency, the Agency shall reimburse such expenses provided that it has agreed in advance to do so. In any case, the Agency shall bear the cost of any additional measuring or sampling which Agency inspectors may request.

THIRD PARTY LIABILITY FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE

Article 16

The Community and the States shall ensure that any protection against third party liability in respect of nuclear damage, including any insurance or other financial security which may be available under their laws or regulations shall apply to the Agency and its officials for the purpose of the implementation of this Agreement, in the same way as that protection applies to nationals of the States.

INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

Article 17

Any claim by the Community or a State against the Agency or by the Agency against the Community or a State in respect of any damage resulting from the implementation of safeguards under this Agreement, other than damage arising out of a nuclear incident, shall be settled in accordance with international law.

MEASURES IN RELATION TO VERIFICATION OF NON-DIVERSION

Article 18

If the Board, upon report of the Director General, decides that an action by the Community or a State, in so far as either Party is individually concerned, is essential and urgent in order to ensure verification that nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, the Board may call upon the Community or that State to take the required action without delay, irrespective of whether procedures have been invoked pursuant to Article 22 for the settlement of a dispute.

Article 19

If the Board, upon examination of relevant information reported to it by Director General, finds that the Agency is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded under this Agreement, to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, it may make the reports provided for in Article XII (C) of the Statute and may also take, where applicable, the other measures provided for in that paragraph. In taking such action, the Board shall take account of the degree of assurance provided by the safeguards measures that have been applied and shall offer the Community or the State, in so far as either Party is individually concerned, every reasonable opportunity to furnish the Board with any necessary reassurance.

INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF THE AGREEMENT AND SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

Article 20

At the request of the Agency, the Community or a State, there shall be consultations about any question arising out of the interpretation or application of this Agreement.

Article 21

The Community and the States shall have the right to request that any question arising out of the interpretation or application of this Agreement be considered by the Board. The Board shall invite the Community and the State concerned to participate in the discussion of any such question by the Board.

Article 22

Any dispute arising out of the interpretation or application of this Agreement except a dispute with regard to a finding by the Board under Article 19 or an action taken by the Board pursuant to such a finding, which is not settled by negotiation or another procedure agreed to by the Agency, the Community and the States shall, at the request of any one of them, be submitted to an arbitral tribunal composed of five arbitrators. The Community and the States shall designate two arbitrators and the Agency shall also designate two arbitrators, and the four arbitrators so designated shall elect a fifth, who shall be the chairman.

If, within 30 days of the request for arbitration, the Community and the States, or the Agency have not designated two arbitrators each, the Community or the Agency may request the President of the International Court of Justice to appoint these arbitrators. The same procedure shall apply if, within 30 days of the designation or appointment of the fourth arbitrator, the fifth arbitrator has not been elected.

A majority of the members of the arbitral tribunal shall constitute a quorum, and all decisions shall require the concurrence of at least three arbitrators. The arbitral procedure shall be fixed by the tribunal. The decisions of the tribunal shall be binding on the Agency, the Community and the States concerned.

ACCESSION

Article 23

(a) This Agreement shall come into force for non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty which become Members of the Community, upon:

(i) Notification to the Agency by the State concerned that its procedures with respect to the coming into force of this Agreement have been completed ; and

(ii) Notification to the Agency by the Community that it is in a position to apply its safeguards in respect of that State for the purposes of this Agreement.

(b) Where the State concerned has concluded other agreements with the Agency for the application of Agency safeguards, upon the coming into force of this Agreement for that State, the application of Agency safeguards under such agreements shall be suspended while this Agreement is in force ; provided, however, that the State’s undertaking in those agreements not to use items which are subject thereto in such a way as to further any military purpose shall continue to apply.

AMENDMENT OF THE AGREEMENT

Article 24

(a) The Agency, the Community and the States shall, at the request of any one of them, consult on amendment to this Agreement.

(b) All amendments shall require the agreement of the Agency, the Community and the States.

(c) The Director General shall promptly inform all Member States of the Agency of any amendment to this Agreement.

ENTRY INTO FORCE AND DURATION

Article 25

(a) This Agreement shall enter into force on the date upon which the Agency receives from the Community and the States written notification that their own requirements for entry into force have been met. The Director General shall promptly inform all Member States of the Agency of the entry into force of this Agreement.

(b) This Agreement shall remain in force as long as the States are Parties to the Treaty.

PROTOCOL

Article 26

The Protocol attached to this Agreement shall be an integral part thereof. The term «Agreement» as used in this instrument means the Agreement and the Protocol together.

PART II

INTRODUCTION

Article 27

The purpose of this part of the Agreement is to specify, as required, the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I.

OBJECTIVE OF SAFEGUARDS

Article 28

The objective of the safeguards procedures set forth in this Agreement is the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection.

Article 29

For the purpose of achieving the objective set forth in Article 28, material accountancy shall be used as a safeguards measure of fundamental importance, with containment and surveillance as important complementary measures.

Article 30

The technical conclusion of the Agency’s verification activities shall be a statement, in respect of each material balance area, of the amount of material unaccounted for over a specific period, and giving the limits of accuracy of the amounts stated.

THE COMMUNITY’S SYSTEM OF SAFEGUARDS

Article 31

Pursuant to Article 3, the Agency, in carrying out its verification activities, shall make full use of the Community’s system of safeguards.

Article 32

The Community’s system of accounting for and control of nuclear material under this Agreement shall be based on a structure of material balance areas. The Community, in applying its safeguards, will make use of and, to the extent necessary, make provision for, as appropriate and specified in the subsidiary arrangements such measures as:

(a) A measurement system for the determination of the quantities of nuclear material received, produced, shipped, lost or otherwise removed from inventory, and the quantities on inventory;

(b) The evaluation of precision and accuracy of measurements and the estimation of measurement uncertainty;

(c) Procedures for indentifying, reviewing and evaluating differences in shipper/receiver measurements;

(d) Procedures for taking a physical inventory;

(e) Procedures for the evaluation of accumulations of unmeasured inventory and unmeasured losses;

(f) A system of records and reports showing, for each material balance area, the inventory of nuclear material and the changes in that inventory including receipts into and transfers out of the material balance area;

(g) Provisions to ensure that the accounting procedures and arrangements are being operated correctly ; and

(h) Procedures for the provision of reports to the Agency in accordance with Articles 59 to 65 and 67 to 69.

Article 33

Safeguards under this Agreement shall not apply to material in mining or ore processing activities.

Article 34

(a) When any material containing uranium or thorium which has not reached the stage of the nuclear fuel cycle described in paragraph (c) is directly or indirectly exported to a non-nuclear-weapon State not Party to this Agreement, the Community shall inform the Agency of its quantity, composition and destination, unless the material is exported for specifically non-nuclear purposes.

(b) When any material containing uranium or thorium which has not reached the stage of the nuclear fuel cycle described in paragraph (c) is imported into the States, the Community shall inform the Agency of its quantity and composition, unless the material is imported for specifically non-nuclear purposes.

(c) When any nuclear material of a composition and purity suitable for fuel fabrication or for isotopic enrichment leaves the plant or the process stage in which it has been produced, or when such nuclear material, or any other nuclear material produced at a later stage in the nuclear fuel cycle, is imported into the States, the nuclear material shall become subject to the other safeguards procedures specified in this Agreement.

TERMINATION OF SAFEGUARDS

Article 35

(a) Safeguards under this Agreement shall terminate on nuclear material, under the conditions set forth in Article 11. Where the conditions of that Article are not met, but the Community considers that the recovery of nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement from residues is not for the time being practicable or desirable, the Agency and the Community shall consult on the appropriate safeguards measures to be applied.

(b) Safeguards under this Agreement shall terminate on nuclear material, under the conditions set forth in Article 13, provided that the Agency and the Community agree that such nuclear material is practicably irrecoverable.

EXEMPTIONS FROM SAFEGUARDS

Article 36

At the request of the Community, the Agency shall exempt nuclear material from safeguards under this Agreement, as follows:

(a) Special fissionable material, when it is used in gram quantities or less as a sensing component in instruments;

(b) Nuclear material, when it is used in non-nuclear activities in accordance with Article 13, if such nuclear material is recoverable; and

(c) Plutonium with an isotopic concentration of plutonium-238 exceeding 80%.

Article 37

At the request of the Community the Agency shall exempt from safeguards under this Agreement nuclear material that would otherwise be subject to such safeguards, provided that the total quantity of nuclear material which has been exempted in the Sates in accordance with this Article may not at any time exceed:

(a) One kilogram in total of special fissionable material, which may consist of one or more of the following:

(i) Plutonium;

(ii) Uranium with an enrichment of 0.2 (20%) and above, taken account of by multiplying its weight by its enrichment ; and

(iii) Uranium with an enrichment below 0.2 (20%) and above that of natural uranium, taken account of by multiplying its weight by five times the square of its enrichment;

(b) Ten metric tons in total of natural uranium and depleted uranium with an enrichment above 0.005 (0.5%);

(c) Twenty metric tons of depleted uranium with an enrichment of 0.005 (0.5%) or below; and

(d) Twenty metric tons of thorium;

or such greater amounts as may be specified by the Board for uniform application.

Article 38

If exempted nuclear material is to be processed or stored together with nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement, provision shall be made for the re-application of such safeguards thereto.

SUBSIDIARY ARRANGEMENTS

Article 39

The Community shall make subsidiary arrangements with the Agency which shall specify in detail, to the extent necessary to permit the Agency to fulfil its responsibilities under this Agreement in an effective and efficient manner, how the procedures laid down in this Agreement are to be applied. The subsidiary arrangements may be extended or changed by agreement between the Agency and the Community without amendment of this Agreement.

Article 40

The subsidiary arrangement shall enter into force at the same time as, or as soon as possible after, the entry into force of this Agreement. The Agency, the Community and the States shall make every effort to achieve their entry into force within 90 days of the entry into force of this Agreement; an extension of that period shall require agreement between the Agency, the Community and the States. The Community shall provide the Agency promptly with the information required for completing the subsidiary arrangements. Upon the entry into force of this Agreement, the Agency shall have the right to apply the procedures laid down therein in respect of the nuclear material listed in the inventory provided for in Article 41, even if the subsidiary arrangements have not yet entered into force.

INVENTORY

Article 41

On the basis of the initial report referred to in Article 62, the Agency shall establish a unified inventory of all nuclear material in the States subject to safeguards under this Agreement, irrespective of its origin, and shall maintain this inventory on the basis of subsequent reports and of the results of its verification activities. Copies of the inventory shall be made available to the Community at intervals to be agreed.

DESIGN INFORMATION

General provisions

Article 42

Pursuant to Article 8, design information in respect of existing facilities shall be provided to the Agency by the Community during the discussion of the subsidiary arrangements. The time limits for the provision of design information in respect of the new facilities shall be specified in the subsidiary arrangements and such information shall be provided as early as possible before nuclear material is introduced into a new facility.

Article 43

The design information to be provided to the Agency shall include, in respect of each facility, when applicable:

(a) The identification of the facility, stating its general character, purpose, nominal capacity and geographic location, and the name and address to be used for routine business purposes;

(b) A description of the general arrangement of the facility with reference, to the extent feasible, to the form, location and flow of nuclear material and to the general layout of important items of equipment which use, produce or process nuclear material;

(c) A description of features of the facility relating to material accountancy, containment and surveillance; and

(d) A description of the existing and proposed procedures at the facility for nuclear material accountancy and control, with special reference to material balance areas established by the operator, measurements of flow and procedures for physical inventory-taking.

Article 44

Other information relevant to the application of safeguards under this Agreement shall also be provided to the Agency in respect of each facility, if so specified in the subsidiary arrangements. The Community shall provide the Agency with supplementary information on the health and safety procedures which the Agency shall observe and with which Agency inspectors shall comply at the facility.

Article 45

The Agency shall be provided by the Community with design information in respect of a modification relevant for purposes of safeguards under this Agreement, for examination, and shall be informed of any change in the information provided to it under Article 44, sufficiently in advance for the safeguards procedures to be applied under this Agreement to be adjusted when necessary.

Article 46

Purpose of examination of design information

The design information provided to the Agency shall be used for the following purposes:

(a) To identify the features of facilities and nuclear material relevant to the application of safeguards to nuclear material in sufficient detail to facilitate verification;

(b) To determine material balance areas to be used for accounting purposes under this Agreement and to select those strategic points which are key measurement points and which will be used to determine flow and inventory of nuclear material ; in determining such material balance areas the following criteria shall inter alia be used:

(i) The size of the material balance area shall be related to the accuracy with which the material balance can be established;

(ii) In determining the material balance area advantage shall be taken of any opportunity to use containment and surveillance to help ensure the completeness of flow measurements and thereby to simplify the application of safeguards and to concentrate measurement efforts at key measurement points;

(iii) A special material balance area may be established at the request of the Community or of the State concerned around a process step involving commercially sensitive information;

(c) To establish the nominal timing and procedures for taking of physical inventory of nuclear material for accounting purposes under this Agreement;

(d) To establish the records and reports requirements and records evaluation procedures;

(e) To establish requirements and procedures for verification of the quantity and location of nuclear material; and

(f) To select appropriate combinations of containment and surveillance methods and techniques and the strategic points at which they are to be applied.

The results of the examination of the design information, as agreed upon between the Agency and the Community, shall be included in the subsidiary arrangements.

Article 47

Re-examination of design information

Design information shall be re-examined in the light of changes in operating conditions, of developments in safeguards technology or of the experience in the application of verification procedures, with a view to modifying action taken pursuant to Article 46.

Article 48

Verification of design information

The Agency, in cooperation with the Community and the State concerned, may send inspectors to facilities to verify the design information provided to the Agency pursuant to Articles 42 to 45 for the purposes stated in Article 46.

INFORMATION IN RESPECT OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL OUTSIDE FACILITIES

Article 49

The Agency shall be provided by the Community with the following information when nuclear material is to be customarily used outside facilities, as applicable:

(a) A general description of the use of the nuclear material, its geographic location, and the user’s name and address for routine business purposes; and

(b) A general description of the existing and proposed procedures for nuclear material accountancy and control, as specified in the subsidiary arrangements.

The Agency shall be informed by the Community, on a timely basis, of any change in the information provided to it under this Article.

Article 50

The information provided to the Agency pursuant to Article 49 may be used, to the extent relevant, for the purposes set out in Article 46 (b) to (f).

RECORDS SYSTEM

General provisions

Article 51

The Community shall arrange that records are kept in respect of each material balance area. The records to be kept shall be described in the subsidiary arrangements.

Article 52

The Community shall make arrangements to facilitate the examination of records by Agency inspectors, particularly if the records are not kept in English, French, Russian or Spanish.

Article 53

Records shall be retained for at least five years.

Article 54

Records shall consist, as appropriate, of:

(a) Accounting records of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement ; and

(b) Operating records for facilities containing such nuclear material.

Article 55

The system of measurements on which the records used for the preparation of reports are based shall either conform to the latest international standards or be equivalent in quality to such standards.

Accounting records

Article 56

The accounting records shall set forth the following in respect of each material balance area:

(a) All inventory changes, so as to permit a determination of the book inventory at any time;

(b) All measurement results that are used for determination of the physical inventory; and

(c) All adjustments and corrections that have been made in respect of inventory changes, book inventories and physical inventories.

Article 57

For all inventory changes and physical inventories the records shall show, in respect of each batch of nuclear material: material identification, batch data and source data. The records shall account for uranium, thorium and plutonium separately in each batch of nuclear material. For each inventory change, the date of the inventory change and, when appropriate, the originating material balance area and the receiving material balance area or the recipient, shall be indicated.

Article 58

Operating records

The operating records shall set forth, as appropriate, in respect of each material balance area:

(a) Those operating data which are used to establish changes in the quantities and composition of nuclear material;

(b) The data obtained from the calibration of tanks and instruments and from sampling and analyses, the procedures to control the quality of measurements and the derived estimates of random and systematic error;

(c) A description of the sequence of the actions taken in preparing for, and in taking, a physical inventory, in order to ensure that it is correct and complete ; and

(d) A description of the actions taken in order to ascertain the cause and magnitude of any accidental or unmeasured loss that might occur.

REPORTS SYSTEMS

General provisions

Article 59

The Community shall provide the Agency with reports as detailed in Articles 60 to 65 and 67 to 69 in respect of nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement.

Article 60

Reports shall be made in English, French, Russian or Spanish, except as otherwise specified in the subsidiary arrangements.

Article 61

Reports shall be based on the records kept in accordance with Articles 51 to 58 and shall consist, as appropriate, of accounting reports and special reports.

Accounting reports

Article 62

The Agency shall be provided by the Community with an initial report on all nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement. The initial report shall be dispatched to the Agency within 30 days of the last day of the calendar month in which this Agreement enters into force, and shall reflect the situation as of the last day of that month.

Article 63

The Community shall provide the Agency with the following accounting reports for each material balance area:

(a) Inventory change reports showing all changes in the inventory of nuclear material. The reports shall be dispatched as soon as possible and in any event within the time limits specified in the subsidiary arrangements; and

(b) Material balance reports showing the material balance based on a physical inventory of nuclear material actually present in the material balance area. The reports shall be dispatched as soon as possible and in any event within the time limits specified in the subsidiary arrangements.

The reports shall be based on data available as of the date of reporting and may be corrected at a later date, as required.

Article 64

Inventory change reports shall specify identification and batch data for each batch of nuclear material, the date of the inventory change and, as appropriate, the originating material balance area and the receiving material balance area or the recipient. These reports shall be accompanied by concise notes:

(a) Explaining the inventory changes, on the basis of the operating data contained in the operating records provided for under Article 58 (a) ; and

(b) Describing, as specified in the subsidiary arrangements, the anticipated operational programme, particularly the taking of a physical inventory.

Article 65

The Community shall report each inventory change, adjustment and correction, either periodically in a consolidated list or individually. Inventory changes shall be reported in terms of batches. As specified in the subsidiary arrangements, small changes in inventory of nuclear material, such as transfers of analytical samples, may be combined in one batch and reported as one inventory change.

Article 66

The Agency shall provide the Community, for the use of the interested parties, with semi-annual statements of book inventory of nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement, for each material balance area, as based on the inventory change reports for the period covered by each such statement.

Article 67

Material balance reports shall include the following entries, unless otherwise agreed by the Agency and the Community:

(a) Beginning physical inventory;

(b) Inventory changes (first increases, then decreases);

(c) Ending book inventory;

(d) Shipper/receiver differences;

(e) Adjusted ending book inventory;

(f) Ending physical inventory; and

(g) Material unaccounted for.

A statement of the physical inventory, listing all batches separately and specifying material identification and batch data for each batch, shall be attached to each material balance report.

Article 68

Special reports

The Community shall make special reports without delay:

(a) If any unusual incident or circumstance leads the Community to believe that there is or may have been loss of nuclear material that exceeds the limits specified for this purpose in the subsidiary arrangements; or

(b) If the containment has unexpectedly changed from that specified in the subsidiary arrangements to the extent that unauthorized removal of nuclear material has become possible.

Article 69

Amplification and clarification of reports

If the Agency so requests, the Community shall provide it with amplifications or clarifications of any report, in so far as relevant for the purpose of safeguards under this Agreement.

INSPECTIONS

Article 70

General provisions

The Agency shall have the right to make inspections as provided for in this Agreement.

Purpose of inspections

Article 71

The Agency may make ad hoc inspections in order to:

(a) Verify the information contained in the initial report on the nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement and identify and verify changes in the situation which have occurred between the date of the initial report and the date of the entry into force of the subsidiary arrangements in respect of a given facility; and

(b) Identify, and if possible verify the quantity and composition of, nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement in accordance with Articles 93 and 96, before its transfer out of or upon its transfer into the States except for transfers within the Community.

Article 72

The Agency may make routine inspections in order to:

(a) Verify that reports are consistent with records;

(b) Verify the location, identity, quantity and composition of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement; and

(c) Verify information on the possible causes of material unaccounted for, shipper/receiver differences and uncertainties in the book inventory.

Article 73

Subject to the procedures laid down in Article 77, the Agency may make special inspections:

(a) In order to verify the information contained in special reports; or

(b) If the Agency considers that information made available by the Community, including explanations from the Community and information obtained from routine inspections, is not adequate for the Agency to fulfil its responsibilities under this Agreement.

An inspection shall be deemed to be special when it is either additional to the routine inspection effort provided for in this Agreement or involves access to information or locations in addition to the access specified in Article 76 for ad hoc and routine inspections, or both.

Scope of inspections

Article 74

For the purposes specified in Articles 71 to 73, the Agency may:

(a) Examine the records kept pursuant to Articles 51 to 58;

(b) Make independent measurements of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement;

(c) Verify the functioning and calibration of instruments and other measuring and control equipment;

(d) Apply and make use of surveillance and containment measures; and

(e) Use other objective methods which have been demonstrated to be technically feasible.

Article 75

Within the scope of Article 74, the Agency shall be enabled:

(a) To observe that samples at key measurement points for material balance accountancy are taken in accordance with procedures which produce representative samples, to observe the treatment and analysis of the samples and to obtain duplicates of such samples;

(b) To observe that the measurements of nuclear material at key measurement points for material balance accountancy are representative, and to observe the calibration of the instruments and equipment involved;

(c) To make arrangements with the Community and to the extent necessary with the State concerned that, if necessary:

(i) Additional measurements are made and additional samples taken for the Agency’s use;

(ii) The Agency’s standard analytical samples are analyzed;

(iii) Appropriate absolute standards are used in calibrating instruments and other equipment; and

(iv) Other calibrations are carried out;

(d) To arrange to use its own equipment for independent measurement and surveillance, and if so agreed and specified in the subsidiary arrangements to arrange to install such equipment;

(e) To apply its seals and other identifying and tamper-indicating devices to containments, if so agreed and specified in the subsidiary arrangements; and

(f) To make arrangements with the Community or the State concerned for the shipping of samples taken for the Agency’s use.

Access for inspections

Article 76

(a) For the purposes specified in Article 71 (a) and until such time as the strategic points have been specified in the subsidiary arrangements, the Agency inspectors shall have access to any location where the initial report or any inspections carried out in connection with it indicate that nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement is present.

(b) For the purposes specified in Article 71 (b), the Agency inspectors shall have access to any location of which the Agency has been notified in accordance with Article 92 (d) (iii) or 95 (d) (iii).

(c) For the purposes specified in Article 72, the inspectors shall have access only to the strategic points specified in the subsidiary arrangements and to the records maintained pursuant to Articles 51 to 58.

(d) In the event of the Community concluding that any unusual circumstances require extended limitations on access by the Agency, the Community and the Agency shall promptly make arrangements with a view to enabling the Agency to discharge its safeguards responsibilities in the light of these limitations. The Director General shall report each such arrangement to the Board.

Article 77

In the circumstances which may lead to special inspections for the purposes specified in Article 73, the Community and the Agency shall consult forthwith. As a result of such consultations the Agency may:

(a) Make inspections in addition to the routine inspection effort provided for in this Agreement; and

(b) Obtain access, in agreement with the Community, to information or locations in addition to those specified in Article 76. Any disagreement shall be resolved in accordance with Articles 21 and 22. In case action by the Community or a State, in so far as either Party is individually concerned, is essential and urgent, Article 18 shall apply.

Frequency and intensity of routine inspections

Article 78

The number, intensity and duration of routine inspections, applying optimum timing, shall be kept to the minimum consistent with the effective implementation of the safeguards procedures set forth in this Agreement, and optimum and most economical use of available inspection resources under the Agreement shall be made.

Article 79

The Agency may carry out one routine inspection per year in respect of facilities and material balance areas outside facilities with a content or annual throughput, whichever is greater, of nuclear material not exceeding five effective kilograms.

Article 80

The number, intensity, duration, timing and mode of routine inspections in respect of facilities with a content or annual throughput of nuclear material exceeding five effective kilograms shall be determined on the basis that in the maximum or limiting case the inspection regime shall be no more intensive than is necessary and sufficient to maintain continuity of knowledge of the flow and inventory of nuclear material, and the maximum routine inspection effort in respect of such facilities shall be determined as follows:

(a) For reactors and sealed storage installations the maximum total of routine inspection per year shall be determined by allowing one-sixth of a man-year of inspection for each such facility;

(b) For facilities, other than reactors or sealed storage installations, involving plutonium or uranium enriched to more than 5%, the maximum total of routine inspection per year shall be determined by allowing for each such facility 30 × man-days of inspection per year, where E is the inventory or annual throughput of nuclear material, whichever is greater, expressed in effective kilograms. The maximum established for any such facility shall not, however, be less than 1.5 man-years of inspection; and

(c) For facilities not covered by paragraph (a) or (b), the maximum total of routine inspection per year shall be determined by allowing for each such facility one-third of a man-year of inspection plus 0.4 × E man-days of inspection per year, where E is the inventory or annual throughput of nuclear material, whichever is greater, expressed in effective kilograms.

The Parties to this Agreement may agree to amend the figures for the maximum inspection effort, specified in this Article, upon determination by the Board that such amendment is reasonable.

Article 81

Subject to Articles 78 to 80 the criteria to be used for determining the actual number, intensity, duration, timing and mode of routine inspections in respect of any facility shall include:

(a) The form of the nuclear material, in particular, whether the nuclear material is in bulk form or contained in a number of separate items; its chemical composition and, in the case of uranium, whether it is of low or high enrichment; and its accessibility;

(b) The effectiveness of the Community’s safeguards, including the extent to which the operators of facilities are functionally independent of the Community’s safeguards; the extent to which the measures specified in Article 32 have been implemented by the Community; the promptness of reports provided to the Agency; their consistency with the Agency’s independent verification; and the amount and accuracy of the material unaccounted for, as verified by the Agency;

(c) Characteristics of the nuclear fuel cycle in the States, in particular, the number and types of facilities containing nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement, the characteristics of such facilities relevant to safeguards under this Agreement, notably the degree of containment; the extent to which the design of such facilities facilitates verification of the flow and inventory of nuclear material ; and the extent to which information from different material balance areas can be correlated;

(d) International interdependence, in particular, the extent to which nuclear material is received from or sent to other States for use or processing; any verification activities by the Agency in connection therewith; and the extent to which the nuclear activities in each State are interrelated with those in other States; and

(e) Technical developments in the field of safeguards, including the use of statistical techniques and random sampling in evaluating the flow of nuclear material.

Article 82

The Agency and the Community shall consult if the latter considers that the inspection effort is being deployed with undue concentration on particular facilities.

Notice of inspections

Article 83

The Agency shall give advance notice to the Community and to the States concerned before arrival of Agency inspectors at facilities or material balance areas outside facilities, as follows:

(a) For ad hoc inspections pursuant to Article 71 (b), at least 24 hours; for those pursuant to Article 71 (a), as well as the activities provided for in Article 48, at least one week;

(b) For special inspections pursuant to Article 73, as promptly as possible after the Agency and the Community have consulted as provided for in Article 77, it being understood that notification of arrival normally will constitute part of the consultations; and

(c) For routine inspections pursuant to Article 72, at least 24 hours in respect of the facilities referred to in Article 80 (b) and sealed storage installations containing plutonium or uranium enriched to more than 5%, and one week in all other cases.

Such notice of inspections shall include the names of the Agency inspectors and shall indicate the facilities and the material balance areas outside facilities to be visited and the period during which they will be visited. If the Agency inspectors are to arrive from outside the States, the Agency shall also give advance notice of the place and time of their arrival in the States.

Article 84

Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 83, the Agency may, as a supplementary measure, carry out without advance notification a portion of the routine inspections pursuant to Article 80 in accordance with the principle of random sampling. In performing any unannounced inspections, the Agency shall fully take into account any operational programme provided to it pursuant to Article 64 (b). Moreover, whenever practicable, and on the basis of the operational programme, it shall advise the Community and the State concerned periodically of its general programme of announced and unannounced inspections, specifying the general periods when inspections are foreseen. In carrying out any unannounced inspections, the Agency shall make every effort to minimize any practical difficulties for the Community and the State concerned and for facility operators, bearing in mind the relevant provisions of Articles 44 and 89. Similarly the Community and the State concerned shall make every effort to facilitate the task of Agency inspectors.

Designation of Agency inspectors

Article 85

The following procedures shall apply to the designation of Agency inspectors:

(a) The Director General shall inform the Community and the States in writing of the name, qualifications, nationality, grade and such other particulars as may be relevant, of each Agency official he proposes for designation as an Agency inspector for the States;

(b) The Community shall inform the Director General within 30 days of the receipt of such a proposal whether the proposal is accepted;

(c) The Director General may designate each official who has been accepted by the Community and the States as one of the Agency inspectors for the States, and shall inform the Community and the States of such designations ; and

(d) The Director General, acting in response to a request by the Community or on his own initiative, shall immediately inform the Community and the States of the withdrawal of the designation of any official as an Agency inspector for the States.

However, in respect of Agency inspectors needed for the activities provided for in Article 48 and to carry out ad hoc inspections pursuant to Article 71 (a), the designation procedures shall be completed if possible within 30 days after the entry into force of this Agreement. If such designation appears impossible within this time limit, Agency inspectors for such purposes shall be designated on a temporary basis.

Article 86

The States shall grant or renew as quickly as possible appropriate visas, where required, for each Agency inspector designated pursuant to Article 85.

Conduct and visits of Agency inspectors

Article 87

Agency inspectors, in exercising their functions under Articles 48 and 71 to 75, shall carry out their activities in a manner designed to avoid hampering or delaying the construction, Commissioning or operation of facilities, or affecting their safety. In particular, Agency inspectors shall not operate any facility themselves or direct the staff of a facility to carry out any operation. If Agency inspectors consider that in pursuance of Articles 74 and 75, particular operations in a facility should be carried out by the operator, they shall make a request therefor.

Article 88

When Agency inspectors require services available in a State, including the use of equipment in connection with the performance of inspections, the State concerned and the Community shall facilitate the procurement of such services and the use of such equipment by Agency inspectors.

Article 89

The Community and the States concerned shall have the right to have Agency inspectors accompanied during their inspections by its inspectors and their representatives respectively, provided that Agency inspectors shall not thereby be delayed or otherwise impeded in the exercise of their functions.

STATEMENT ON THE AGENCY’S VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES

Article 90

The Agency shall inform the Community for the use of the interested Parties of:

(a) The results of its inspections, at intervals to be specified in the subsidiary arrangements; and

(b) The conclusions it has drawn from its verification activities.

TRANSFERS INTO OR OUT OF THE STATES

Article 91

General provisions

Nuclear material subject or required to be subject to safeguards under this Agreement which is transferred into or out of the States shall, for purposes of this Agreement, be regarded as being the responsibility of the Community and of the State concerned:

(a) In the case of transfers into the States, from the time that such responsibility ceases to lie with the State from which the material is transferred, and no later than the time at which the material reaches its destination; and

(b) In the case of transfers out of the States up to the time at which the recipient State has such responsibility, and no later than the time at which the nuclear material reaches its destination.

The point at which the transfer of responsibility will take place shall be determined in accordance with suitable arrangements to be made by the Community and the State concerned on the one hand, and the State to which or from which the nuclear material is transferred on the other. Neither the Community nor a State shall be deemed to have such responsibility for nuclear material merely by reason of the fact that the nuclear material is in transit on or over a State’s territory, or that it is being transported on a ship under a State’s flag or in the aircraft of a State.

Transfers out of the States

Article 92

(a) The Community shall notify the Agency of any intended transfer out of the States of nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement if the shipment exceeds one effective kilogram, or, for facilities which normally transfer significant quantities to the same State in shipments each not exceeding one effective kilogram, if so specified in the subsidiary arrangements.

(b) Such notification shall be given to the Agency after the conclusion of the contractual arrangements leading to the transfer and within the time limit specified in the subsidiary Arrangements.

(c) The Agency and the Community may agree on different procedures for advance notification.

(d) The notification shall specify:

(i) The identification and, if possible, the expected quantity and the composition of the nuclear material to be transferred, and the material balance area from which it will come;

(ii) The State for which the nuclear material is destined;

(iii) The dates on and locations at which the nuclear material is to be prepared for shipping;

(iv) The approximate dates of dispatch and arrival of the nuclear material; and

(v) At what point of the transfer the recipient State will assume responsibility for the nuclear material for the purpose of this Agreement, and the probable date on which that point will be reached.

Article 93

The notification referred to in Article 92 shall be such as to enable the Agency to make, if necessary, an ad hoc inspection to identify, and if possible verify, the quantity and composition of the nuclear material before it is transferred out of the States, except for transfers within the Community and, if the Agency so wishes or the Community so requests, to affix seals to the nuclear material when it has been prepared for shipping. However the transfer of the nuclear material shall not be delayed in any way by any action taken or contemplated by the Agency pursuant to such a notification.

Article 94

If nuclear material will not be subject to Agency safeguards in the recipient State the Community shall make arrangements for the Agency to receive within three months of the time when the recipient State accepts responsibility for the nuclear material, confirmation by the recipient State of the transfer.

Transfers into the States

Article 95

(a) The Community shall notify the Agency of any expected transfer into the States of nuclear material required to be subject to safeguards under this Agreement if the shipment exceeds one effective kilogram, or, for facilities to which significant quantities are normally transferred from the same State in shipments each not exceeding one effective kilogram, if so specified in the subsidiary arrangements.

(b) The Agency shall be notified as much in advance as possible of the expected arrival of the nuclear material, and in any case within the time limits specified in the subsidiary arrangements.

(c) The Agency and the Community may agree on different procedures for advance notification.

(d) The notification shall specify:

(i) The identification and, if possible, the expected quantity and composition of the nuclear material;

(ii) At what point of the transfer the Community and the State concerned will have responsibility for the nuclear material for the purpose of this Agreement, and the probable date on which that point will be reached; and

(iii) The expected date of arrival, the location where, and the date on which, the nuclear material is intended to be unpacked.

Article 96

The notification referred to in Article 95 shall be such as to enable the Agency to make, if necessary, an ad hoc inspection to identify, and if possible verify, the quantity and composition of, the nuclear material transferred into the States, except for transfers within the Community, at the time the consignment is unpacked. However, unpacking shall not be delayed by any action taken or contemplated by the Agency pursuant to such a notification.

Article 97

Special reports

The Community shall make a special report as envisaged in Article 68 if any unusual incident or circumstance leads the Community to believe that there is or may have been loss of nuclear material, including the occurrence of significant delay, during a transfer into or out of the States.

DEFINITIONS

Article 98

For the purposes of this Agreement:

1. A. Community means both:

(a) The legal person created by the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), Party to this Agreement; and

(b) The territories to which the Euratom Treaty applies.

B. States means the non-nuclear-weapon States, members of the Community, Party to this Agreement.

2. A. Adjustment means an entry into an accounting record or a report showing a shipper/receiver difference or material unaccounted for.

B. Annual throughput means, for the purposes of Articles 79 and 80, the amount of nuclear material transferred annually out of a facility working at nominal capacity.

C. Batch means a portion of nuclear material handled as a unit for accounting purposes at a key measurement point and for which the composition and quantity are defined by a single set of specifications or measurements. The nuclear material may be in bulk form or contained in a number of separate items.

D. Batch data means the total weight of each element of nuclear material and, in the case of plutonium and uranium, the isotopic composition when appropriate. The units of account shall be as follows:

(a) Grams of contained plutonium;

(b) Grams of total uranium and grams of contained uranium-235 plus uranium-233 for uranium enriched in these isotopes; and

(c) Kilograms of contained thorium, natural uranium or depleted uranium.

For reporting purposes the weights of individual items in the batch shall be added together before rounding to the nearest unit.

E. Book inventory of a material balance area means the algebraic sum of the most recent physical inventory of that material balance area and of all inventory changes that have occurred since that physical inventory was taken.

F. Correction means an entry into an accounting record or a report to rectify an identified mistake or to reflect an improved measurement of a quantity previously entered into the record or report. Each correction must identify the entry to which it pertains.

G. Effective kilogram means a special unit used in safeguarding nuclear material. The quantity in effective kilograms is obtained by taking:

(a) For plutonium, its weight in kilograms;

(b) For uranium with an enrichment of 0.01 (1%) and above, its weight in kilograms multiplied by the square of its enrichment;

(c) For uranium with an enrichment below 0.01 (1%) and above 0.005 (0.5%), its weight in kilograms multiplied by 0.0001; and

(d) For depleted uranium with an enrichment of 0.005 (0.5%) or below, and for thorium, its weight in kilograms multiplied by 0.00005.

H. Enrichment means the ratio of the combined weight of the isotopes uranium-223 and uranium-235 to that of the total uranium in question.

I. Facility means:

(a) A reactor, a critical facility, a conversion plant, a fabrication plant, a reprocessing plant, an isotope separation plant or a separate storage installation; or

(b) Any location where nuclear material in amounts greater than one effective kilogram is customarily used.

J. Inventory change means an increase or decrease, in terms of batches, of nuclear material in a material balance area; such a change shall involve one of the following:

(a) Increases:

(i) Import;

(ii) Domestic receipt: receipts from within the States; from other material balance areas; from a non-safeguarded (non-peaceful) activity; at the starting point of safeguards;

(iii) Nuclear production: production of special fissionable material in a reactor ; and

(iv) De-exemption: reapplication of safeguards on nuclear material previously exempted therefrom on account of its use or quantity.

(b) Decreases:

(i) Export;

(ii) Domestic shipment: shipments within the States to other material balance areas or for a non-safeguarded (non-peaceful) activity;

(iii) Nuclear loss: loss of nuclear material due to its transformation into other element(s) or isotope(s) as a result of nuclear reactions;

(iv) Measured discard: nuclear material which has been measured, or estimated on the basis of measurements, and disposed of in such a way that it is not suitable for further nuclear use;

(v) Retained waste: nuclear material generated from processing or from an operational accident, which is deemed to be unrecoverable for the time being but which is stored;

(vi) Exemption: exemption of nuclear material from safeguards on account of its use or quantity; and

(vii) Other loss: for example, accidental loss (that is, irretrievable and inadvertent loss of nuclear material as the result of an operational accident) or theft.

K. Key measurement point means a location where nuclear material appears in such a form that it may be measured to determine material flow or inventory. Key measurement points thus include, but are not limited to, the inputs and outputs (including measured discards) and storages in material balance areas.

L. Man-year of inspection means, for the purposes of Article 80, 300 man-days of inspection, a man-day being a day during which a single inspector has access to a facility at any time for a total of not more than eight hours.

M. Material balance area means an area in or outside of a facility such that:

(a) The quantity of nuclear material in each transfer into or out of each material balance area can be determined; and

(b) The physical inventory of nuclear material in each material balance area can be determined when necessary in accordance with specified procedures,

in order that the material balance for Agency safeguards purposes can be established.

N. Material unaccounted for means the difference between book inventory and physical inventory.

O. Nuclear material means any source or any special fissionable material as defined in Article XX of the Statute. The term «source material» shall not be interpreted as applying to ore or ore residue. Any determination by the Board under Article XX of the Statute after the entry into force of this Agreement which adds to the materials considered to be source material or special fissionable material shall have effect under this Agreement only upon acceptance by the Community and the States.

P. Physical inventory means the sum of all the measured or derived estimates of batch quantities of nuclear material on hand at a given time within a material balance area, obtained in accordance with specified procedures.

Q. Shipper/receiver difference means the difference between the quantity of nuclear material in a batch as stated by the shipping material balance area and as measured at the receiving material balance area.

R. Source data means those data, recorded during measurement or calibration or used to derive empirical relationships, which identify nuclear material and provide batch data. Source data may include, for example, weight of compounds, conversion factors to determine weight of element, specific gravity, element concentration, isotopic ratios, relationship between volume and manometer readings and relationship between plutonium produced and power generated.

S. Strategic point means a location selected during examination of design information where, under normal conditions and when combined with the information from all strategic points taken together, the information necessary and sufficient for the implementation of safeguards measures is obtained and verified; a strategic point may include any location where key measurements related to material balance accountancy are made and where containment and surveillance measures are executed.

PROTOCOL

Article 1

This Protocol amplifies certain provisions of the Agreement and, in particular, specifies the conditions and means according to which cooperation in the application of the safeguards provided for under the Agreement shall be implemented in such a way as to avoid unnecessary duplication of the Community’s safeguards activities.

Article 2

The Community shall collect the information on facilities and on nuclear material outside facilities to be provided to the Agency under the Agreement on the basis of the agreed indicative questionnaire annexed to the subsidiary arrangements.

Article 3

The Agency and the Community shall carry out jointly the examination of design information provided for in Article 46 (a) to (f) of the Agreement and shall include the agreed results thereof in the subsidiary arrangements. The verification of design information provided for in Article 48 of the Agreement shall be carried out by the Agency in cooperation with the Community.

Article 4

When providing the Agency with the information referred to in Article 2 of this Protocol, the Community shall also transmit information on the inspection methods which it proposes to use and the complete proposals, including estimates of inspection efforts for the routine inspection activities, for attachments to the subsidiary arrangements for facilities and material balance areas outside facilities.

Article 5

The preparation of the attachments to the subsidiary arrangements shall be performed together by the Community and the Agency.

Article 6

The Community shall collect the reports from the operators, keep centralized accounts on the basis of these reports and proceed with the technical and accounting control and analysis of the information received.

Article 7

Upon completion of the tasks referred to in Article 6 of this Protocol the Community shall, on a monthly basis, produce and provide the Agency with the inventory change reports within the time limits specified in the subsidiary arrangements.

Article 8

Further, the Community shall transmit to the Agency the material balance reports and physical inventory listings with frequency depending on the frequency of physical inventory taking as specified in the subsidiary arrangements.

Article 9

The form and format of reports referred to in Articles 7 and 8 of this Protocol, as agreed between the Agency and the Community, shall be specified in the subsidiary arrangements.

Article 10

The routine inspection activities of the Community and of the Agency, including the inspections referred to in Article 84 of the Agreement, for the purposes of the Agreement, shall be coordinated pursuant to the provisions of Articles 11 to 23 of this Protocol.

Article 11

Subject to Articles 79 and 80 of the Agreement, in determining the actual number, intensity, duration, timing and mode of the Agency inspections in respect of each facility, account shall be taken of the inspection effort carried out by the Community in the framework of its multinational system of safeguards pursuant to the provisions of this Protocol.

Article 12

Inspection efforts under the Agreement for each facility shall be determined by the use of the criteria of Article 81 of the Agreement. Such criteria shall be implemented by using the rules and methods set forth in the subsidiary arrangements which have been used for the calculation of the inspection efforts in respect of specific examples attached to the subsidiary arrangements. These rules and methods shall be reviewed from time to time, pursuant to Article 7 of the Agreement, to take into account new technological developments in the field of safeguards and experience gained.

Article 13

Such inspection efforts, expressed as agreed estimates of the actual inspection efforts to be applied, shall be set out in the subsidiary arrangements together with relevant descriptions of verification approaches and scopes of inspections to be carried out by the Community and by the Agency. These inspection efforts shall constitute, under normal operating conditions and under the conditions set out below, the actual maximum inspection efforts at the facility under the Agreement:

(a) The continued validity of the information on Community safeguards provided for in Article 32 of the Agreement, as specified in the subsidiary arrangements;

(b) The continued validity of the information provided to the Agency in accordance with Article 2 of this Protocol;

(c) The continued provision by the Community of the reports pursuant to Articles 60, 61, 63 to 65 and 67 to 69 of the Agreement, as specified in the subsidiary arrangements;

(d) The continued application of the coordination arrangements for inspections pursuant to Articles 10 to 23 of this Protocol, as specified in the subsidiary arrangements; and

(e) The application by the Community of its inspection effort with respect to the facility, as specified in the subsidiary arrangements, pursuant to this Article.

Article 14

(a) Subject to the conditions of Article 13 of this Protocol, the Agency inspections shall be carried out simultaneously with the inspection activities of the Community. Agency inspectors shall be present during the performance of certain of the Community inspections.

(b) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (a), whenever the Agency can achieve the purposes of its routine inspections set out in the Agreement, the Agency inspectors shall implement the provisions of Articles 74 and 75 of the Agreement through the observation of the inspection activities of the Community inspectors, provided, however, that:

(i) With respect to inspection activities of Agency inspectors to be implemented other than through the observation of the inspection activities of the Community inspectors, which can be foreseen, these shall be specified in the subsidiary arrangements; and

(ii) In the course of an inspection, Agency inspectors may carry out inspection activities other than through the observation of the inspection activities of the Community inspectors where they find this to be essential and urgent, if the Agency could not otherwise achieve the purposes of its routine inspections and this was unforeseeable.

Article 15

The general scheduling and planning of the Community inspections under the Agreement shall be established by the Community in cooperation with the Agency.

Article 16

Arrangements for the presence of Agency inspectors during the performance of certain of the Community inspections shall be agreed in advance by the Agency and the Community for each type of facility, and to the extent necessary, for individual facilities.

Article 17

In order to enable the Agency to decide, based on requirements for statistical sampling, as to its presence at a particular Community inspection, the Community shall provide the Agency with an advance statement of the numbers, types and contents of items to be inspected according to the information available to the Community from the operator of the facility.

Article 18

Technical procedures in general for each type of facility and, to the extent necessary, for individual facilities, shall be agreed in advance by the Agency and the Community, in particular, with respect to:

(a) The determination of techniques for random selection of statistical samples; and

(b) The checking and identification of standards.

Article 19

The coordination arrangements for each type of facility set out in the subsidiary arrangements shall serve as a basis for the coordination arrangements to be specified in each facility attachment.

Article 20

The specific coordination actions on matters specified in the facility attachments pursuant to Article 19 of this Protocol shall be taken between Community and Agency officials designated for that purpose.

Article 21

The Community shall transmit to the Agency its working papers for these inspections at which Agency inspectors were present and inspection reports for all other Community inspections performed under the Agreement.

Article 22

The samples of nuclear material for the Agency shall be drawn from the same randomly selected batches of items as for the Community and shall be taken together with Community samples, except when the maintenance of or reduction to the lowest practical level of the Agency inspection effort requires independent sampling by the Agency, as agreed in advance and specified in the subsidiary arrangements.

Article 23

The frequencies of physical inventories to be taken by facility operators and to be verified for safeguards purposes will be in accordance with those laid down as guidelines in the subsidiary arrangements. If additional activities under the Agreement in relation to physical inventories are considered to be essential, they will be discussed in the Liaison Committee provided for in Article 25 of this Protocol and agreed implementation.

Article 24

Whenever the Agency can achieve the purposes of its ad hoc inspections set out in the Agreement through observation of the inspection activities of Community inspectors, it shall do so.

Article 25

(a) With a view to facilitating the application of the Agreement and of this Protocol, a Liaison Committee shall be established, composed of representatives of the Community and of the Agency.

(b) The Committee shall meet at least once a year:

(i) To review, in particular, the performance of the coordination arrangements provided for in this Protocol, including agreed estimates of inspection efforts;

(ii) To examine the development of safeguards methods and techniques; and

(iii) To consider any questions which have been referred to it by the periodic meetings referred to in paragraph (c).

(c) The Committee shall meet periodically at a lower level to discuss, in particular and to the extent necessary, for individual facilities, the operation of the coordination arrangements provided for in this Protocol, including, in the light of technical and operational developments, up-dating of agreed estimates of inspection efforts with respect to changes in throughput, inventory and facility operational programmes, and the application of inspection procedures in different types of routine inspection activities and, in general terms, statistical sampling requirements. Any questions which could not be settled would be referred to the meetings mentioned in paragraph (b).

(d) Without prejudice to urgent actions which might be required under the Agreement, should problems arise in the application of Article 13 of this Protocol, in particular, when the Agency considered that the conditions specified therein had not been met, the Committee would meet as soon as possible at the suitable level in order to assess the situation and to discuss the measures to be taken. If a problem could not be settled, the Committee may make appropriate proposals to the Parties, in particular, with the view to modifying the estimates of inspection efforts for routine inspection activities.

(e) The Committee shall elaborate proposals, as necessary, with respect to questions which require the agreement of the Parties.

DONE at Brussels in duplicate, on the fifth day of April in the year one thousand nine hundred and seventy-three in the English and French languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF BELGIUM

Joseph VAN DER MEULEN,

Ambassador, Permanent Representative to the European Communities

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF DENMARK

Niels ERSBØLL,

Ambassador, Permanent Representative to the European Communities

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Hans-Georg SACHS,

Ambassador, Permanent Representative to the European Communities

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND

Sean P. KENNAN,

Ambassador, Permanent Representative to the European Communities

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ITALIAN REPUBLIC

Giorgio BOMBASSEI FRASCANI de VETTOR,

Ambassador, Permanent Representative to the European Communities

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE GRAND DUCHY OF LUXEMBOURG

Jean DONDELINGER,

Ambassador, Permanent Representative to the European Communities

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS

E. M. J. A. SASSEN,

Ambassador, Permanent Representative to the European Communities

FOR THE EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY

Ralf DAHRENDORF,

Member of the Commission of the European Communities

FOR THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

Sigvard EKLUND,

Director General

PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL

TO THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF AUSTRIA, THE KINGDOM OF BELGIUM, THE KINGDOM OF DENMARK, THE REPUBLIC OF FINLAND, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, THE HELLENIC REPUBLIC, IRELAND, THE ITALIAN REPUBLIC, THE GRAND DUCHY OF LUXEMBOURG, THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS, THE PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC, THE KINGDOM OF SPAIN, THE KINGDOM OF SWEDEN, THE EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY IN IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE III, (1) AND (4) OF THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

PREAMBLE

WHEREAS the Republic of Austria, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Republic of Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Kingdom of Sweden (hereinafter referred to as «the States») and the European Atomic Energy Community (hereinafter referred to as «the Community») are parties to an Agreement between the States, the Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter referred to as the «the Agency») in implementation of Article III(1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (hereinafter referred to as the «Safeguards Agreement»), which entered into force on 21 February 1997;

AWARE of the desire of the international community to further enhance nuclear non-proliferation by strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the Agency’s safeguards system;

RECALLING that the Agency must take into account in the implementation of safeguards the need to avoid hampering the economic and technological development in the Community or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, to respect health, safety, physical protection and other security provisions in force and the rights of individuals, and to take every precaution to protect commercial, technological and industrial secrets as well as other confidential information coming to its knowledge;

WHEREAS the frequency and intensity of activities described in this Protocol shall be kept to the minimum consistent with the objective of strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of Agency safeguards;

NOW THEREFORE the Community, the States and the Agency have agreed as follows:

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE THE PROTOCOL AND THE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT

Article 1

The provisions of the Safeguards Agreement shall apply to this Protocol to the extent that they are relevant to and compatible with the provisions of this Protocol. In case of conflict between the provisions of the Safeguards Agreement and those of this Protocol, the provisions of this Protocol shall apply.

PROVISION OF INFORMATION

Article 2

a. Each State shall provide the Agency with a declaration containing the information identified in sub-paragraphs (i), (ii), (iv), (ix) and (x). The Community shall provide the Agency with a declaration containing the information identified in sub-paragraphs (v), (vi) and (vii). Each State and the Community shall provide the Agency with a declaration containing the information identified in sub-paragraphs (iii) and (viii).

(i) A general description of and information specifying the location of nuclear fuel cycle-related research and development activities not involving nuclear material carried out anywhere that are funded, specifically authorised or controlled by, or carried out on behalf of, the State concerned.

(ii) Information identified by the Agency on the basis of expected gains in effectiveness or efficiency, and agreed to by the State concerned, on operational activities of safeguards relevance at facilities and locations outside facilities where nuclear material is customarily used.

(iii) A general description of each building on each site, including its use and, if not apparent from that description, its contents. The description shall include a map of the site.

(iv) A description of the scale of operations for each location engaged in the activities specified in Annex I to this Protocol.

(v) Information specifying the location, operational status and the estimated annual production capacity of uranium mines and concentration plants and thorium concentration plants in each State, and the current annual production of such mines and concentration plants. The Community shall provide, on request by the Agency, the current annual production of an individual mine or concentration plant. The provision of this information does not require detailed nuclear material accountancy.

(vi) Information regarding source material which has not reached the composition and purity suitable for fuel fabrication or for being isotopically enriched, as follows:

(a) The quantities, the chemical composition, the use or intended use of such material, whether in nuclear or non-nuclear use, for each location in the States at which the material is present in quantities exceeding 10 tonnes of uranium and/or 20 tonnes of thorium, and for other locations with quantities of more than 1 tonne, the aggregate for the States as a whole if the aggregate exceeds 10 tonnes of uranium or 20 tonnes of thorium. The provision of this information does not require detailed nuclear material accountancy;

(b) The quantities, the chemical composition and the destination of each export from the States to a State outside the Community, of such material for specifically non-nuclear purposes in quantities exceeding:

1) Ten metric tons of uranium, or for successive exports of uranium to the same state, each of less than ten metric tons, but exceeding a total of ten metric tons for the year;

2) Twenty metric tons of thorium, or for successive exports of thorium to the same State, each of less than twenty metric tons, but exceeding a total twenty metric tons for the year;

(c) The quantities, chemical composition, current location and use or intended use of each import into the Sates from outside the Community of such material for specifically non-nuclear purposes in quantities exceeding:

1) Ten metric tons of uranium, or for successive imports of uranium each of less than ten metric tons, but exceeding a total of ten metric tons for the year;

2) Twenty metric tons of thorium, or for successive imports of thorium each of less than twenty metric tons, but exceeding a total of twenty metric tons for the year;

it being understood that there is no requirement to provide information on such material intended for a non-nuclear use once it is in its non-nuclear end-use form.

(vii) (a) Information regarding the quantities, uses and locations of nuclear material exempted from safeguards pursuant to Article 37 of the Safeguards Agreement;

(b) Information regarding the quantities (which may be in the form of estimates) and uses at each location, of nuclear material exempted from safeguards pursuant to Article 36(b) of the Safeguards Agreement but not yet in a non-nuclear end-use form, in quantities exceeding those set out in Article 37 of the Safeguards Agreement. The provision of this information does not require detailed nuclear material accountancy.

(viii) Information regarding the location or further processing of intermediate or high-level waste containing plutonium, high enriched uranium or uranium-233 on which safeguards have been terminated pursuant to Article 11 of the Safeguards Agreement. For the purpose of this paragraph, «further processing» does not include repackaging of the waste or its further conditioning not involving the separation of elements, for storage or disposal.

(ix) The following information regarding specified equipment and non-nuclear material listed in Annex II:

(a) For each export out of the Community of such equipment and material: the identity, quantity, location of intended use in the receiving State and date or, as appropriate, expected date, of export;

(b) Upon specific request by the Agency, confirmation by the importing State of information provided to the Agency by a State outside of the Community concerning the export of such equipment and material to the importing State.

(x) General plans for the succeeding 10-year period relevant to the development of the nuclear fuel cycle (including planned nuclear fuel cycle-related research and development activities) when approved by the appropriate authorities in the State.

b. Each State shall make every reasonable effort to provide the Agency with the following information:

(i) A general description of and information specifying the location of nuclear fuel cycle-related research and development activities not involving nuclear material which are specifically related to enrichment, reprocessing of nuclear fuel or the processing of intermediate or high-level waste containing plutonium, high enriched uranium or uranium-233 that are carried out anywhere in the State concerned but which are not funded, specifically authorised or controlled by, or carried out on behalf of, that State. For the purpose of this paragraph «processing» of intermediate or high-level waste does not include repackaging of the waste or its conditioning not involving the separation of elements, for storage or disposal.

(ii) A general description of activities and the identity of the person or entity carrying out such activities, at locations identified by the Agency outside a site which the Agency considers might be functionally related to the activities of that site. The provision of this information is subject to a specific request by the Agency. It shall be provided in consultation with the Agency and in a timely fashion.

c. Upon request by the Agency, a State or the Community, or both, as appropriate, shall provide amplifications or clarifications of any information provided under this Article, in so far as relevant for the purpose of safeguards.

Article 3

a. Each State or the Community, or both, as appropriate, shall provide to the Agency the information identified in Article 2.a.(i), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi)(a), (vii), and (x) and Article 2.b.(i) within 180 days of the entry into force of this Protocol.

b. Each State or the Community, or both, as appropriate, shall provide to the Agency, by 15 May of each year, updates of the information referred to in paragraph a. for the period covering the previous calendar year. If there has been no change to the information previously provided, each State or the Community, or both, as appropriate, shall so indicate.

c. The Community shall provide to the Agency, by 15 May of each year, the information identified in Article 2.a.(vi)(b) and (c) for the period covering the previous calendar year.

d. Each State shall provide to the Agency on a quarterly basis the information identified in Article 2.a.(ix)(a). This information shall be provided within 60 days of the end of each quarter.

e. The Community and each State shall provide to the Agency the information identified in Article 2.a.(viii) 180 days before further processing is carried out and, by 15 May of each year, information on changes in location for the period covering the previous calendar year.

f. Each State and the Agency shall agree on the timing and frequency of the provision of the information identified in Article 2.a.(ii).

g. Each State shall provide to the Agency the information in Article 2.a.(ix)(b) within 60 days of the Agency’s request.

COMPLEMENTARY ACCESS

Article 4

The following shall apply in connection with the implementation of complementary access under Article 5 of this Protocol:

a. The Agency shall not mechanistically or systematically seek to verify the information referred to in Article 2; however, the Agency shall have access to:

(i) Any location referred to in Article 5.a.(i) or (ii) on a selective basis in order to assure the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities;

(ii) Any location referred to in Article 5.b. or c. to resolve a question relating to the correctness and completeness of the information provided pursuant to Article 2 or to resolve an inconsistency relating to that information;

(iii) Any location referred to in Article 5.a.(iii) to the extent necessary for the Agency to confirm, for safeguards purposes, the Community’s, or, as appropriate, a State’s declaration of the decommissioned status of a facility or location outside facilities where nuclear material was customarily used.

b. (i) Except as provided in paragraph (ii), the Agency shall give the State concerned, or for access under Article 5.a. or under Article 5.c. where nuclear material is involved, the State concerned and the Community, advance notice of access of at least 24 hours.

(ii) For access to any place on a site that is sought in conjunction with design information verification visits or ad hoc or routine inspections on that site, the period of advance notice shall, if the Agency so requests, be at least two hours but, in exceptional circumstances, it may be less than two hours.

c. Advance notice shall be in writing and shall specify the reasons for access and the activities to be carried out during such access.

d. In the case of a question or inconsistency, the Agency shall provide the State concerned and, as appropriate, the Community with an opportunity to clarify and facilitate the resolution of the question or inconsistency. Such an opportunity will be provided before a request for access, unless the Agency considers that delay in access would prejudice the purpose for which the access is sought. In any event, the Agency shall not draw any conclusions about the question or inconsistency until the State concerned and, as appropriate, the Community have been provided with such an opportunity.

e. Unless otherwise agreed to by the State concerned, access shall only take place during regular working hours.

f. The State concerned, or for access under Article 5.a. or under Article 5.c. where nuclear material is involved, the State concerned and the Community, shall have the right to have agency inspectors accompanied during their access by its representatives and, as appropriate, by Community inspectors provided that Agency inspectors shall not thereby be delayed or otherwise impeded in the exercise of their functions.

Article 5

Each State shall provide the Agency with access to:

a. (i) Any place on a site;

(ii) Any location identified under Article 2.a.(v) to (viii);

(iii) Any decommissioned facility or decommissioned location outside facilities where nuclear material was customarily used.

b. Any location identified by the State concerned under Article 2.a.(i), Article 2.a.(iv), Article 2.a.(ix)(b) or Article 2.b., other than those referred to in paragraph a.(i), provided that if the State concerned is unable to provide such access, that State shall make every reasonable effort to satisfy Agency requirements, without delay, through other means.

c. Any location specified by the Agency, other than locations referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b), to carry out location-specific environmental sampling, provided that if the State concerned is unable to provide such access, that State shall make every reasonable effort to satisfy Agency requirements, without delay, at adjacent locations or through other means.

Article 6

When implementing Article 5, the Agency may carry out the following activities:

a. For access in accordance with Article 5.a.(i) or (iii): visual observation; collection of environmental samples; utilisation of radiation detection and measurement devices; application of seals and other identifying and tamper indicating devices specified in Subsidiary Arrangements; and other objective measures which have been demonstrated to be technically feasible and the use of which has been agreed by the Board of Governors (hereinafter referred to as «the Board») and following consultations between the Agency, the Community and the State concerned.

b. For access in accordance with Article 5.a.(ii): visual observation; item counting of nuclear material; non-destructive measurements and sampling; utilisation of radiation detection and measurement devices; examination of records relevant to the quantities, origin and disposition of the material; collection of environmental samples; and other objective measures which have been demonstrated to be technically feasible and the use of which has been agreed by the Board and following consultations between the Agency, the Community and the State concerned.

c. For access in accordance with Article 5.b.: visual observation; collection of environmental samples; utilisation of radiation detection and measurement devices; examination of safeguards relevant production and shipping records; and other objective measures which have been demonstrated to be technically feasible and the use of which has been agreed by the Board and following consultations between the Agency and the State concerned.

d. For access in accordance with Article 5.c., collection of environmental samples and, in the event the results do not resolve the question or inconsistency at the location specified by the Agency pursuant to Article 5.c., utilisation at that location of visual observation, radiation detection and measurement devices, and, as agreed by the State concerned and, where nuclear material is involved, the Community, and the Agency, other objective measures.

Article 7

a. Upon request by a State, the Agency and that State shall make arrangements for managed access under this Protocol in order to prevent the dissemination of proliferation sensitive information, to meet safety or physical protection requirements, or to protect proprietary or commercially sensitive information. Such arrangements shall not preclude the Agency from conducting activities necessary to provide credible assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities at the location in question, including the resolution of a question relating to the correctness and completeness of the information referred to in Article 2 or of an inconsistency relating to that information.

b. A State may, when providing the information referred to in Article 2, inform the Agency of the places at a site or location at which managed access may be applicable.

c. Pending the entry into force of any necessary Subsidiary Arrangements, a State may have recourse to managed access consistent with the provisions of paragraph (a).

Article 8

Nothing in this Protocol shall preclude a State from offering the Agency access to locations in addition to those referred to in Articles 5 and 9 or from requesting the Agency to conduct verification activities at a particular location. The Agency shall, without delay, make every reasonable effort to act on such a request.

Article 9

Each State shall provide the Agency with access to locations specified by the Agency to carry out wide-area environmental sampling, provided that if a State is unable to provide such access that State shall make every reasonable effort to satisfy Agency requirements at alternative locations. The Agency shall not seek such access until the use of wide-area environmental sampling and the procedural arrangements therefor have been approved by the Board and following consultations between the Agency and the State concerned.

Article 10

a. The Agency shall inform the State concerned and, as appropriate, the Community of:

(i) The activities carried out under this Protocol, including those in respect of any questions or inconsistencies the Agency had brought to the attention of the State concerned and, as appropriate, the Community within 60 days of the activities being carried out by the Agency.

(ii) The results of activities in respect of any questions or inconsistencies the Agency had brought to the attention of the State concerned and, as appropriate, the Community as soon as possible but in any case within 30 days of the results being established by the Agency.

b. The Agency shall inform the State concerned and the Community of the conclusions it has drawn from its activities under this Protocol. The conclusions shall be provided annually.

DESIGNATION OF AGENCY INSPECTORS

Article 11

a. (i) The Director General shall notify the Community and the States of the Board’s approval of any Agency official as a safeguards inspector. Unless the Community advises the Director General of the rejection of such an official as an inspector for the States within three months of receipt of notification of the Board’s approval, the inspector so notified to the Community and the States shall be considered designated to the States.

(ii) The Director General, acting in response to a request by the Community or on his own initiative, shall immediately inform the Community and the States of the withdrawal of the designation of any official as an inspector for the States.

b. A notification referred to in paragraph a. shall be deemed to be received by the Community and the States seven days after the date of the transmission by registered post of the notification by the Agency to the Community and the States.

VISAS

Article 12

Each State shall, within one month of the receipt of a request therefor, provide the designated inspector specified in the request with appropriate multiple entry/exit and/or transit visas, where required, to enable the inspector to enter and remain on the territory of the State concerned for the purpose of carrying out his/her functions. Any visas required shall be valid for at least one year and shall be renewed, as required, to cover the duration of the inspector’s designation to the States.

SUBSIDIARY ARRANGEMENTS

Article 13

a. Where a State or the Community, as appropriate, or the Agency indicate that it is necessary to specify in subsidiary Arrangements how measures laid down in this Protocol are to be applied, that State, or that State and the Community and the Agency shall agree on such Subsidiary Arrangements within 90 days of the entry into force of this Protocol or, where the indication of the need for such Subsidiary Arrangements is made after the entry into force of this Protocol, within 90 days of the date of such indication.

b. Pending the entry into force of any necessary Subsidiary Arrangements, the Agency shall be entitled to apply the measures laid down in this Protocol.

COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS

Article 14

a. Each State shall permit and protect free communications by the Agency for official purposes between Agency inspectors in that State and Agency Headquarters and/or Regional Offices, including attended and unattended transmission of information generated by Agency containment and/or surveillance or measurement devices. The Agency shall have, in consultation with the State concerned, the right to make use of internationally established systems of direct communications, including satellite systems and other forms of telecommunication, not in use in that State. At the request of a State, or the Agency, details of the implementation of this paragraph in that State with respect to the attended or unattended transmission of information generated by Agency containment and/or surveillance or measurement devices shall be specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements.

b. Communication and transmission of information as provided for in paragraph a. shall take due account of the need to protect proprietary or commercially sensitive information or design information which the State concerned regards as being of particular sensitivity.

PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION

Article 15

a. The Agency shall maintain a stringent regime to ensure effective protection against disclosure of commercial, technological and industrial secrets and other confidential information coming to its knowledge, including such information coming to the Agency’s knowledge in the implementation of this Protocol.

b. The regime referred to in paragraph a. shall include, among others, provisions relating to:

(i) General principles and associated measures for the handling of confidential information;

(ii) Conditions of staff employment relating to the protection of confidential information;

(iii) Procedures in cases of breaches or alleged breaches of confidentiality.

c. The regime referred to in paragraph a. above shall be approved and periodically reviewed by the Board.

ANNEXES

Article 16

a. The Annexes to this Protocol shall be an integral part thereof. Except for the purposes of amendment of Annexes I and II, the term «Protocol» as used in this instrument means this Protocol and the Annexes together.

b. The list of activities specified in Annex I, and the list of equipment and material specified in Annex II, may be amended by the Board on the advice of an open-ended working group of experts established by the Board. any such amendment shall take effect four months after its adoption by the Board.

c. Annex III to this Protocol specifies how measures in this Protocol shall be implemented by the Community and the States.

ENTRY INTO FORCE

Article 17

a. This Protocol shall enter into force on the day on which the Agency receives from the Community and the States written notification that their respective requirements for entry into force have been met.

b. The States and the Community may, at any date before this Protocol enters into force, declare that they will apply this Protocol provisionally.

c. The Director General shall promptly inform all Member States of the Agency of any declaration of provisional application of, and of the entry into force of, this Protocol.

DEFINITIONS

Article 18

For the purpose of this Protocol:

a. Nuclear fuel cycle-related research and development activities means those activities which are specifically related to any process or system development aspect of any of the following:

– conversion of nuclear material,

– enrichment of nuclear material,

– nuclear fuel fabrication,

– reactors,

– critical facilities,

– reprocessing of nuclear fuel,

– processing (not including repackaging or conditioning not involving the separation of elements, for storage or disposal) of intermediate or high-level waste containing plutonium, high enriched uranium or uranium-233,

but do not include activities related to theoretical or basic scientific research or to research and development on industrial radioisotope applications, medical, hydrological and agricultural applications, health and environmental effects and improved maintenance.

b. Site means that area delimited by the Community and a State in the relevant design information for a facility, including a closed-down facility, and in the relevant information on a location outside facilities where nuclear material is customarily used, including a closed-down location outside facilities where nuclear material was customarily used (this is limited to locations with hot cells or where activities related to conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication or reprocessing were carried out). «Site» shall also include all installations, colocated with the facility or location, for the provision or use of essential services, including: hot cells for processing irradiated materials not containing nuclear material; installations for the treatment, storage and disposal of waste; and buildings associated with specified activities identified by the State concerned under Article 2.a.(iv).

c. Decommissioned facility or «decommissioned location outside facilities» means an installation or location at which residual structures and equipment essential for its use have been removed or rendered inoperable so that it is not used to store and can no longer be used to handle, process or utilise nuclear material.

d. Closed-down facility or «closed-down location outside facilities» means an installation or location where operations have been stopped and the nuclear material removed but which has not been decommissioned.

e. High enriched uranium means uranium containing 20% or more of the isotope uranium-235.

f. Location-specific environmental sampling means the collection of environmental samples (e. g. air, water, vegetation, soil, smears) at, and in the immediate vicinity of, a location specified by the Agency for the purpose of assisting the Agency to draw conclusions about the absence of undeclared nuclear material or nuclear activities at the specified location.

g. Wide-area environmental sampling means the collection of environmental samples (e. g. air, water, vegetation, soil, smears) at a set of locations specified by the Agency for the purpose of assisting the Agency to draw conclusions about the absence of undeclared nuclear material or nuclear activities over a wide area.

h. Nuclear material means any source or any special fissionable material as defined in Article XX of the Statute. The term source material shall not be interpreted as applying to ore or ore residue. Any determination by the Board under Article XX of the Statute of the Agency after the entry into force of this Protocol which adds to the materials considered to be source material or special fissionable material shall have effect under this Protocol only on acceptance by the Community and the States.

i. Facility means:

(i) A reactor, a critical facility, a conversion plant, a fabrication plant, a reprocessing plant, an isotope separation plant or a separate storage installation, or

(ii) Any location where nuclear material in amounts greater than one effective kilogram is customarily used.

j. Location outside facilities means any installation or location, which is not a facility, where nuclear material is customarily used in amounts of one effective kilogram or less.

DONE at Vienna in duplicate, on the twenty second day of September 1998 in the Danish, Dutch, English, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish and Swedish languages, the texts of which are equally authentic except that, in case of divergence, those texts concluded in the official languages of the IAEA Board of Governors shall prevail.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF BELGIUM

Mireille CLAEYS

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF DENMARK

Henrik WØHLK

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Karl BORCHARD Helmut STAHL

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE HELLENIC REPUBLIC

Emmanuel FRAGOULIS

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF SPAIN

D. Antonio ORTIZ GARCÍA

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND

Thelma M. DORAN

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ITALIAN REPUBLIC

Vincenzo MANNO

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE GRAND DUCHY OF LUXEMBOURG

Georges SANTER

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS

Hans A.F.M. FÖRSTER

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF AUSTRIA

Irene FREUDENSCHUSS-REICHL

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC

Álvaro José Costa DE MENDONÇA E MOURA

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF FINLAND

Eva-Christina MÄKELÄINEN

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF SWEDEN

Björn SKALA

FOR THE EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY

Lars-Erik LUNDIN

FOR THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

Mohamed ElBARADEI

ANNEX I

LIST OF ACTIVITIES REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 2.a.(iv) OF THE PROTOCOL

(i) The manufacture of centrifuge rotor tubes or the assembly of gas centrifuges.

Centrifuge rotor tubes means thin-walled cylinders as described at point 5.1.1(b) of Annex II.

Gas centrifuges means centrifuges as described in the introductory note to point 5.1 of Annex II.

(ii) The manufacture of diffusion barriers.

Diffusion barriers means thin, porous filters as described in point 5.3.1(a) of Annex II.

(iii) The manufacture or assembly of laser-based systems.

Laser-based systems means systems incorporating those items as described in point 5.7 of Annex II.

(iv) The manufacture or assembly of electromagnetic isotope separators.

Electromagnetic isotope separators means those items referred to in point 5.9.1 of Annex II containing ion sources as described in 5.9.1(a) of Annex II.

(v) The manufacture or assembly of columns or extraction equipment.

Columns or extraction equipment means those items as described in points 5.6.1, 5.6.2, 5.6.3, 5.6.5, 5.6.6, 5.6.7 and 5.6.8 of Annex II.

(vi) The manufacture of aerodynamic separation nozzles or vortex tubes.

Aerodynamic separation nozzles or vortex tubes means separation nozzles and vortex tubes as described respectively in points 5.5.1 and 5.5.2 of Annex II.

(vii) The manufacture or assembly of uranium plasma generation systems.

Uranium plasma generation systems means systems for the generation of uranium plasma as described in point 5.8.3 of Annex II.

(viii) The manufacture of zirconium tubes.

Zirconium tubes means tubes as described in point 1.6 of Annex II.

(ix) The manufacture or upgrading of heavy water or deuterium.

Heavy water or deuterium means deuterium, heavy water (deuterium oxide) and any other deuterium compound in which the ratio of deuterium to hydrogen atoms exceeds 1:5 000.

(x) The manufacture of nuclear grade graphite.

Nuclear grade graphite means graphite having a purity level better than five parts per million boron equivalent and with a density greater than 1,50 g/cm3.

(xi) The manufacture of flasks for irradiated fuel.

A flask or irradiated fuel means a vessel for the transportation and/or storage of irradiated fuel which provides chemical, thermal and radiological protection, and dissipated decay heat during handling, transportation and storage.

(xii) The manufacture of reactor control rods.

Reactor control rods means rods as described in point 1.4 of Annex II.

(xiii) The manufacture of criticality safe tanks and vessels.

Criticality safe tanks and vessels means those items as described in points 3.2 and 3.4 of Annex II.

(xiv) The manufacture of irradiated fuel element chopping machines.

Irradiated fuel element chopping machines means equipment as described in point 3.1 of Annex II.

(xv) The construction of hot cells.

Hot cells means a cell or interconnected cells totalling at least 6 m3 in volume with shielding equal to or greater than the equivalent of 0,5 m of concrete, with a density of 3,2 g/cm3 or greater, outfitted with equipment for remote operations.

ANNEX II

LIST OF SPECIFIED EQUIPMENT AND NON-NUCLEAR MATERIAL FOR THE REPORTING OF EXPORTS AND IMPORTS ACCORDING TO ARTICLE 2.a.(ix)

1. REACTORS AND EQUIPMENT THEREFOR

1.1. Complete nuclear reactors

Nuclear reactors capable of operation so as to maintain a controlled self-sustaining fission chain reaction, excluding zero energy reactors, the latter being defined as reactors with a designed maximum rate of production of plutonium not exceeding 100 grams per year.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

A «nuclear reactor» basically includes the items within or attached directly to the reactor vessel, the equipment which controls the level of power in the core, and the components which normally contain or come in direct contact with or control the primary coolant of the reactor core.

It is not intended to exclude reactors which could reasonably be capable of modification to produce significantly more than 100 grams of plutonium per year. Reactors designed for sustained operation at significant power levels, regardless of their capacity for plutonium production, are not considered as «zero energy reactors».

1.2. Reactor pressure vessels

Metal vessels, as complete units or as major shop-fabricated parts therefor, which are especially designed or prepared to contain the core of a nuclear reactor as defined in paragraph 1.1 and are capable of withstanding the operating pressure of the primary coolant.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

A top plate for a reactor pressure vessel is covered by item 1.2 as a major shop-fabricated part of a pressure vessel.

Reactor internals (e.g. support columns and plates for the core and other vessel internals, control rod guide tubes, thermal shields, baffles, core grid plates, diffuser plates, etc.) are normally supplied by the reactor supplier. In some cases, certain internal support components are included in the fabrication of the pressure vessel. These items are sufficiently critical to the safety and reliability of the operation of the reactor (and, therefore, to the guarantees and liability of the reactor supplier), so that their supply, outside the basic supply arrangement for the reactor itself, would not be common practice. Therefore, although the separate supply of these unique, especially designed and prepared, critical, large and expensive items would not necessarily be considered as falling outside the area of concern, such a mode of supply is considered unlikely.

1.3. Reactor fuel charging and discharging machines

Manipulative equipment especially designed or prepared for inserting or removing fuel in a nuclear reactor as defined in paragraph 1.1 capable of on-load operation or employing technically sophisticated positioning or alignment features to allow complex off-load fuelling operations such as those in which direct viewing of or access to the fuel is not normally available.

1.4. Reactor control rods

Rods especially designed or prepared for the control of the reaction rate in a nuclear reactor as defined in paragraph 1.1.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

This item includes, in addition to the neutron absorbing part, the support or suspension structures therefor is supplied separately.

1.5. Reactor pressure tubes

Tubes which are especially designed or prepared to contain fuel elements and the primary coolant in a reactor as defined in paragraph 1.1 at an operating pressure in excess of 5,1 MPa (740 psi).

1.6. Zirconium tubes

Zirconium metal and alloys in the form of tubes or assemblies of tubes, and in quantities exceeding 500 kg in any period of 12 months, especially designed or prepared for use in a reactor as defined in paragraph 1.1, and in which the relation of hafnium to zirconium is less than 1:500 parts by weight.

1.7. Primary coolant pumps

Pumps especially designed or prepared for circulating the primary coolant for nuclear reactors as defined in paragraph 1.1.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

Especially designed or prepared pumps may include elaborate sealed or multisealed systems to prevent leakage of primary coolant, canned-driven pumps, and pumps with inertial mass systems. This definition encompasses pumps certified to NC-1 or equivalent standards.

2. NON-NUCLEAR MATERIALS FOR REACTORS

2.1. Deuterium and heavy water

Deuterium, heavy water (deuterium oxide) and any other deuterium compound in which the ratio of deuterium to hydrogen atoms exceeds 1:5000 for use in a nuclear reactor as defined in paragraph 1.1 in quantities exceeding 200 kg of deuterium atoms for any one recipient country in any period of 12 months.

2.2. Nuclear grade graphite

Graphite having a purity level better than 5 parts per million boron equivalent and with a density greater than 1,50 g/cm3 for use in a nuclear reactor as defined in paragraph 1.1 in quantities exceeding 3 x 104 kg (30 metric tons) for any one recipient country in any period of 12 months.

NOTE

For the purpose of reporting, the government will determine whether or not the exports of graphite meeting the above specifications are for nuclear reactor use.

3. PLANTS FOR THE REPROCESSING OF IRRADIATED FUEL ELEMENTS, AND EQUIPMENT ESPECIALLY DESIGNED OR PREPARED THEREFOR

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

Reprocessing irradiated nuclear fuel separates plutonium and uranium from intensely radioactive fission products and other transuranic elements. Different technical processes can accomplish this separation. However, over the years purex has become the most commonly used and accepted process. Purex involves the dissolution of irradiated nuclear fuel in nitric acid, followed by separation of the uranium, plutonium, and fission products by solvent extraction using a mixture of tributyl phosphate in an organic diluent.

Purex facilities have process functions similar to each other, including: irradiated fuel element chopping, fuel dissolution, solvent extraction, and process liquor storage. There may also be equipment for thermal denitration of uranium nitrate, conversion of plutonium nitrate to oxide or metal, and treatment of fission product waste liquor to a form suitable for long term storage or disposal. However, the specific type and configuration of the equipment performing these functions may differ between purex facilities for several reasons, including the type and quantity of irradiated nuclear fuel to be reprocessed and the intended disposition of the recovered materials, and the safety and maintenance philosophy incorporated into the design of the facility.

A «plant for the reprocessing of irradiated fuel elements» included the equipment and components which normally come in direct contact with and directly control the irradiated fuel and the major nuclear material and fission product processing streams.

These processes, including the complete systems for plutonium conversion and plutonium metal production, may be identified by the measures taken to avoid criticality (e.g. by geometry), radiation exposure (e.g. by shielding), and toxicity hazards (e.g. by containment).

Items of equipment that are considered to fall within the meaning of the phrase «and equipment especially designed or prepared» for the reprocessing of irradiated fuel elements include:

3.1. Irradiated fuel element chopping machines

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

This equipment breaches the cladding of the fuel to expose the irradiated nuclear material to dissolution. Especially designed metal cutting shears are the most commonly employed, although advanced equipment, such as lasers, may be used.

Remotely operated equipment especially designed or prepared for use in a reprocessing plant as identified above and intended to cut, chop or shear irradiated nuclear fuel assemblies, bundles or rods.

3.2. Dissolvers

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

Dissolvers normally receive the chopped-up spent fuel. In these critically safe vessels, the irradiated nuclear material is dissolved in nitric acid and the remaining hulls removed from the process stream.

Critically safe tanks (e.g. small diameter, annular or slab tanks) especially designed or prepared for use in a reprocessing plant as identified above, intended for dissolution of irradiated nuclear fuel and which are capable of withstanding hot, highly corrosive liquid, and which can be remotely loaded and maintained.

3.3. Solvent extractors and solvent extraction equipment

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

Solvent extractors both receive the solution of irradiated fuel from the dissolvers and the organic solution which separates the uranium, plutonium, and fission products. Solvent extraction equipment is normally designed to meet strict operating parameters, such as long operating lifetimes with no maintenance requirements or adaptability to easy replacement, simplicity of operation and control, and flexibility for variations in process conditions.

Especially designed or prepared solvent extractors such as packed or pulse columns, mixer settlers or centrifugal contactors for use in a plant for the reprocessing of irradiated fuel. Solvent extractors must be resistant to the corrosive effect of nitric acid. Solvent extractors are normally fabricated to extremely high standards (including special welding and inspection and quality assurance and quality control techniques) out of low carbon stainless steels, titanium, zirconium, or other high quality materials.

3.4. Chemical holding or storage vessels

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

Three main process liquor streams result from the solvent extraction step. Holding or storage vessels are used in the further processing of all three streams, as follows:

(a) The pure uranium nitrate solution is concentrated by evaporation and passed to a denitration process where it is converted to uranium oxide. This oxide is reused in the nuclear fuel cycle;

(b) The intensely radioactive fission products solution is normally concentrated by evaporation and stored as a liquor concentrate. This concentrate may be subsequently evaporated and converted to a form suitable for storage or disposal;

(c) The pure plutonium nitrate solution is concentrated and stored pending its transfer to further process steps. In particular, holding or storage vessels for plutonium solutions are designed to avoid criticality problems resulting from changes in concentration and form of this stream.

Especially designed or prepared holding or storage vessels for use in a plant for the reprocessing of irradiated fuel. The holding or storage vessels must be resistant to the corrosive effect of nitric acid. The holding or storage vessels are normally fabricated of materials such as low carbon stainless steels, titanium or zirconium, or other high quality materials. Holding or storage vessels may be designed for remote operation and maintenance and may have the following features for control of nuclear criticality:

1) walls or internal structures with a boron equivalent of at least 2%, or

2) a maximum diameter of 175 mm (7 in) for cylindrical vessels, or

3) a maximum width of 75 mm (3 in) for either a slab or annular vessel.

3.5. Plutonium nitrate to oxide conversion system

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

In most reprocessing facilities, this final process involves the conversion of the plutonium nitrate solution to plutonium dioxide. The main functions involved in this process are: process feed storage and adjustment, precipitation and solid/liquor separation, calcination, product handling, ventilation, waste management, and process control.

Complete systems especially designed or prepared for the conversion of plutonium nitrate to plutonium oxide, in particular adapted so as to avoid criticality and radiation effects and to minimise toxicity hazards.

3.6. Plutonium oxide to metal production system

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

This process, which could be related to a reprocessing facility, involves the fluorination of plutonium dioxide, normally with highly corrosive hydrogen fluoride, to produce plutonium fluoride which is subsequently reduced using high purity calcium metal to produce metallic plutonium and a calcium fluoride slag. The main functions involved in this process are: fluorination (e.g. involving equipment fabricated or lined with a precious metal), metal reduction (e.g. employing ceramic crucibles), slag recovery, product handling, ventilation, waste management and process control.

Complete systems especially designed or prepared for the production of plutonium metal, in particular adapted so as to avoid criticality and radiation effects and to minimise toxicity hazards.

4. PLANTS FOR THE FABRICATION OF FUEL ELEMENTS

A «plant for the fabrication of fuel elements» includes the equipment:

(a) Which normally comes in direct contact with, or directly processes, or controls, the production flow of nuclear material, or

(b) Which seals the nuclear material within the cladding.

5. PLANTS FOR THE SEPARATION OF ISOTOPES OF URANIUM AND EQUIPMENT, OTHER THAN ANALYTICAL INSTRUMENTS, ESPECIALLY DESIGNED OR PREPARED THEREFOR

Items of equipment that are considered to fall within the meaning of the phrase «equipment, other than analytical instruments, especially designed or prepared» for the separation of isotopes of uranium include:

5.1. Gas centrifuges and assemblies and components especially designed or prepared for use in gas centrifuges

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

The gas centrifuge normally consists of a thin-walled cylinder(s) of between 75 mm (3 in) and 400 mm (16 in) diameter contained in a vacuum environment and spun at high peripheral speed of the order of 300 m/s or more with its central axis vertical. In order to achieve high speed the materials of construction for the rotating components have to be of a high strength to density ratio and the rotor assembly, and hence its individual components, have to be manufactured to very close tolerances in order to minimise the imbalance. In contrast to other centrifuges, the gas centrifuge for uranium enrichment is characterised by having within the rotor chamber a rotating disc-shaped baffle(s) and a stationary tube arrangement for feeding and extracting to UF6 gas and featuring at least three separate channels, of which two are connected to scoops extending from the rotor axis towards the periphery of the rotor chamber. Also contained within the vacuum environment are a number of critical items which do not rotate and which although they are especially designed are not difficult to fabricate nor are they fabricated out of unique materials. A centrifuge facility however requires a large number of these components, so that quantities can provide an important indication of end use.

5.1.1. Rotating components

(a) Complete rotor assemblies:

Thin-walled cylinders, or a number of interconnected thin-walled cylinders, manufactured from one or more of the high strength to density ratio materials described in the EXPLANATORY NOTE to this section. If interconnected, the cylinders are joined together by flexible bellows or rings as described in Section 5.1.1.(c) following. The rotor is fitted with an internal baffle(s) and end caps, as described in Section 5.1.1.(d) and (e) following, if in final form. However the complete assembly may be delivered only partly assembled.

(b) Rotor tubes:

Especially designed or prepared thin-walled cylinders with thickness of 12 mm (0,5 in) or less, a diameter of between 75 mm (3 in) and 400 mm (16 in), and manufactured from one or more of the high strength to density ratio materials described in the EXPLANATORY NOTE to this section.

(c) Rings or bellows:

Components especially designed or prepared to give localised support to the rotor tube or to join together a number of rotor tubes. The bellows is a short cylinder of wall thickness 3 mm (0,12 in) or less, a diameter of between 75 mm (3 in) and 400 m (16 in), having a convolute, and manufactured from one of the high strength to density ratio materials described in the EXPLANATORY NOTE to this section.

(d) Baffles:

Disc-shaped components of between 75 mm (3 in) and 400 m (16 in) diameter especially designed or prepared to be mounted inside the centrifuge rotor tube, in order to isolate the take-off chamber from the main separation chamber and, in some cases, to assist the UF6 gas circulation within the main separation chamber of the rotor tube, and manufactured from one of the high strength to density ratio materials described in the EXPLANATORY NOTE to this section.

(e) Top caps/bottom caps:

Disc-shaped components of between 75 mm (3 in) and 400 (16 in) diameter especially designed or prepared to fit to the ends of the rotor tube, and so contain the UF6 within the rotor tube, and in some cases to support, retain or contain as an integrated part an element of the upper bearing (top cap) or to carry the rotating elements of the motor and lower bearing (bottom cap), and manufactured from one of the high strength to density ratio materials described in the EXPLANATORY NOTE to this section.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The materials used for centrifuge rotating components are:

(a) Maraging steel capable of an ultimate tensile strength of 2,05 x 109 N/m2 (300 000 psi) or more,

(b) Aluminium alloys capable of an ultimate tensile strength of 0,46 x 109 N/m2 (67 000 psi) or more,

(c) Filamentary materials suitable for use in composite structures and having a specific modulus of 12,3 x 106 m or greater and a specific ultimate tensile strength of 0,3 x 106 m or greater («Specific Modulus» is the Young’s Modulus in N/m2 divided by the specific weight in N/m3; «Specific Ultimate Tensile Strength» is the ultimate tensile strength in N/m2 divided by the specific weight in N/m3.

5.1.2. Static components

(a) Magnetic suspension bearings:

Especially designed or prepared bearing assemblies consisting of an annular magnet suspended within a housing containing a damping medium. The housing will be manufactured from a UF6-resistant material (see EXPLANATORY NOTE to Section 5.2). The magnet couples with a pole piece or a second magnet fitted to the top cap described in Section 5.1.1.(e). The magnet may be ring-shaped with a relation between outer and inner diameter smaller or equal to 1,6:1. The magnet may be in a form having an initial permeability of 0,15 H/m (120 000 in CGS units) or more, or a remanence of 98,5% or more, or an energy product of greater than 80 kJ/m3 (107 gauss-oersteds). In addition to the usual material properties, it is a prerequisite that the deviation of the magnetic axes from the geometrical axes is limited to very small tolerances (lower than 0,1 mm or 0,004 in) or that homogeneity of the material of the magnet is specially called for.

(b) Bearings/dampers:

Especially designed or prepared bearings comprising a pivot/cup assembly mounted on a damper. The pivot is normally a hardened steel shaft with a hemisphere at one end with a means of attachment to the bottom cap described in section 5.1.1.(e) at the other. The shaft may however have a hydrodynamic bearing attached. The cup is pellet-shaped with a hemispherical indentation in one surface. These components are often supplied separately to the damper.

(c) Molecular pumps:

Especially designed or prepared cylinders having internally machined or extruded helical grooves and internally machines bores. Typical dimensions are as follows: 75 mm (3 in) to 400 mm (16 in) internal diameter, 10 mm (0,4 in) or more wall thickness, with the length equal to or greater than the diameter. The grooves are typically rectangular in cross-section and 2 mm (0,08 in) or more in depth.

(d) Motor stators:

Especially designed or prepared ring-shaped stators for high speed multiphase AC hysteresis (or reluctance) motors for synchronous operation within a vacuum in the frequency range of 600-2 000 Hz and a power range of 50-1 000 VA. The stators consist of multiphase windings on a laminated low loss iron core comprised of thin layers typically 2,0 mm (0,08 in) thick or less.

(e) Centrifuge housing/recipients:

Components especially designed designed or prepared to contain the rotor tube assembly of a gas centrifuge. The housing consists of a rigid cylinder of wall thickness up to 30 mm (1,2 in) with precision machined ends to locate the bearings and with one or more flanges for mounting. The machined ends are parallel to each other and perpendicular to the cylinder’s longitudinal axis to within 0,05° or less. The housing may also be a honeycomb type structure to accommodate several rotor tubes. The housings are made of or protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF6.

(f) Scoops:

Especially designed or prepared tubes up to 12 mm (0,5 in) internal diameter for the extraction of UF6 gas from within the rotor tube by a pilot tube action (that is, with an aperture facing into the circumferential gas flow within the rotor tube, for example by bending the end of a radially disposed tube) and capable of being fixed to the central gas extraction system. The tubes are made of or protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF6.

5.2. Especially designed or prepared auxiliary systems, equipment and components for gas centrifuge enrichment plants

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

The auxiliary systems, equipment and components for a gas centrifuge enrichment plant are the systems of plant needed to feed UF6 to the centrifuges, to link the individual centrifuges to each other to form cascades (or stages) to allow for progressively higher enrichments and to extract the «product» and «tails» UF6 from the centrifuges, together with the equipment required to drive the centrifuges or to control the plant.

Normally UF6 is evaporated from the solid using heated autoclaves and is distributed in gaseous form to the centrifuges by way of cascade header pipework. The «product» and «tails» UF6 gaseous streams flowing from the centrifuges are also passed by way of cascade header pipework to cold traps (operating at about 203 K (-70 °C)) where they are condensed prior to onward transfer into suitable containers for transportation or storage. Because an enrichment plant consists of many thousands of centrifuges arranged in cascades there are many kilometres of cascade header pipework, incorporating thousands of welds with a substantial amount of repetition of layout. The equipment, components and piping systems are fabricated to very high vacuum and cleanliness standards.

5.2.1. Feed systems/product and tails withdrawal systems

Especially designed or prepared process systems including:

– Feed autoclaves (or stations), used for passing UF6 to the centrifuge cascades at up to 100 kPa (15 psi) and at a rate of 1 kg/h or more,

– Desublimers (or cold traps) used to remove UF6 from the cascades at up to 3 kPa (0,5 psi) pressure. The desublimers are capable of being chilled to 203 K (-70 °C) and heated to 343 K (70 °C),

– «Product» and «Tails» stations used for trapping UF6 into containers.

This plant, equipment and pipework is wholly made of or lined with UF6-resistant materials (see explanatory note to this section) and is fabricated to very high vacuum and cleanliness standards.

5.2.2. Machine header piping systems

Especially designed or prepared piping systems and header systems for handling UF6 within the centrifuge cascades. The piping network is normally of the «triple» header system with each centrifuge connected to each of the headers. There is thus a substantial amount of repetition in its form. It is wholly made of UF6-resistant materials (see EXPLANATORY NOTE to this section) and is fabricated to very high vacuum and cleanliness standards.

5.2.3. UF6 mass spectrometers/ion sources

Especially designed or prepared magnetic or quadrupole mass spectrometers capable of taking «on-line» samples of feed, product or tails, from UF6 gas streams and having all of the following characteristics:

1. Unit resolution for atomic mass unit greater than 320;

2. Ion sources constructed of or lined with nichrome or monel or nickel plated;

3. Electron bombardment ionisation sources;

4. Having a collector system suitable for isotopic analysis.

5.2.4. Frequency changers

Frequency changers (also known as converters or invertors) especially designed or prepared to supply motor stators as defined under 5.1.2(d), or parts, components and subassemblies of such frequency changers having all of the following characteristics:

1. A multiphase output of 600 to 2 000 Hz;

2. High stability (with frequency control better than 0,1%);

3. Low harmonic distortion (less than 2%), and

4. An efficiency of greater than 80%.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The items listed above either come into direct contact with the UF6 process gas or directly control the centrifuges and the passage of the gas from centrifuge to centrifuge and cascade to cascade.

Materials resistant to corrosion by UF6 include stainless steel, aluminium, aluminium alloys, nickel or alloys containing 60% or more nickel.

5.3. Especially designed or prepared assemblies and components for use in gaseous diffusion enrichment

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

In the gaseous diffusion method of uranium isotope separation, the main technological assembly is a special porous gaseous diffusion barrier, heat exchanger for cooling the gas (which is heated by the process of compression), seal valves and control valves, and pipelines. Inasmuch as gaseous diffusion technology uses uranium hexafluoride (UF6), all equipment, pipeline and instrumentation surfaces (that come in contact with the gas) must be made of materials that remain stable in contact with UF6. A gaseous diffusion facility requires a number of these assemblies, so that quantities can provide an important indication of end use.

5.3.1. Gaseous diffusion barriers

(a) Especially designed or prepared thin, porous filters, with a pore size of 100-1 000 Å (angstroms), a thickness of 5 mm (0,2 in) or less, and for tubular forms, a diameter of 25 mm (1 in) or less, made of metallic, polymer or ceramic materials resistant to corrosion by UF6, and

(b) especially prepared compounds or powders for the manufacture of such filters. Such compounds and powders include nickel or alloys containing 60% or more nickel, aluminium oxide, or UF6-resistant fully fluorinated hydrocarbon polymers having a purity of 99,9% or more, a particle size less than 10 microns, and a high degree of particle size uniformity, which are especially prepared for the manufacture of gaseous diffusion barriers.

5.3.2. Diffuser housings

Especially designed or prepared hermetically sealed cylindrical vessels greater than 300 mm (12 in) in diameter and greater than 900 mm (35 in) in length, or rectangular vessels of comparable dimensions, which have an inlet connection and two outlet connections all of which are greater than 50 mm (2 in) in diameter, for containing the gaseous diffusion barrier, made of or lined with UF6-resistant materials and designed for horizontal or vertical installation.

5.3.3. Compressors and gas blowers

Especially designed or prepared axial, centrifugal, or positive displacement compressors, or gas blowers with a suction volume capacity of 1 m3/min. or more of UF6 and with a discharge pressure of up to several hundred kPa (100 psi), designed for long-term operation in the UF6 environment with or without an electrical motor of appropriate power, as well as separate assemblies of such compressors and gas blowers. These compressors and gas blowers have a pressure ratio between 2:1 and 6:1 and are made of, or lined with, materials resistant to UF6.

5.3.4. Rotary shaft seals

Especially designed or prepared vacuum seals, with seal feed and seal exhaust connections, for sealing the shaft connecting the compressor or the gas blower rotor with the driver motor so as to ensure a reliable seal against in-leaking of air into the inner chamber of the compressor or gas blower which is filled with UF6. Such seals are normally designed for a buffer gas in-leakage rate of less than

1 000 cm3/min (60 in3/min).

5.3.5. Heat exchangers for cooling UF6

Especially designed or prepared heat exchangers made of or lined with UF6-resistant materials (except stainless steel) or with copper or any combination of those metals, and intended for a leakage pressure change rate of less than 10 Pa (0,0015 psi) per hour under a pressure difference of 100 kPa (15 psi).

5.4. Especially designed or prepared auxiliary systems, equipment and components for use in gaseous diffusion enrichment

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

The auxiliary systems, equipment and components for gaseous diffusion enrichment plants are the systems of plant needed to feed UF6 to the gaseous diffusion assembly, to link the individual assemblies to each other to form cascades (or stages) to allow for progressively higher enrichments and to extract the «product» and «tails» UF6 from the diffusion cascades. Because of the high inertial properties of diffusion cascades, any interruption in their operation, and especially their shutdown, leads to serious consequences. Therefore, a strict and constant maintenance of vacuum in all technological systems, automatic protection from accidents, and precise automated regulation of the gas flow is of importance in a gaseous diffusion plant. All this leads to a need to equip the plant with a large number of special measuring, regulating and controlling systems.

Normally UF6 is evaporated from cylinders placed within autoclaves and is distributed in gaseous form to the entry point by way of cascade header pipework. The «product» and «tails» UF6 gaseous streams flowing from exit points are passed by way of cascade header pipework to either cold traps or to compression stations where the UF6 gas is liquefied prior to onward transfer into suitable containers for transportation or storage. Because a gaseous diffusion enrichment plant consists of a large number of gaseous diffusion assemblies arranged in cascades, there are many kilometres of cascade header pipework, incorporating thousands of welds with substantial amounts of repetition of layout. The equipment, components and piping systems are fabricated to very high vacuum and cleanliness standards.

5.4.1. Feed systems/product and tails withdrawal systems

Especially designed or prepared process systems, capable of operating at pressures of 300 kPa (45 psi) or less, including:

– Feed autoclaves (or systems), used for passing UF6 to the gaseous diffusion cascades,

– Desublimers (or cold traps) used to remove UF6 from diffusion cascades,

– Liquefaction stations where UF6 gas from the cascade is compressed and cooled to form liquid UF6,

– «Product» or «Tails» stations used for transferring UF6 into containers.

5.4.2. Header piping systems

Especially designed or prepared piping systems and header systems for handling UF6 within the gaseous diffusion cascades. This piping network is normally of the «double» header system with each cell connected to each of the headers.

5.4.3. Vacuum systems

(a) Especially designed or prepared large vacuum manifolds, vacuum headers and vacuum pumps having a suction capacity of 5 m3/min. (175 ft3/min.) or more.

(b) Vacuum pumps especially designed for service in UF6-bearing atmospheres made of, or lined with, aluminium, nickel, or alloys bearing more than 60% nickel. These pumps may be either rotary or positive, may have displacement and fluorocarbon seals, and may have special working fluids present.

5.4.4. Special shut-off and control valves

Especially designed or prepared manual or automated shut-off and control bellows valves made of UF6-resistant materials with a diameter of 40 to 1 500 mm (1,5 to 59 in) for installation in main and auxiliary systems of gaseous diffusion enrichment plants.

5.4.5. UF6 mass spectrometers/ion sources

Especially designed or prepared magnetic or quadrupole mass spectrometers capable of taking on-line samples of feed, product or tails, from UF6 gas streams and having all of the following characteristics:

1. Unit resolution for atomic mass unit greater than 320;

2. Ion sources constructed of or lined with nichrome or monel or nickel plated;

3. Electron bombardment ionisation sources;

4. Collector system suitable for isotopic analysis.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The items listed above either come into direct contact with the UF6 process gas or directly control the flow within the cascade. All surfaces which come into contact with the process gas are wholly made of, or lined with, UF6-resistant materials. For the purposes of the sections relating to gaseous diffusion items the materials resistant to corrosion by UF6 include stainless steel, aluminium, aluminium alloys, aluminium oxide, nickel or alloys containing 60% or more nickel and UF6-resistant fully fluorinated hydrocarbon polymers.

5.5. Especially designed or prepared systems, equipment and components for use in aerodynamic enrichment plants

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

In aerodynamic enrichment processes, a mixture of gaseous UF6 and light gas (hydrogen of helium) is compressed and then passed through separating elements wherein isotopic separation is accomplished by the generation of high centrifugal forces over a curved-wall geometry. Two processes of this type have been successfully developed: the separation nozzle process and the vortex tube process. For both processes the main components of a separation stage include cylindrical vessels housing the special separation elements (nozzles or vortex tubes), gas compressors and heat exchangers to remove the heat of compression. An aerodynamic plant requires a number of these stages, so that quantities can provide an important indication of end use. Since aerodynamic processes use UF6 all equipment, pipeline and instrumentation surfaces (that come in contact with the gas) must be made of materials that remain stable in contact with UF6.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The items listed in this section either come into direct contact with the UF6 process gas or directly control the flow within the cascade. All surfaces which come into contact with the process gas are wholly made of or protected by UF6-resistant materials. For the purpose of the section relating to aerodynamic enrichments items, the materials resistant to corrosion by UF6 include copper, stainless steel, aluminium, aluminium alloys, nickel or alloys containing 60% or more nickel and UF6-resistant fully fluorinated hydrocarbon polymers.

5.5.1. Separation nozzles

Especially designed or prepared separation nozzles and assemblies thereof. The separation nozzles consist of slit-shaped, curved channels having a radius of curvature less than 1 mm (typically 0,1 to 0,05 mm), resistant to corrosion by UF6 and having a knife-edge within the nozzle that separates the gas flowing through the nozzle into two fractions.

5.5.2. Vortex tubes

Especially designed or prepared vortex tubes and assemblies thereof. The vortex tubes are cylindrical or tapered, made of or protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF6, having a diameter of between 0,5 cm and 4 cm, a length to diameter ratio of 20:1 or less and with one or more tangential inlets. The tubes may be equipped with nozzle-type appendages at either or both ends.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The feed gas enters the vortex tube tangentially at one end or through swirl vanes or at numerous tangential positions along the periphery of the tube.

5.5.3. Compressors and gas blowers

Especially designed or prepared axial, centrifugal or positive displacement compressors or gas blowers made of or protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF6 and with a suction volume capacity of 2 m3/min. or more of UF6/carrier gas (hydrogen or helium) mixture.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

These compressors and gas blowers typically have a pressure ratio between 1.2:1 and 6:1.

5.5.4. Rotary shaft seals

Especially designed or prepared rotary shaft seals, with seal feed and seal exhaust connections, for sealing the shaft connecting the compressor rotor or the gas blower rotor with the driver motor so as to ensure a reliable seal against out-leakage of process gas or in-leakage of air or seal gas into the inner chamber of the compressor or gas blower which is filled with a UF6/carrier gas mixture.

5.5.5. Heat exchangers for gas cooling

Especially designed or prepared heat exchangers made of or protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF6.

5.5.6. Separation element housings

Especially designed or prepared separation element housings, made of or protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF6, for containing vortex tubes or separation nozzles.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

These housings may be cylindrical vessels greater than 300 mm in diameter and greater than 900 mm in length, or may be rectangular vessels of comparable dimensions, and may be designed for horizontal or vertical installation.

5.5.7. Feed systems/product and tails withdrawal systems

Especially designed or prepared process systems or equipment for enrichment plants made of or protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF6, including:

(a) Feed autoclaves, ovens, or systems used for passing UF6 to the enrichment process;

(b) Desublimers (or cold traps) used to remove UF6 from the enrichment process for subsequent transfer upon heating;

(c) Solidification or liquefaction stations used to remove UF6 from the enrichment process by compressing and converting UF6 to a liquid or solid form;

(d) «Product» or «tails» stations used for transferring UF6 into containers.

5.5.8. Header piping systems

Especially designed or prepared header piping systems, made of or protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF6 for handling UF6 within the aerodynamic cascades. This piping network is normally of the «double» header design with each stage or group of stages connected to each of the headers.

5.5.9. Vacuum systems and pumps

(a) Especially designed or prepared vacuum systems having a suction capacity of 5 m3/min or more, consisting of vacuum manifolds, vacuum headers and vacuum pumps, and designed for service in UF6-bearing atmospheres.

(b) Vacuum pumps especially designed or prepared for service in UF6-bearing atmospheres and made of or protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF6. These pumps may use fluorocarbon seals and special working fluids.

5.5.10. Special shut-off and control valves

Especially designed or prepared manual or automated shut-off and control bellows valves made of or protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF6 with a diameter of 40 to 1 500 mm for installation in main and auxiliary systems of aerodynamic enrichment plants.

5.5.11. UF6 mass spectrometers/ion sources

Especially designed or prepared magnetic or quadrupole mass spectrometers capable of taking «on-line» samples of feed, «product» or «tails», from UF6 gas streams and having all of the following characteristics:

1. Unit resolution for mass greater than 320;

2. Ion sources constructed of or lined with nichrome or monel or nickel plated;

3. Electron bombardment ionisation sources;

4. Collector system suitable for isotopic analysis.

5.5.12. UF6/carrier gas separation systems

Especially designed or prepared systems for separating UF6 from carrier gas (hydrogen or helium).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

These systems are designed to reduce the UF6 content in the carrier gas to 1 ppm or less and many incorporate equipment such as:

(a) Cryogenic heat exchangers and cryoseparators capable of temperatures of -120 °c or less, or

(b) Cryogenic refrigeration units capable of temperatures of -120 °C or less, or

(c) Separation nozzle or vortex tube units for the separation of UF6 from carrier gas, or

(d) UF6 cold traps capable of temperatures of -20 °C or less.

5.6. Especially designed or prepared systems, equipment and components for use in chemical exchange or ion exchange enrichment plants

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

The slight difference in mass between the isotopes of uranium causes small changes in chemical reaction equilibria that can be used as a basis for separation of the isotopes. Two processes have been successfully developed: liquid-liquid chemical exchange and solid-liquid ion exchange.

In the liquid-liquid chemical exchange process, immiscible liquid phases (aqueous and organic) are countercurrently contacted to give the cascading effect of thousands of separation stages. The aqueous phase consists of uranium chloride in hydrochloric acid solution; the organic phase consists of an extractant containing uranium chloride in an organic solvent. The contactors employed in the separation cascade can be liquid-liquid exchange columns (such as pulsed columns with sieve plates) or liquid centrifugal contactors. Chemical conversions (oxidation and reduction) are required at both ends of the separation cascade in order to provide for the reflux requirements at each end. A major design concern is to avoid contamination of the process streams with certain metal ions. Plastic, plastic-lined (including use of fluorocarbon polymers) and/or glass-lined columns and piping are therefore used.

In the solid-liquid ion-exchange process, enrichment is accomplished by uranium adsorption/desorption on a special, very fast-acting, ion-exchange resin or adsorbent. A solution of uranium in hydrochloric acid and other chemical agents is passed through cylindrical enrichment columns containing packed beds of the adsorbent. For a continuous process, a reflux system is necessary to release the uranium from the adsorbent back into the liquid flow so that «product» and «tails» can be collected. This is accomplished with the use of suitable reduction/oxidation chemical agents that are fully regenerated in separate external circuits and that may be partially regenerated within the isotopic separation columns themselves. The presence of hot concentrated hydrochloric acid solutions in the process requires that the equipment be made of or protected by special corrosion-resistant materials.

5.6.1. Liquid-liquid exchange columns (chemical exchange)

Countercurrent liquid-liquid exchange columns having mechanical power input (i.e., pulsed columns with sieve plates, reciprocating plate columns, and columns with internal turbine mixers), especially designed or prepared for uranium enrichment using the chemical exchange process. For corrosion resistance to concentrated hydrochloric acid solutions, these columns and their internals are made of or protected by suitable plastic materials (such as fluorocarbon polymers) or glass. The stage residence time of the columns is designed to be short (30 seconds or less).

5.6.2. Liquid-liquid centrifugal contactors (chemical exchange)

Liquid-liquid centrifugal contactors especially designed or prepared for uranium enrichment using the chemical exchange process. Such contactors use rotation to achieve dispersion of the organic and aqueous streams and then centrifugal force to separate the phases. For corrosion resistance to concentrated hydrochloric acid solutions, the contactors are made of or are lined with suitable plastic materials (such as fluorocarbon polymers) or are lined with glass. The stage residence time of the centrifugal contactors is designed to be short (30 seconds or less).

5.6.3. Uranium reduction systems and equipment (chemical exchange)

(a) Especially designed or prepared electrochemical reduction cells to reduce uranium from one valence state to another for uranium enrichment using the chemical exchange process. The cell materials in contact with process solutions must be corrosion resistant to concentrated hydrochloric acid solutions.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The cell cathodic compartment must be designed to prevent reoxidation of uranium to its higher valence state. To keep the uranium in the cathodic compartment, the cell may have an impervious diaphragm membrane constructed of special cation exchange material. The cathode consists of a suitable solid conductor such as graphite.

(b) Especially designed or prepared systems at the product end of the cascade for taking the U4+ out of the organic stream, adjusting the acid concentration and feeding to the electrochemical reduction cells.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

These systems consist of solvent extraction equipment for stripping the U4+ from the organic stream into an aqueous solution, evaporation and/or other equipment to accomplish solution pH adjustment and control, and pumps or other transfer devices for feeding to the electrochemical reduction cells. A major design concern is to avoid contamination of the aqueous stream with certain metal ions. Consequently, for those parts in contact with the process stream, the system is constructed of equipment made of or protected by suitable materials (such as glass, fluorocarbon polymers, polyphenyl sulfate, polyether sulfone, and resin-impregnated graphite).

5.6.4. Feed preparation systems (chemical exchange)

Especially designed or prepared systems for producing high-purity uranium chloride feed solutions for chemical exchange uranium isotope separation plants.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

These systems consist of dissolution, solvent extraction and/or ion exchange equipment for purification and electrolytic cells for reducing the uranium U6+ or U4+ to U3+. These systems produce uranium chloride solutions having only a few parts per million of metallic impurities such as chromium, iron, vanadium, molybdenum and other bivalent or higher multi-valent cations. Materials of construction for portions of the systems processing high-purity U3+ include glass, fluorocarbon polymers, polyphenyl sulfate or polyether sulfone plastic-lined and resin-impregnated graphite.

5.6.5. Uranium oxidation systems (chemical exchange)

Especially designed or prepared systems for oxidation of U3+ to U4+ for return to the uranium isotope separation cascade in the chemical exchange enrichment process.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

These systems may incorporate equipment such as:

(a) Equipment for contacting chlorine and oxygen with the aqueous effluent from the isotope separation equipment and extracting the resultant U4+ into the stripped organic stream returning from the product end of the cascade,

(b) Equipment that separates water from hydrochloric acid so that the water and the concentrated hydrochloric acid may be reintroduced to the process at the proper locations.

5.6.6. Fast-reacting ion exchange resins/adsorbents (ion exchange)

Fast-reacting ion-exchange resins or adsorbents especially designed or prepared for uranium enrichment using the ion exchange process, including porous macroreticular resins, and/or pellicular structures in which the active chemical exchange groups are limited to a coating on the surface of an inactive porous support structure, and other composite structures in any suitable form including particles or fibres. These ion exchange resins/adsorbents have diameters of 0,2 mm or less and must be chemically resistant to concentrated hydrochloric acid solutions as well as physically strong enough so as not to degrade in the exchange columns. The resins/adsorbents are especially designed to achieve very fast uranium isotope exchange kinetics (exchange rate half-time of less than 10 seconds) and are capable of operating at a temperature in the range of 100 °C to 200 °C.

5.6.7. Ion exchange columns (ion exchange)

Cylindrical columns greater than 1 000 mm in diameter for containing and supporting packed beds of ion exchange resin/adsorbent, especially designed or prepared for uranium enrichment using the ion exchange process. These columns are made of or protected by materials (such as titanium or fluorocarbon plastics) resistant to corrosion by concentrated hydrochloric acid solutions and are capable of operating at a temperature in the range of 100 °C to 200 °C and pressures above 0,7 MPa (102 psia).

5.6.8. Ion exchange reflux systems (ion exchange)

(a) Especially designed or prepared chemical or electrochemical reduction systems for regeneration of the chemical reducing agent(s) used in ion exchange uranium enrichment cascades.

(b) Especially designed or prepared chemical or electrochemical oxidation systems for regeneration of the chemical oxidising agent(s) used in ion exchange uranium enrichment cascades.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The ion exchange enrichment process may use, for example, trivalent titanium (Ti3+) as a reducing cation in which case the reduction system would regenerate Ti3+ by reducing Ti4+.

The process may use, for example, trivalent iron (Fe3+) as an oxidant in which case the oxidation system would regenerate Fe3+ by oxidising Fe2+.

5.7. Especially designed or prepared systems, equipment and components for use in laser-based enrichment plants

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

Present systems for enrichment processes using lasers fall into two categories: those in which the process medium is atomic uranium vapour and those in which the process medium is the vapour of a uranium compound. Common nomenclature for such processes include: first category, atomic vapour laser isotope separation (AVLIS or SILVA); second category, molecular laser isotope separation (MLIS or MOLIS) and chemical reaction by isotope selective laser activation (CRISLA). The systems, equipment and components for laser enrichment plants embrace:

(a) devices to feed uranium-metal vapour (for selective photo-ionisation) or devices to feed the vapour of a uranium compound (for photo-dissociation or chemical activation);

(b) devices to collect enriched and depleted uranium metal as «product» and «tails» in the first category, and devices to collect dissociated or reacted compounds as «product» and unaffected material as «tails» in the second category;

(c) process laser systems to selectively excite the uranium-235 species, and

(d) feed preparation and product conversion equipment. The complexity of the spectroscopy of uranium atoms and compounds may require incorporation of any of a number of available laser technologies.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

Many of the items listed in this section come into direct contact with uranium metal vapour or liquid or with process gas consisting of UF6 or a mixture of UF6 and other gases. All surfaces that come into contact with the uranium or UF6 are wholly made of or protected by corrosion-resistant materials. For the purposes of the section relating to laser-based enrichment items, the materials resistant to corrosion by the vapour or liquid of uranium metal or uranium alloys include yttria-coated graphite and tantalum; and the materials resistant to corrosion by UF6 include copper, stainless steel, aluminium, aluminium alloys, nickel or alloys containing 60% or more nickel and UF6-resistant fully fluorinated hydrocarbon polymers.

5.7.1. Uranium vaporisation systems (AVLIS)

Especially designed or prepared uranium vaporisation systems which contain high-power strip or scanning electron beam guns with a delivered power on the target of more than 2,5 kW/cm.

5.7.2. Liquid uranium metal handling systems (AVLIS)

Especially designed or prepared liquid metal handling systems for molten uranium or uranium alloys, consisting of crucibles and cooling equipment for the crucibles.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The crucibles and other parts of this system that come into contact with molten uranium and uranium alloys are made of or protected by materials of suitable corrosion and heat resistance. Suitable materials include tantalum, yttria-coated graphite, graphite coated with other rare earth oxides or mixtures thereof.

5.7.3. Uranium metal «product» and «tails» collector assemblies (AVLIS)

Especially designed or prepared «product» and «tails» collector assemblies for uranium metal in liquid or solid form.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

Components for these assemblies are made of or protected by materials resistant to the heat and corrosion of uranium metal vapour or liquid (such as yttria-coated graphite or tantalum) and may include pipes, valves, fittings, «gutters», feed-throughs, heat exchangers and collector plates for magnetic, electrostatic or other separation methods.

5.7.4. Separator module housings (AVLIS)

Especially designed or prepared cylindrical or rectangular vessels for containing the uranium metal vapour source, the electron beam gun, and the «product» and «tails» collectors.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

These housings have multiplicity of ports for electrical and water feed-throughs, laser beam windows, vacuum pump connections and instrumentation diagnostics and monitoring. They have provisions for opening and closure to allow refurbishment of internal components.

5.7.5. Supersonic expansion nozzles (MLIS)

Especially designed or prepared supersonic expansion nozzles for cooling mixtures of UF6 and carrier gas to 150 K or less and which are corrosion resistant to UF6.

5.7.6. Uranium pentafluoride product collectors (MLIS)

Especially designed or prepared uranium pentafluoride (UF5) solid product collectors consisting of filter, impact, or cyclone-type collectors, or combinations thereof, and which are corrosion resistant to the UF5/UF6 environment.

5.7.7. UF6/carrier gas compressors (MLIS)

Especially designed or prepared compressors for UF6/carrier gas mixtures, designed for long term operation in a UF6 environment. The components of these compressors that come into contact with process gas are made of or protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF6.

5.7.8. Rotary shaft seals (MLIS)

Especially designed or prepared rotary shaft seals, with seal feed and seal exhaust connections, for sealing the shaft connecting the compressor rotor with the driver motor so as to ensure a reliable seal against out-leakage of process gas or in-leakage of air or seal gas into the inner chamber of the compressor which is filled with a UF6/carrier gas mixture.

5.7.9. Fluorination systems (MLIS)

Especially designed or prepared systems for fluorinating UF5 (solid) to UF6 (gas).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

These systems are designed to fluorinate the collected UF5 powder to UF6 for subsequent collection in product containers or for transfer as feed to MLIS units for additional enrichment. In one approach, the fluorination reaction may be accomplished within the isotope separation system to react and recover directly off the «product» collectors. In another approach, the UF5 powder may be removed/transferred from the «product» collectors into a suitable reaction vessel (e.g., fluidised-bed reactor, screw reactor or flame tower) for fluorination. In both approaches, equipment for storage and transfer of fluorine (or other suitable fluorinating agents) and for collection and transfer of UF6 are used.

5.7.10. UF6 mass spectrometers/ion sources (MLIS)

Especially designed or prepared magnetic or quadrupole mass spectrometers capable of taking «on-line» samples of feed, «product» or «tails», from UF6 gas streams and having all of the following characteristics:

1. Unit resolution for mass greater than 320;

2. Ion sources constructed of or lined with nichrome or monel or nickel plated;

3. Electron bombardment ionisation sources;

4. Collector system suitable for isotopic analysis.

5.7.11. Feed systems/product and tails withdrawal systems (MLIS)

Especially designed or prepared process systems or equipment for enrichment plants made of or protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF6, including:

(a) Feed autoclaves, ovens, or systems used for passing UF6 to the enrichment process;

(b) Desublimers (or cold traps) used to remove UF6 from the enrichment process for subsequent transfer upon heating;

(c) Solidification or liquefaction stations used to remove UF6 from the enrichment process by compressing and converting UF6 to a liquid or solid form;

(d) «Product» or «tails» stations used for transferring UF6 into containers.

5.7.12. UF6/carrier gas separation systems (MLIS)

Especially designed or prepared process systems for separating UF6 from carrier gas. The carrier gas may be nitrogen, argon, or other gas.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

These systems may incorporate equipment such as:

(a) Cryogenic heat exchangers or cryoseparators capable of temperatures of -120 °C or less, or

(b) Cryogenic refrigeration units capable of temperatures of -120 °C or less, or

(c) UF6 cold traps capable of temperatures of -20 °C or less.

5.7.13. Laser systems (AVLIS, MLIS and CRISLA)

Lasers or laser systems especially designed or prepared for the separation of uranium isotopes.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The laser system for the AVLIS process usually consists of two lasers: a copper vapour laser and a dye laser. The laser system for MLIS usually consists of a CO2 or excimer laser and a multipass optical cell with revolving mirrors at both ends. Lasers or laser systems for both processes require a spectrum frequency stabiliser for operation over extended periods of time.

5.8. Especially designed or prepared systems, equipment and components for use in plasma separation enrichment plants

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

In the plasma separation process, a plasma of uranium ions passes through an electric field tuned to the U-235 ion resonance frequency so that they preferentially absorb energy and increase the diameter of their corkscrew-like orbits. Ions with a large-diameter path are trapped to produce a product enriched in U-235. The plasma, which is made by ionising uranium vapour, is contained in a vacuum chamber with a high-strength magnetic field produced by a superconducting magnet. The main technological systems of the process include the uranium plasma generation system, the separator module with superconducting magnet and metal removal systems for the collection of «product» and «tails».

5.8.1. Microwave power sources and antennae

Especially designed or prepared microwave power sources and antennae for producing or accelerating ions and having the following characteristics: greater than 30 GHz frequency and greater than 50 kW mean power output for ion production.

5.8.2. Ion excitation coils

Especially designed or prepared radio frequency ion excitation coils for frequencies of more than 100 kHz and capable of handling more than 40 kW mean power.

5.8.3. Uranium plasma generation systems

Especially designed or prepared systems for the generation of uranium plasma, which may contain high-power strip or scanning electron beam guns with a delivered power on the target of more than 2,5 kW/cm.

5.8.4. Liquid uranium metal handling systems

Especially designed or prepared liquid metal handling systems for molten uranium or uranium alloys, consisting of crucibles and cooling equipment for the crucibles.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The crucibles and other parts of this system that come into contact with molten uranium or uranium alloys are made of or protected by materials of suitable corrosion and heat resistance. Suitable materials include tantalum, yttria-coated graphite, graphite coated with other rare earth oxides or mixtures thereof.

5.8.5. Uranium metal «product» and «tails» collector assemblies

Especially designed or prepared «product» and «tails» collector assemblies for uranium metal in solid form. These collector assemblies are made of or protected by materials resistant to the heat and corrosion of uranium metal vapour, such as yttria-coated graphite or tantalum.

5.8.6. Separator module housings

Cylindrical vessels especially designed or prepared for use in plasma separation enrichment plants for containing the uranium plasma source, radio-frequency drive coil and the «product» and «tail» collectors.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

These housings have a multiplicity of ports for electrical feed-throughs, diffusion pump connections and instrumentation diagnostics and monitoring. They have provisions for opening and closure to allow for refurbishment of internal components and are constructed of a suitable non-magnetic material such as stainless steel.

5.9. Especially designed or prepared systems, equipment and components for use in electromagnetic enrichment plants

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

In the electromagnetic process, uranium metal ions produced by ionisation of a salt feed material (typically UCl4) are accelerated and passed through a magnetic field that has the effect of causing the ions of different isotopes to follow different paths. The major components of an electromagnetic isotope separator include: a magnetic field for ion-beam diversion/separation of the isotopes, an ion source with its acceleration system, and a collection system for the separated ions. Auxiliary systems for the process include the magnet power supply system, the ion source high-voltage power supply system, the vacuum system, and extensive chemical handling systems for recovery of product and cleaning/recycling of components.

5.9.1. Electromagnetic isotope separators

Electromagnetic isotope separators, especially designed or prepared for the separation of uranium isotopes, and equipment and components therefor, including:

(a) Ion sources

Especially designed or prepared single or multiple uranium ion sources consisting of a vapour source, ioniser, and beam accelerator, constructed of suitable materials such as graphite, stainless steel, or copper, and capable of providing a total ion beam current of 50 mA or greater;

(b) Ion collectors

Collector plates consisting of two or more slits and pockets especially designed or prepared for collection of enriched and depleted uranium ion beams and constructed of suitable materials such as graphite or stainless steel;

(c) Vacuum housings

Especially designed or prepared vacuum housings for uranium electromagnetic separators, constructed of suitable non-magnetic materials such as stainless steel and designed for operation at pressures of 0,1 Pa or lower;

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The housings are specially designed to contain the ion sources, collector plates and water-cooled liners and have provision for diffusion pump connections and opening and closure for removal and reinstallation of these components.

(d) Magnet pole pieces

Especially designed or prepared magnet pole pieces having a diameter greater than 2 m used to maintain a constant magnetic field within a electromagnetic isotope separator and to transfer the magnetic field between adjoining separators.

5.9.2. High voltage power supplies

Especially designed or prepared high-voltage power supplies for ion sources, having all of the following characteristics: capable of continuous operation, output voltage of 20 000 V or greater, output current of 1 A or greater, and voltage regulation of better than 0,01% over a period of eight hours.

5.9.3. Magnet power supplies

Especially designed or prepared high-power, direct current magnet power supplies having all of the following characteristics: capable of continuously producing a current output of 500 A or greater at a voltage of 100 V or greater and with a current or voltage regulation better than 0,01% over a period of 8 hours.

6. PLANTS FOR THE PRODUCTION OF HEAVY WATER, DEUTERIUM AND DEUTERIUM COMPOUNDS AND EQUIPMENT ESPECIALLY DESIGNED OR PREPARED THEREFOR

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

Heavy water can be produced by a variety of processes. However, the two processes that have proven to be commercially viable are the water-hydrogen sulphide exchange process (GS process) and the ammonia-hydrogen exchange process.

The GS process is based upon the exchange of hydrogen an deuterium between water and hydrogen sulphide within a series of towers which are operated with the top section cold and the bottom section hot. Water flows down the towers while the hydrogen sulphide gas circulates from the bottom to the top of the towers. A series of perforated trays are used to promote mixing between the gas and the water. Deuterium migrates to the water at low temperatures and to the hydrogen sulphide at high temperatures. Gas or water, enriched in deuterium, is removed from the first stage towers at the junction of the hot and cold sections and the process is repeated in subsequent stage towers. The product of the last stage, water enriched up to 30% in deuterium, is sent to a distillation unit to produce reactor grade heavy water, i.e., 99,75% deuterium oxide.

The ammonia-hydrogen exchange process can extract deuterium from synthesis gas through contact with liquid ammonia in the presence of a catalyst. The synthesis gas is fed into exchange towers and to an ammonia converter. Inside the towers the gas flows from the bottom to the top while the liquid ammonia flows from the top to the bottom. The deuterium is stripped from the hydrogen in the synthesis gas and concentrated in the ammonia. The ammonia then flows into an ammonia cracker at the bottom of the tower while the gas flows into an ammonia converter at the top. Further enrichment takes place in subsequent stages and reactor grade heavy water is produced through final distillation. The synthesis gas feed can be provided by an ammonia plant that, in turn, can be constructed in association with a heavy water ammonia-hydrogen exchange plant. The ammonia-hydrogen exchange process can also use ordinary water as a feed source of deuterium.

Many of the key equipment items for heavy water production plants using GS or the ammonia-hydrogen exchange processes are common to several segments of the chemical and petroleum industries. This is particularly so for small plants using the GS process. However, few of the items are available «off-the shelf». The GS and ammonia-hydrogen processes require the handling of large quantities of flammable, corrosive and toxic fluids at elevated pressures. Accordingly, in establishing the design and operating standards for plants and equipment using these processes, careful attention to the materials selection and specifications is required to ensure long service life with high safety and reliability factors. The choice of scale is primarily a function of economics and need. Thus, most of the equipment items would be prepared according to the requirements of the customer.

Finally, it should be noted that, in both the GS and the ammonia-hydrogen exchange processes, items of equipment which individually are not especially designed or prepared for heavy water production can be assembled into systems which are especially designed or prepared for producing heavy water. The catalyst production system used in the ammonia-hydrogen exchange process and water distillation systems used for the final concentration of heavy water to reactor-grade in either process are examples of such systems.

The items of equipment which are especially designed or prepared for the production of heavy water utilising either the water-hydrogen sulphide exchange process or the ammonia-hydrogen exchange process include the following:

6.1. Water – hydrogen sulphide exchange towers

Exchange towers fabricated from fine carbon steel (such as ASTM A516) with diameters of 6 m (20’) to 9 m (39’), capable of operating at pressures greater than or equal to 2 MPa (300 psi) and with a corrosion allowance of 6 mm or greater, especially designed or prepared for heavy water production utilising the water-hydrogen sulphide exchange process.

6.2. Blowers and compressors

Single stage, low head (i.e., 0,2 MPa or 30 psi) centrifugal blowers or compressors for hydrogen-sulphide gas circulation (i.e., gas containing more than 70% H2S) especially designed or prepared for heavy water production utilising the water-hydrogen sulphide exchange process. These blowers or compressors have a throughput capacity greater than or equal to 56 m3/second (120,000 SCFM) while operating at pressures greater than or equal to 1,8 MPa (260 psi) suction and have seals designed for wet H2S service.

6.3. Ammonia-hydrogen exchange towers

Ammonia-hydrogen exchange towers greater than or equal to 35 m (114,3’ in height with diameters of 1,5 m (4,9’ to 2,5 m (8,2’) capable of operating at pressures greater than 15 MPa (2225 psi) especially designed or prepared for heavy water production utilising the ammonia-hydrogen exchange process. These towers also have at least one flanged axial opening of the same diameter as the cylindrical part through which the tower internals can be inserted or withdrawn.

6.4. Tower internals and stage pumps

Tower internals and stage pumps especially designed or prepared for towers for heavy water production utilising the ammonia-hydrogen exchange process. Tower internals include especially designed stage contactors which promote intimate gas/liquid contact. Stage pumps include especially designed submersible pumps for circulation of liquid ammonia within a contacting stage internal to the stage towers.

6.5. Ammonia crackers

Ammonia crackers with operating pressures greater than or equal to 3 MPa (450 psi) especially designed or prepared for heavy water production utilising the ammonia-hydrogen exchange process.

6.6. Infrared absorption analysers

Infrared absorption analysers capable of on-line hydrogen/deuterium ratio analysis where deuterium concentrations are equal to or greater than 90%.

6.7. Catalytic burners

Catalytic burners for the conversion of enriched deuterium gas into heavy water especially designed or prepared for heavy water production utilising the ammonia-hydrogen exchange process.

7. PLANTS FOR THE CONVERSION OF URANIUM AND EQUIPMENT ESPECIALLY DESIGNED OR PREPARED THEREFOR

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

Uranium conversion plants and systems may perform one or more transformations from one uranium chemical species to another, including: conversion of uranium ore concentrates to UO3, conversion of UO3 to UO2, conversion of uranium oxides to UF4 or UF6, conversion of UF4 to UF6, conversion of UF6 to UF4, conversion of UF4 to uranium metal, and conversion of uranium fluorides to UO2. Many of the key equipment items for uranium conversion plants are common to several segments of the chemical process industry. For example, the types of equipment employed in these processes may include: furnaces, rotary kilns, fluidised bed reactors, flame tower reactors, liquid centrifuges, distillation columns and liquid-liquid extraction columns. However, few of the items are available «off-the-shelf», most would be prepared according to the requirements and specifications of the customer. In some instances, special design and construction considerations are required to address the corrosive properties of some of the chemicals handled (HF, F2, CIF3, and uranium fluorides). Finally, it should be noted that, in all of the uranium conversion processes, items of equipment which individually are not especially designed or prepared for uranium conversion can be assembled into systems which are especially designed or prepared for use in uranium conversion.

7.1. Especially designed or prepared systems for the conversion of uranium ore concentrates to UO3

EXPLANATORY NOTE

Conversion of uranium ore concentrates to UO3 can be performed by first dissolving the ore in nitric acid and extracting purified uranyl nitrate using a solvent such as tributyl phosphate. Next, the uranyl nitrate is converted to UO3 either by concentration and denitration or by neutralization with gaseous ammonia to produce ammonium diuranate with subsequent filtering, drying, and calcining.

7.2. Especially designed or prepared systems for the conversion of UO3 to UF6

EXPLANATORY NOTE

Conversion of UO3 to UF6 can be performed directly by fluorination. The process requires a source of fluorine gas or chlorine trifluoride.

7.3. Especially designed or prepared systems for the conversion of UO3 to UO2

EXPLANATORY NOTE

Conversion of UO3 to UO2 can be performed through reduction of UO3 with cracked ammonia gas or hydrogen.

7.4. Especially designed or prepared systems for the conversion of UO2 to UF4

EXPLANATORY NOTE

Conversion of UO2 to UF4 can be performed by reacting UO2 with hydrogen fluoride gas (HF) at 300-500 °C.

7.5. Especially designed or prepared systems for the conversion of UF4 to UF6

EXPLANATORY NOTE

Conversion of UF4 to UF6 is performed by exothermic reaction with fluorine in a tower reactor. UF6 is condensed from the hot effluent gases by passing the effluent stream through a cold trap cooled to -10 °C. The process requires a source of fluorine gas.

7.6. Especially designed or prepared systems for the conversion of UF4 to U metal

EXPLANATORY NOTE

Conversion UF4 to U metal is performed by reduction with magnesium (large batches) or calcium (small batches). The reaction is carried out at temperatures above the melting point of uranium (1 130 °C).

7.7. Especially designed or prepared systems for the conversion of UF6 to UO2

EXPLANATORY NOTE

Conversion of UF6 to UO2 can be performed by one of three processes. In the first, UF6 is reduced and hydrolysed to UO2 using hydrogen and steam. In the second, UF6 is hydrolysed by solution in water, ammonia is added to precipitate ammonium diuranate, and the diuranate is reduced to UO2 with hydrogen at 820 °C. In the third process, gaseous UF6, CO2 and NH3 are combined in water, precipitating ammonium uranyl carbonate. The ammonium aranyl carbonate is combined with steam and hydrogen at 500-600 °C to yield UO2.

UF6 to UO2 conversion is often performed as the first stage of a fuel fabrication plant.

7.8. Especially designed or prepared systems for the conversion of UF6 to UF4

EXPLANATORY NOTE

Conversion of UF6 to UF4 is performed by reduction with hydrogen.

ANNEX III

To the extent that the measures in this Protocol involve nuclear material declared by the Community and without prejudice to Article 1 of this Protocol, the Agency and the Community shall cooperate to facilitate implementation of those measures and shall avoid unnecessary duplication of activities.

The Community shall provide the Agency with information relating to transfers, for both nuclear and non-nuclear purposes, from each State to another Member State of the Community and to such transfers to each State from another Member State of the Community that corresponds to the information to be provided under Article 2.a.(vi)(b) and under Article 2.a.(vi)(c) in relation to exports and imports of source material which has not reached the composition and purity suitable for fuel fabrication or for being isotopically enriched.

Each State shall provide the Agency with information relating to transfers to or from another Member State of the Community that corresponds to the information on specified equipment and non-nuclear material listed in Annex II of this Protocol to be provided under Article 2.a.(ix)(a) in relation to exports and, on specific request of the Agency, under Article 2.a.(ix)(b) in relation to imports.

With regard to the Community’s Joint Research Centre, the Community shall also implement the measures which this Protocol sets out for States, as appropriate in close collaboration with the State on whose territory an establishment of the centre is located.

The Liaison Committee, established under Article 25(a) of the Protocol referred to in Article 26 of the Safeguards Agreement, will be extended in order to allow for participation by representatives of the States and adjustment to the new circumstances resulting from this Protocol.

For the sole purposes of the implementation of this Protocol, and without prejudice to the respective competences and responsibilities of the Community and its Member States, each State which decides to entrust to the Commission of the European Communities implementation of certain provisions which under this Protocol are the responsibility of the States, shall so inform the other Parties to the Protocol through a side letter. The Commission of the European Communities shall inform the other Parties to the Protocol of its acceptance of any such decisions.

DODATNI PROTOKOL

UZ SPORAZUM IZMEĐU REPUBLIKE AUSTRIJE, KRALJEVINE BELGIJE, KRALJEVINE DANSKE, REPUBLIKE FINSKE, SAVEZNE REPUBLIKE NJEMAČKE, HELENSKE REPUBLIKE, IRSKE, TALIJANSKE REPUBLIKE, VELIKOG VOJVODSTVA LUKSEMBURGA, KRALJEVINE NIZOZEMSKE, PORTUGALSKE REPUBLIKE, KRALJEVINE ŠPANJOLSKE, KRALJEVINE ŠVEDSKE, EUROPSKE ZAJEDNICE ZA ATOMSKU ENERGIJU I MEĐUNARODNE AGENCIJE ZA ATOMSKU ENERGIJU O PROVEDBI ČLANKA III. STAVAKA 1. i 4. UGOVORA O NEŠIRENJU NUKLEARNOG ORUŽJA

PREAMBULA

BUDUĆI DA su Republika Austrija, Kraljevina Belgija, Kraljevina Danska, Republika Finska, Savezna Republika Njemačka, Helenska Republika, Irska, Talijanska Republika, Veliko Vojvodstvo Luksemburg, Kraljevina Nizozemska, Portugalska Republika, Kraljevina Španjolska, Kraljevina Švedska (dalje u tekstu: »države«) i Europska zajednica za atomsku energiju (dalje u tekstu: »Zajednica«) potpisnice Sporazuma između država, Zajednice i Međunarodne agencije za atomsku energiju (dalje u tekstu: »Agencija«) o provedbi članka III. stavka 1. i 4. Ugovora o neširenju nuklearnog oružja (dalje u tekstu: »Sporazum o zaštitnim mjerama«) koji je stupio na snagu 21. veljače 1997.;

SVJESNI želje međunarodne zajednice za daljnjim jačanjem borbe protiv širenja nuklearnog oružja povećanjem učinkovitosti i poboljšanjem djelotvornosti sustava zaštitnih mjera Agencije;

PODSJEĆAJUĆI na to da Agencija pri provedbi zaštitnih mjera mora uzeti u obzir potrebu izbjegavanja kočenja gospodarskog i tehnološkog razvoja Zajednice ili međunarodne suradnje u području miroljubivih nuklearnih aktivnosti, poštovanja zdravlja, sigurnosti, fizičke zaštite i drugih sigurnosnih odredbi koje su na snazi, kao i poštovanje prava pojedinaca, te da mora poduzimati sve mjere opreza kako bi zaštitila poslovne, tehnološke i proizvodne tajne, kao i druge povjerljive informacije koje dozna;

BUDUĆI DA je učestalost i intenzitet aktivnosti opisanih u ovom Protokolu potrebno svesti na najmanju mjeru sukladno ciljevima jačanja učinkovitosti i poboljšanja djelotvornosti zaštitnih mjera Agencije;

STOGA su se Zajednica, države i Agencija sporazumjele kako slijedi:

ODNOS IZMEĐU PROTOKOLA I SPORAZUMA O ZAŠTITNIM MJERAMA

Članak 1.

Odredbe se Sporazuma o zaštitnim mjerama primjenjuju na ovaj Protokol u onoj mjeri u kojoj su relevantne i sukladne s odredbama ovog Protokola. U slučaju nesuglasja između odredbi Sporazuma o zaštitnim mjerama i onih iz ovog Protokola, primjenjuju se odredbe ovog Protokola.

ODREDBA O PRIBAVLJANJU INFORMACIJA

Članak 2.

a. Svaka država dostavlja Agenciji izjavu, koja sadrži informacije utvrđene u podtočkama (i), (ii), (iv), (ix) i (x) Zajednica dostavlja Agenciji izjavu, koja sadrži informacije utvrđene u podtočkama (v), (vi) i (vii). Svaka država i Zajednica dostavljaju Agenciji izjavu, koja sadrži informacije utvrđene u podstavcima (iii) i (viii).

(i) Opći opis i informaciju, koji pobliže označavaju lokaciju istraživačkih i razvojnih aktivnosti povezanih s nuklearnim gorivnim ciklusom, a koje ne uključuju nuklearni materijal, te koje se izvode svugdje gdje ih financira, posebno odobrava ili nadzire određena država, ili koje su izvršene u njezino ime.

(ii) Informacije, koje je Agencija utvrdila na temelju očekivanih poboljšanja učinkovitosti ili djelotvornosti operativnih djelatnosti s kojima se složila određena država, o primjenjivosti zaštitnih mjera u postrojenjima i na lokacijama izvan postrojenja gdje se nuklearni materijal uobičajeno rabi.

(iii) Opći opis svake zgrade u svakom području, uključujući njezinu uporabu i, ako iz opisa nije očigledno, njezin sadržaj. Opis uključuje kartu područja.

(iv) Opis opsega aktivnosti za svaku lokaciju uključenu u djelatnosti navedene u Prilogu I. ovom Protokolu.

(v) Informacije, koje u svakoj državi pobliže označavaju lokaciju, operativni status i procijenjeni godišnji kapacitet proizvodnje rudnika uranija te postrojenja za obogaćivanje uranija i postrojenja za obogaćivanje torija, kao i tekuću godišnju proizvodnju takvih rudnika i postrojenja za obogaćivanje. Na zahtjev Agencije, Zajednica dostavlja tekuću godišnju proizvodnju pojedinog rudnika ili postrojenja za obogaćivanje. Pribavljanje tih informacija ne zahtijeva detaljno vođenje evidencije o nuklearnom materijalu.

(vi) Informacije vezane za izvorni materijal, koji nije dosegao sastav i čistoću pogodnu za proizvodnju goriva ili za izotopsko obogaćivanje, kako slijedi:

(a) količine, kemijski sastav, uporabu ili planiranu uporabu takvog materijala, bilo u nuklearne ili nenuklearne svrhe, za svaku lokaciju u državama u kojima je materijal prisutan u količinama koje premašuju 10 tona uranija i/ili 20 tona torija, te za sve druge lokacije s količinama većima od 1 tone, ukupno za države kao cjeline, ako ukupna količina premašuje 10 tona uranija ili 20 tona torija. Pribavljanje tih informacija ne zahtijeva detaljno vođenje evidencije o nuklearnom materijalu;

(b) količine, kemijski sastav i odredište svakog izvoza takvog materijala iz država u državu izvan Zajednice, za posebne nenuklearne svrhe, te u količinama koje premašuju:

1) 10 tona uranija, ili kod uzastopnog izvoza uranija u istu državu, pri čemu je svaki izvoz manji od 10 tona, ali ukupno godišnje premašuje 10 tona;

2) 20 tona torija, ili kod uzastopnog izvoza torija u istu državu, pri čemu je svaki izvoz manji od 20 tona, ali ukupno godišnje premašuje 20 tona;

(c) količine, kemijski sastav, trenutačnu lokaciju i uporabu ili planiranu uporabu svakog uvoza takvog materijala u države izvan Zajednice, za posebne nenuklearne svrhe te u količinama koje premašuju:

1) 10 tona uranija, ili kod uzastopnog uvoza uranija, pri čemu je svaki uvoz manji od 10 tona, ali ukupno godišnje premašuje 10 tona;

2) 20 tona torija, ili kod uzastopnog uvoza torija, pri čemu je svaki uvoz manji od 20 tona, ali ukupno godišnje premašuje 20 tona;

pri čemu se podrazumijeva, da se dostavljanje informacija o takvom materijalu namijenjenom za nenuklearnu uporabu ne zahtijeva, jednom kada je takav materijal u svojem obliku za nenuklearnu krajnju uporabu.

(vii) (a) Informacije, koje se odnose na količine, uporabu i lokacije nuklearnog materijala izuzetog iz zaštitnih mjera na temelju članka 37. Sporazuma o zaštitnim mjerama;

(b) informacije, koje se odnose na količine (koje mogu biti u obliku procjena) i uporabe na svakoj lokaciji nuklearnog materijala izuzetog iz zaštitnih mjera prema članku 36. stavku (b) Sporazuma o zaštitnim mjerama, ali koji još nije u obliku za nenuklearnu krajnju uporabu, u količinama koje premašuju one navedene u članku 37. Sporazuma o zaštitnim mjerama. Pribavljanje tih informacija ne zahtijeva detaljno vođenje evidencije o nuklearnom materijalu.

(viii) Informacije, koje se odnose na lokaciju ili daljnju preradu srednjo- ili visokoaktivnog otpada, koji sadrži plutonij, visoko obogaćeni uranij ili uranij-233 za koje su zaštitne mjere ukinute na temelju članka 11. Sporazuma o zaštitnim mjerama. U smislu ovog stavka, pojam »daljnja prerada« ne uključuje prepakiranje otpada ili njegovo daljnje kondicioniranje, koje ne uključuje odvajanje elemenata, za potrebe skladištenja ili odlaganja.

(ix) Sljedeće informacije, koje se odnose na posebnu opremu i nenuklearni materijal naveden u Prilogu II.:

(a) za svaki izvoz takve opreme i takvog materijala iz Zajednice: točan naziv, količina, lokacija planirane uporabe u državi primateljici te datum ili, prema potrebi, očekivani datum izvoza;

(b) na poseban zahtjev Agencije, potvrdu države uvoznice o informacijama, koje je Agenciji dostavila država izvan Zajednice, a koje su u vezi s izvozom takve opreme i materijala u državu uvoznicu.

(x) Opće planove za sljedeće 10-godišnje razdoblje relevantne za razvoj nuklearnoga gorivnog ciklusa (uključujući istraživačke i razvojne djelatnosti vezane uz nuklearni gorivni ciklus), kada su ih odobrila odgovarajuća tijela u državi.

b. Svaka je država obvezna uložiti sve razumne napore kako bi Agenciji osigurala sljedeće informacije:

(i) opći opis i informacije, koje pobliže označavaju lokaciju istraživačkih i razvojnih djelatnosti vezanih uz nuklearni gorivni ciklus, ne uključujući nuklearni materijal, a koje se posebno odnose na obogaćivanje, ponovnu preradu nuklearnoga goriva ili preradu srednjoaktivnog i visokoaktivnog otpada koji sadrži plutonij, visoko obogaćeni uranij ili uranij-233, koje se provode bilo gdje u određenoj državi, ali koje ne financira, odobrava ili nadzire ta država ili se iste ne provode u njezino ime. U smislu ovog stavka, pojam »prerada« srednjoaktivnog ili visoko aktivnog otpada ne uključuje prepakiranje otpada ili njegovo kondicioniranje, koje ne uključuje odvajanje elemenata, za potrebe skladištenja ili odlaganja.

(ii) Opći opis aktivnosti i identitet osobe ili subjekta, koji provode takve aktivnosti na lokacijama koje je Agencija utvrdila izvan područja, za koje Agencija smatra da bi mogle biti funkcionalno povezane s aktivnostima u tom području. Pribavljanje tih informacija predmet je posebnog zahtjeva Agencije. Informacije se dostavljaju u dogovoru s Agencijom i pravodobno.

c. Na zahtjev Agencije, država ili Zajednica, prema potrebi, dostavlja dopunu ili razjašnjenje bilo koje informacije dostavljene prema ovom članku, ako je to relevantno za zaštitne mjere.

Članak 3.

a. Svaka država ili Zajednica, ili obje, prema potrebi dostavljaju Agenciji informacije utvrđene u članku 2. točki a. podtočkama (i), (iii), (iv), (v), članku 2. točki a. podtočki (vi) alineji (a), članku 2. točki a. podtočkama (vii) i (x) i članku 2. točki b. podtočki (i) u roku od 180 dana od dana stupanja na snagu ovog Protokola.

b. Svaka država ili Zajednica, ili obje, prema potrebi dostavljaju Agenciji, do 15. svibnja svake godine, ažurirane informacije navedene u točki (a) za razdoblje koje pokriva prethodnu kalendarsku godinu. Ako se informacije nisu mijenjale od posljednjeg dostavljanja, svaka država ili Zajednica, ili obje, prema potrebi to naznačuju.

c. Zajednica je obvezna, do 15. svibnja svake godine, dostaviti Agenciji informacije utvrđene u članku 2. točki a. podtočki (vi) alinejama (b) i (c) za razdoblje koje pokriva prethodnu kalendarsku godinu.

d. Svaka država Agenciji tromjesečno dostavlja informacije utvrđene u članku 2. točki a. podtočki (ix) alineji (a). Te se informacije dostavljaju u roku od 60 dana od završetka svakog tromjesečja.

e. Zajednica i svaka država dostavljaju Agenciji informacije utvrđene u članku 2. točki a. podtočki (viii) 180 dana prije provođenja daljnje prerade, te do 15. svibnja svake godine, informacije o promjenama u lokaciji, za razdoblje koje pokriva prethodnu kalendarsku godinu.

f. Svaka država i Agencija dogovaraju vremenski tijek i učestalost pribavljanja informacija utvrđenih u članku 2. točki a. podtočki (ii).

g. Svaka država dostavlja Agenciji informacije iz članka 2. točke a. alineje (ix) podtočki (b) u roku od 60 dana od Agencijskog zahtjeva.

DOPUNSKI PRISTUP

Članak 4.

U vezi s provedbom dopunskog pristupa na temelju članka 5. ovog Protokola, primjenjuje se sljedeće:

a. Agencija ne zahtijeva, automatski ili sustavno, provjeru informacija iz članka 2., međutim Agencija ima pristup:

(i) svakoj lokaciji iz članka 5. točke a. podtočke (i) ili (ii) na selektivnoj osnovi, kako bi zajamčila nepostojanje nedeklariranog nuklearnog materijala i aktivnosti;

(ii) svakoj lokaciji iz članka 5. točke b. ili c., kako bi riješila pitanje koje se odnosi na točnost i potpunost informacija dostavljenih na temelju članka 2. ili kako bi riješila nedosljednosti koje se odnose na te informacije;

(iii) svakoj lokaciji iz članka 5. točke a. podtočke (iii) u mjeri, koja je Agenciji potrebna da, u svrhu zaštitnih mjera, potvrdi izjavu Zajednice ili, prema potrebi, države, a koja se odnosi na stanje razgrađenosti postrojenja ili lokacije izvan postrojenja gdje se nuklearni materijal uobičajeno rabio.

b. (i) Osim predviđenog u stavku (ii), Agencija je obvezna određenu državu ili, za pristup iz članka 5. točke a. ili članka 5. točke c. gdje je uključen nuklearni materijal, određenu državu i Zajednicu, obavijestiti o pristupu najmanje 24 sata unaprijed.

(ii) Za pristup bilo kojem mjestu na području, koji se zahtijeva u vezi s obilascima radi provjere projektnih podataka ili ad hoc ili rutinskih inspekcija u tom području, ako Agencija tako zatraži, potrebno je dva sata ranije izdati obavijest, te u iznimnim okolnostima čak i kraće od dva sata.

c. Prethodna obavijest mora biti u pisanom obliku, te sadržavati razloge za pristup i aktivnosti koje treba izvršiti tijekom takvog pristupa.

d. U slučaju pitanja ili nedosljednosti, Agencija je obvezna, određenoj državi i, prema potrebi, Zajednici, pružiti mogućnost da razjasni i olakša rješavanje pitanja ili neusklađenosti. Takvu je mogućnost potrebno pružiti prije zahtjeva za pristup, osim ako Agencija smatra da bi kašnjenje pristupa dovelo u pitanje potrebu zbog koje je pristup zatražen. U svakom slučaju, Agencija ne donosi nikakav zaključak o pitanju ili neusklađenosti, sve dok se određenoj državi i, prema potrebi, Zajednici ne osigura takva mogućnost.

e. Ako s određenom državom nije dogovoreno drukčije, pristup je moguć isključivo tijekom redovnog radnog vremena.

f. Određena država, ili u slučaju pristupa sukladno članku 5. točki a. ili sukladno članku 5. točki c. kada je uključen nuklearni materijal, određena država i Zajednica, imaju pravo da njihovi predstavnici i, prema potrebi, inspektori Zajednice, prate inspektore Agencije tijekom njihovog pristupa, pod uvjetom da se inspektori Agencije time ne zadržavaju ili na drugi način ometaju u izvršenju svojih zadaća.

Članak 5.

Svaka država osigurava Agenciji pristup:

a. (i) svakom mjestu u području;

(ii) svakoj lokaciji utvrđenoj u članku 2. točki a. podtočkama (v) do (viii);

(iii) svakom razgrađenom postrojenju ili razgrađenoj lokaciji izvan postrojenja gdje se nuklearni materijal uobičajeno rabio:

b. svakoj lokaciji, koju određena država odredi na temelju članka 2. točke a. podtočke (i), članka 2. točke a. podtočke (iv), članka 2. točke a. podtočke (ix) alineje (b) ili članka 2. točke b. ili lokaciji različitoj od onih navedenih u stavku a. točki (i), pod uvjetom da je određena država, ako nije u mogućnosti osigurati takav pristup, obvezna uložiti sve razumne napore kako bi, bez odgađanja, na druge načine zadovoljila zahtjeve Agencije;

c. svakoj lokaciji, koju navede Agencija, osim lokacija navedenih u točkama (a) i (b), radi uzimanja uzoraka okoliša specifičnih za lokaciju, pod uvjetom da je određena država, ako nije u mogućnosti osigurati takav pristup, obvezna uložiti sve razumne napore da, bez odgađanja, zadovolji zahtjeve Agencije na susjednim lokacijama ili na druge načine.

Članak 6.

Pri provedbi članka 5., Agencija može provoditi sljedeće aktivnosti:

a. za pristup sukladno članku 5. točki a. podtočki (i) ili (iii): vizualno promatranje; prikupljanje uzoraka okoliša; uporaba uređaja za detekciju i mjerenje zračenja; primjena pečata i drugih uređaja za otkrivanje neovlaštenih manipulacija navedenih u dopunskim dogovorima i druge objektivne mjere koje su se pokazale izvedivima i čiju je primjenu odobrilo Vijeće guvernera (dalje u tekstu »Vijeće«) nakon konzultacija između Agencije, Zajednice i određene države.

b. Za pristup sukladno članku 5. točki a. podtočki (ii): vizualno promatranje; brojanje stavki nuklearnog materijala; nerazarajuća mjerenja i uzorkovanje; uporaba uređaja za detekciju i mjerenje zračenja; pregledavanje evidencije relevantne za količine, podrijetlo i dispoziciju materijala; prikupljanje uzoraka okoliša; te druge objektivne mjere koje su se pokazale tehnički izvedivima i čiju je primjenu odobrilo Vijeće, te nakon konzultacija između Agencije, Zajednice i određene države.

c. Za pristup sukladno članku 5. točki b.: vizualno promatranje; prikupljanje uzoraka okoliša; uporaba uređaja za detekciju i mjerenje zračenja; pregled dokumentacije o zaštitnim mjerama relevantnima za proizvodnju i otpremu; te druge objektivne mjere koje su se pokazale tehnički izvedivima i čiju je primjenu odobrilo Vijeće, te nakon konzultacija između Agencije i određene države.

d. Za pristup sukladno članku 5. točki c.: prikupljanje uzoraka okoliša i, u slučaju da rezultati ne rješavaju pitanje ili nesuglasje u lokaciji koju je navela Agencija na temelju članka 5. točke c., primjena vizualnog promatranja na toj lokaciji, uređaja za detekciju i mjerenje zračenja i drugih objektivnih mjera kako je dogovoreno između određene države i, kad se radi o nuklearnom materijalu, Zajednice i Agencije.

Članak 7.

a. Na zahtjev države, Agencija i ta država donose rješenja o kontroliranom pristupu sukladno ovom Protokolu, kako bi se spriječilo širenje osjetljivih informacija, ispunili zahtjevi sigurnosne i fizičke zaštite ili zaštite vlasničkih ili poslovno osjetljivih informacija. Takva rješenja ne smiju sprečavati Agenciju u provođenju aktivnosti potrebnih da se vjerodostojno zajamči nepostojanje nedeklariranog nuklearnog materijala i djelatnosti na dotičnoj lokaciji, uključujući rješenje pitanja, koji se odnosi na točnost i potpunost informacija navedenih u članku 2. ili proturječnost u vezi s tim informacijama.

b. Država može, prilikom dostavljanja informacija sukladno članku 2., obavijestiti Agenciju o mjestima na području i lokaciji na kojima se može primijeniti kontrolirani pristup.

c. Do stupanja na snagu bilo kojih potrebnih dopunskih dogovora, država može pribjeći kontroliranom pristupu u skladu s odredbama točke a.

Članak 8.

Ništa u ovom Protokolu ne sprečava državu da Agenciji ponudi pristup lokacijama povrh onih navedenih u člancima 5. i 9. ili da od Agencije zatraži provođenje aktivnosti provjere na određenoj lokaciji. Agencija je obvezna, bez odgađanja uložiti sve razumne napore da postupi po tom zahtjevu.

Članak 9.

Svaka država omogućuje Agenciji pristup lokacijama koje je Agencija navela radi uzimanja uzoraka okoliša sa šireg područja, pod uvjetom da, ako država nije u mogućnosti osigurati takav pristup, navedena država uloži sve razumne napore, da zahtjevima Agencije udovolji na alternativnim lokacijama. Agencija ne traži takav pristup dok Vijeće ne potvrdi uzorkovanje okoliša u širem području i proceduralne dogovore za isto, te nakon konzultacija između Agencije i određene države.

Članak 10.

a. Agencija je obvezna određenu državu i, prema potrebi, Zajednicu obavijestiti o:

(i) aktivnostima provedenima prema ovom Protokolu, uključujući one koje se odnose na sva pitanja ili proturječnosti na koje je Agencija skrenula pozornost dotičnoj državi i, prema potrebi, Zajednici, u roku od 60 dana nakon što je Agencija izvršila aktivnosti.

(ii) Rezultatima aktivnosti, u vezi sa svim pitanjima ili proturječnostima na koje je Agencija skrenula pozornost dotičnoj državi i, prema potrebi, Zajednici što je prije moguće, ali u svakom slučaju u roku od 30 dana nakon što je Agencija utvrdila rezultate.

b. Agencija je obvezna određenu državu i Zajednicu obavijestiti o zaključcima do kojih je došla aktivnostima iz ovog Protokola. Zaključci se dostavljaju jednom godišnje.

IMENOVANJE INSPEKTORA AGENCIJE

Članak 11.

a. (i) Glavni direktor obavješćuje Zajednicu i države o odobrenju koje je Vijeće izdalo za svakog službenika Agencije kao inspektora zaštitnih mjera. Ako Zajednica, u roku od tri mjeseca od primitka obavijesti o odobrenju Vijeća, ne obavijesti glavnog direktora o neprihvaćanju takvog službenika kao inspektora za države, inspektor o kojem su Zajednica i države bile obaviještene na taj način, smatra se imenovanim za te države.

(ii) Glavni je direktor obvezan, odgovarajući na zahtjev Zajednice ili na vlastitu inicijativu, odmah obavijestiti Zajednicu i države o povlačenju imenovanja bilo kojeg službenika kao inspektora za države.

b. Smatra se da su Zajednica i države primile obavijest iz točke a. 7 dana od dana kada je Agencija poslala preporučenom poštom obavijest Zajednici i državama.

VIZE

Članak 12.

Svaka je država obvezna u roku od mjesec dana od dana primitka zahtjeva osigurati imenovanom inspektoru, koji je naveden u zahtjevu, odgovarajuće višekratne ulazne/izlazne i/ili tranzitne vize, kada je to potrebno, kako bi mu se omogućio ulazak u i boravak na državnom području određene države, radi provođenja njegovih/njezinih zadaća. Sve potrebne vize moraju biti valjane najmanje godinu dana te se produžuju, prema potrebi, kako bi se pokrilo trajanje inspektorovog imenovanja u državi.

DOPUNSKI DOGOVORI

Članak 13.

a. U slučajevima kada država ili, prema potrebi, Zajednica ili Agencija ukažu na to, da je u dopunskim dogovorima potrebno navesti način na koji će se primjenjivati mjere utvrđene u ovom Protokolu, navedena država ili navedena država te Zajednica i Agencija se o takvim dopunskim dogovorima moraju usuglasiti u roku od 90 dana od dana stupanja na snagu ovog Protokola ili, u slučajevima kada se potreba za takvim dopunskim dogovorima utvrdi nakon stupanja na snagu ovog Protokola, u roku od 90 dana od takvog utvrđivanja.

b. Do stupanja na snagu potrebnih dopunskih dogovora, Agencija ima pravo primijeniti mjere utvrđene u ovom Protokolu.

KOMUNIKACIJSKI SUSTAVI

Članak 14.

a. Svaka je država obvezna dopustiti i zaštititi slobodnu komunikaciju Agencije, koja se za službene potrebe odvija između inspektora Agencije u toj državi i sjedišta Agencije i/ili regionalnih ureda, uključujući nadzirani i nenadzirani prijenos podataka dobivenih iz uređaja Agencije za ograničavanje i/ili nadziranje i mjerenje. Agencija ima pravo, u dogovoru s određenom državom, na uporabu međunarodno uspostavljenih sustava izravne komunikacije, uključujući satelitske sustave i druge oblike telekomunikacija koji se ne upotrebljavaju u toj državi. Na zahtjev države ili Agencije, u dopunskim su dogovorima pobliže naznačene pojedinosti provedbe ovog stavka unutar te države, a koji su u vezi s nadziranim i nenadziranim prijenosom podataka dobivenih iz uređaja Agencije za ograničavanje i/ili nadziranje ili mjerenje.

b. Pri komunikaciji i prijenosu podataka, na način utvrđen u točki a., potrebno je obratiti dužnu pozornost na potrebu zaštite vlasničkih ili poslovno osjetljivih informacija ili projektnih podataka koje određena država smatra iznimno osjetljivima.

ZAŠTITA POVJERLJIVIH INFORMACIJA

Članak 15.

a. Agencija je obvezna održavati strogi režim kako bi osigurala učinkovitu zaštitu od razotkrivanja poslovnih, tehnoloških i industrijskih tajni te ostalih povjerljivih informacija, koje je doznala, uključujući podatke koje je Agencija doznala provodeći ovaj Protokol.

b. Režim iz točke a. uključuje, između ostalog, odredbe koje se odnose na:

(i) opća načela i s njima povezane mjere za postupanje s povjerljivim informacijama;

(ii) uvjete zapošljavanja osoblja u vezi sa zaštitom povjerljivih informacija;

(iii) postupke u slučaju povreda ili navodnih povreda povjerljivosti.

c. Režim iz gornje točke a. odobrava i periodično preispituje Vijeće.

PRILOZI

Članak 16.

a. Prilozi ovom Protokolu čine njegov sastavni dio. Osim za potrebe izmjene priloga I. i II., pojam »Protokol«, kako je upotrijebljen u ovom instrumentu, znači Protokol i priloge zajedno.

b. Popis aktivnosti navedenih u Prilogu I. i popis opreme i materijala naveden u Prilogu II. može izmijeniti Vijeće na temelju savjeta otvorene radne grupe stručnjaka, koju je osnovalo Vijeće. Svaka takva izmjena stupa na snagu četiri mjeseca nakon što ju je Vijeće donijelo.

c. U Prilogu III. ovom Protokolu se navodi na koji način Zajednica i države provode mjere iz ovog Protokola.

STUPANJE NA SNAGU

Članak 17.

a. Ovaj Protokol stupa na snagu na dan kada Agencija primi od Zajednice i države pisanu obavijest da su ispunjeni njihovi uvjeti za stupanje na snagu.

b. Države i Zajednica mogu, bilo kada prije stupanja ovog Protokola na snagu, izjaviti da će ovaj Protokol primjenjivati privremeno.

c. Generalni je direktor obvezan odmah obavijestiti sve države članice Agencije o svakoj izjavi o privremenoj primjeni, kao i o stupanju ovog Protokola na snagu.

DEFINICIJE

Članak 18.

Za potrebe ovog Protokola:

a. istraživačke i razvojne aktivnosti vezane uz nuklearni gorivni ciklus znači one aktivnosti koje se posebno odnose na svaki aspekt procesa ili razvoja sustava bilo koje od sljedećih stavki:

– pretvaranje nuklearnog materijala,

– obogaćivanje nuklearnog materijala,

– proizvodnja nuklearnoga goriva,

– reaktori,

– postrojenja u kojima se može postići kritičnost,

– prerada nuklearnoga goriva,

– prerada (ne uključujući prepakiranje ili kondicioniranje, koje ne uključuje odvajanje elemenata, za potrebe skladištenja ili odlaganja) srednjo- ili visoko radioaktivnog otpada koji sadrži plutonij, visoko obogaćeni uranij ili uranij-233,

ali ne uključuje aktivnosti u vezi s teorijskim ili osnovnim znanstvenim istraživanjem ili istraživanjem i razvojem primjene radioaktivnih izotopa u industriji, medicini, hidrologiji i poljoprivredi, učinke na zdravlje i okoliš te poboljšano održavanje.

b. mjesto ispitivanja znači područje koje su Zajednica i država razgraničile u relevantnim projektnim podacima za postrojenje, uključujući zatvoreno postrojenje, te u podacima koji se odnose na lokaciju izvan postrojenja gdje se nuklearni materijal uobičajeno rabi, uključujući zatvorenu lokaciju izvan postrojenja gdje se nuklearni materijal uobičajeno rabio (to je ograničeno na lokacije s vrućim komorama ili gdje se provode aktivnosti u vezi s pretvorbom, obogaćivanjem, proizvodnjom goriva ili preradom). »Mjesto ispitivanja« također uključuje sve objekte, postavljene zajedno s postrojenjem ili lokacijom za opskrbljivanje ili uporabu bitnih usluga, uključujući: vruće komore za obradu ozračenih materijala koji ne sadrži nuklearni materijal, objekte za obradu, skladištenje i odlaganje otpada te zgrade povezane s navedenim aktivnostima, koje je određena država odredila u članku 2. točki a. podtočki (iv).

c. razgrađeno postrojenje ili razgrađena lokacija izvan postrojenja znači objekt ili lokacija na kojoj su preostale građevine i oprema koji su bitni za njezinu uporabu uklonjeni ili učinjeni neuporabljivima, tako da nisu upotrebljivi za skladištenje te se ne mogu više upotrebljavati za rukovanje, preradu ili uporabu nuklearnog materijala.

d. zatvoreno postrojenje ili zatvorena lokacija izvan postrojenja znači objekt ili lokacija na kojoj je rad zaustavljen i nuklearni materijal uklonjen, ali koja nije razgrađena.

e. visoko obogaćeni uranij znači uranij koji sadrži 20% ili više izotopnog uranija-235.

f. uzorkovanje okoliša specifičnih za lokaciju znači prikupljanje uzoraka okoliša (npr. zraka, vode, raslinja, tla, prljavštine) na lokaciji i u neposrednoj blizini lokacije, koju je odredila Agencija kako bi Agenciji pomogli pri donošenju zaključaka o odsustvu nedeklariranog nuklearnog materijala ili nuklearnih aktivnosti na određenoj lokaciji.

g. uzorkovanje okoliša u širem području znači prikupljanje uzoraka okoliša (npr. zraka, vode, raslinja, tla, prljavštine) na nekoliko lokacija koje je odredila Agencija kako bi Agenciji pomogli pri donošenju zaključaka o odsutnosti nedeklariranog nuklearnog materijala ili nuklearnih aktivnosti u širem području.

h. nuklearni materijal znači svaki izvoran ili poseban fisibilan materijal kako je definirano u članku XX. Statuta. Pojam izvoran materijal ne tumači se kao pojam koji se primjenjuje na rudu ili ostatke rude. Svaka odluka Vijeća na temelju članka XX. Statuta Agencije nakon stupanja na snagu ovog Protokola, koja se odnosi na materijale za koje se smatra da su izvoran ili poseban fisibilan materijal stupa na snagu na temelju ovog Protokola ako je prihvate Zajednica i države.

i. postrojenje znači:

(i) reaktor, postrojenje u kojem se može postići kritičnost, postrojenje za pretvorbu, postrojenje za proizvodnju, postrojenje za preradu, postrojenje za odvajanje izotopa ili objekt za odvojeno skladištenje, ili

(ii) svaku lokaciju na kojoj se uobičajeno upotrebljava nuklearni materijal u količinama većima od jednog efektivnog kilograma.

j. lokacija izvan postrojenja znači svaki objekt ili lokaciju, koja nije postrojenje, a na kojoj se nuklearni materijal uobičajeno upotrebljava u količinama od jednog efektivnog kilograma ili manje.

SASTAVLJENO u Beču dvadeset i drugog dana mjeseca rujna 1998. u po dva primjerka na danskom, nizozemskom, engleskom, finskom, francuskom, njemačkom, grčkom, talijanskom, portugalskom, španjolskom i švedskom jeziku, s time da je svaki tekst jednako vjerodostojan, osim u slučaju nepodudarnosti, kada su mjerodavni tekstovi sastavljeni na službenim jezicima Vijeća guvernera Međunarodne agencije za nuklearnu energiju.

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PRILOG I.

POPIS DJELATNOSTI NAVEDENIH U ČLANKU 2. TOČKI a. PODTOČKI (iv) PROTOKOLA

(i) Proizvodnja centrifugalnih rotorskih cijevi ili montaža plinskih centrifuga.

Pojam centrifugalne rotorske cijevi znači cilindre s tankim stijenkama kako je opisano u točki 5.1.1. podtočki (b) Priloga II.

Pojam plinske centrifuge znači centrifuge, kako je opisano u uvodnoj napomeni točke 5.1. Priloga II.

(ii) Izrada difuzijskih barijera.

Pojam difuzijske barijere znači tanke, porozne filtre, kako je opisano u točki 5.3.1. podtočki (a) Priloga II.

(iii) Proizvodnja ili montaža laserskih sustava.

Pojam laserski sustavi znači sustave, koji uključuju elemente, kako je opisano u točki 5.7. Priloga II.

(iv) Izrada ili montaža elektromagnetskih separatora izotopa.

Pojam elektromagnetski separatori izotopa znači elemente navedene u točki 5.9.1. Priloga II., koji sadrže izvore iona, kako je opisano u točki 5.9.1. podtočki (a) Priloga II.

(v) Izrada ili montaža kolona i opreme za ekstrakciju.

Pojam kolone i oprema za ekstrakciju znači elemente, kako je opisano u točkama 5.6.1., 5.6.2., 5.6.3., 5.6.5., 5.6.6., 5.6.7. i 5.6.8. Priloga II.

(vi) Izrada mlaznica za aerodinamičnu separaciju ili vrtložnih cijevi.

Pojam mlaznice za aerodinamičnu separaciju ili vrtložne cijevi znači mlaznice za separaciju i vrtložne cijevi, kako je opisano u točkama 5.5.1. i 5.5.2. Priloga II.

(vii) Proizvodnja ili montaža sustava za stvaranje plazme uranija.

Pojam sustavi za stvaranje plazme uranija znači sustave za stvaranje plazme uranija, kako je opisano u točki 5.8.3. Priloga II.

(viii) Proizvodnja cirkonijevih cijevi.

Pojam cirkonijeve cijevi znači cijevi, kako je opisano u točki 1.6. Priloga II.

(ix) Proizvodnja ili poboljšanje kvalitete teške vode ili deuterija.

Pojam teška voda ili deuterij znači deuterij, teška voda (deuterijev oksid) i sve druge spojeve deuterija u kojima omjer atoma deuterija i vodika premašuje 1:5 000.

(x) Izrada grafita nuklearne kakvoće.

Pojam grafit nuklearne kakvoće znači grafit, koji ima razinu čistoće bolju od pet čestica na milijun bor-ekvivalenta te gustoću veću od 1,50 g/cm3.

(xi) Proizvodnja boca za ozračeno gorivo.

Pojam boca za ozračeno gorivo znači posuda za prijevoz i/ili skladištenje ozračenoga goriva, koja osigurava kemijsku, toplinsku i radiološku zaštitu, te koja tijekom rukovanja, prijevoza i skladištenja otpušta toplinu raspada.

(xii) Izrada reaktorskih kontrolnih šipki.

Pojam reaktorske kontrolne šipke znači šipke, kako je opisano u točki 1.4. Priloga II.

(xiii) Izrada spremnika i posuda sigurnih od kritičnosti.

Pojam spremnici i posude sigurni od kritičnosti znači elementi, kako je opisano u točki 3.2. i 3.4. Priloga II.

(xiv) Proizvodnja strojeva za usitnjavanje elemenata ozračenoga goriva.

Pojam strojevi za usitnjavanje elemenata ozračenoga goriva znači oprema, kako je opisana u točki 3.1. Priloga II.

(xv) Izrada vrućih komora.

Pojam vruće komore znači komore ili međusobno povezane komore ukupnog volumena od najmanje 6 m3 sa zaštitom jednakom ili većom od ekvivalenta 0,5 m betona, gustoće 3,2 g/cm3 ili veće, te koje imaju opremu za daljinsko upravljanje.

PRILOG II.

POPIS POSEBNE OPREME I NENUKLEARNOG MATERIJALA ZA IZVJEŠTAVANJE O IZVOZU I UVOZU SUKLADNO ČLANKU 2. TOČKI a. PODTOČKI (ix)

1. REAKTORI I NJIHOVA OPREMA

1.1. Potpuni nuklearni reaktori

Nuklearni reaktori osposobljeni za rad tako da održavaju kontroliranu samoodrživu lančanu reakciju fisije, ne uključujući reaktore nulte snage definirane kao reaktori, koji su projektirani tako, da pri maksimalnoj brzini ne proizvedu više od 100 grama plutonija godišnje.

NAPOMENA ZA POJAŠNJENJE

»Nuklearni reaktor« u osnovi uključuje elemente unutar reaktorske posude ili izravno priključene na reaktorsku posudu, opremu kojom se kontrolira razina snage u jezgri, te komponente koje uobičajeno sadrže primarno rashladno sredstvo jezgre reaktora ili su s njim u neposrednom kontaktu ili ga kontroliraju.

Namjera nije isključiti reaktore koji se razumno mogu preinačiti tako da proizvode znatno više od 100 grama plutonija godišnje. Reaktori projektirani za neprekidan rad na znatnim razinama snage, bez obzira na svoj kapacitet za proizvodnju plutonija, ne smatraju se »reaktorima nulte snage«.

1.2. Reaktorske posude pod tlakom

Metalne posude, kao cjelovite jedinice ili kao njihovi glavni dijelovi izrađeni u radionicama, te koje su posebno projektirane ili izrađene tako da sadrže jezgru nuklearnog reaktora, kako je određeno u točki 1.1. te koje mogu izdržati radni tlak primarnog rashladnog sredstva.

NAPOMENA ZA POJAŠNJENJE

Točka 1.2. obuhvaća gornju ploču reaktorske posude pod tlakom kao glavni dio posude pod tlakom proizveden u radionici.

Unutarnje dijelove reaktora (npr. potporne stupove i ploče za jezgru te druge unutarnje dijelove, cijevi vodilica za kontrolne šipke, toplinske štitove, skretne pregrade, rešetkaste ploče jezgre, difuzijske ploče itd.) uobičajeno dobavlja dobavljač reaktora. U nekim slučajevima proizvodnja posude pod tlakom također uključuje neke unutarnje potporne komponente. Dobava tih sastavnih dijelova, koji su dovoljno kritični za siguran i pouzdan rad reaktora (samim time i za jamstva i odgovornost dobavljača reaktora), izvan osnovnog ugovora o isporuci samog reaktora nije neuobičajena praksa. Stoga, iako odvojena dobava tih jedinstvenih, posebno projektiranih i izrađenih, kritičkih, velikih i skupih elemenata nije nemoguća, takav se način dobave smatra malo vjerojatnim.

1.3. Uređaji za izmjenu reaktorskoga goriva

Oprema za rukovanje, koja je posebno projektirana ili izrađena za umetanje ili uklanjanje goriva iz nuklearnog reaktora, kako je definirano u točki 1.1., a koja omogućuje punjenje tijekom rada ili koja upotrebljava tehnički sofisticirane karakteristike za pozicioniranje ili centriranje radi omogućavanja složenih postupaka vađenja goriva, kao što su postupci kod kojih neposredna vizualna kontrola ili pristup gorivu uobičajeno nisu mogući.

1.4. Reaktorske kontrolne šipke

Šipke posebno projektirane ili izrađene za nadzor nad i upravljanje brzinom reakcije u nuklearnom reaktoru, kako je definirano u točki 1.1.

NAPOMENA ZA POJAŠNJENJE

Osim dijela za apsorpciju neutrona, ova točka također uključuje konstrukcije za podupiranje ili ovješenje, zbog čega se dobavlja odvojeno.

1.5. Reaktorske tlačne cijevi

Cijevi koje su posebno projektirane ili izrađene tako da sadrže gorivne elemente i primarno rashladno sredstvo u reaktoru, kako je određeno u točki 1.1. pri radnom tlaku većem od 5,1 MPa (740 psi).

1.6. Cirkonijeve cijevi

Cirkonij metal i legure u obliku cijevi ili cijevnih sklopova te u količinama koje premašuju 500 kg u bilo kojem razdoblju od 12 mjeseci, posebno projektirane ili izrađene za uporabu u reaktoru, kako je definirano u točki 1.1. te u kojima je omjer hafnija i cirkonija manji od 1:500 težinskih udjela.

1.7. Crpke za primarno rashladno sredstvo

Crpke posebno projektirane ili izrađene za cirkulaciju primarnog rashladnog sredstva u nuklearnim reaktorima, kako je definirano u točki 1.1.

NAPOMENA ZA POJAŠNJENJE

Posebno projektirane ili izrađene crpke mogu uključivati razrađene hermetički zatvorene ili višestruko hermetički zatvorene sustave kako bi se spriječilo propuštanje primarnog rashladnog sredstva, oklopljene motorne crpke i crpke s inercijskim sustavima. Navedena se definicija odnosi na crpke čija je usklađenost potvrđena s normom NC-1 ili istovjetnim normama.

2. NENUKLEARNI MATERIJALI ZA REAKTORE

2.1. Deuterij i teška voda

Deuterij, teška voda (deuterijev oksid) i svi drugi deuterijevi spojevi u kojima omjer deuterijevih i vodikovih atoma premašuje 1:5 000 za uporabu u nuklearnom reaktoru, kako je definirano u točki 1.1., u količinama koje premašuju 200 kg atoma deuterija za bilo koju zemlju primatelja u bilo kojem razdoblju od 12 mjeseci.

2.2. Grafit nuklearne kakvoće

Grafit koji ima razinu čistoće bolju od 5 čestica na milijun bor-ekvivalenta te gustoću veću od 1,50 g/cm3 za uporabu u nuklearnom reaktoru, kako je definirano u točki 1.1., u količinama koje premašuju 3 x 104 kg (30 tona) za bilo koju zemlju primatelja u bilo kojem razdoblju od 12 mjeseci.

NAPOMENA

U smislu izvještavanja, vlada utvrđuje da li su izvozi grafita, koji zadovoljava gore navedene specifikacije, namijenjeni uporabi u nuklearnom reaktoru ili to nisu.

3. POSTROJENJA ZA PONOVNU PRERADU OZRAČENIH GORIVNIH ELEMENATA I OPREMA KOJA JE U TU SVRHU POSEBNO PROJEKTIRANA ILI IZRAĐENA

UVODNA NAPOMENA

Ponovnom se preradom ozračenog nuklearnoga goriva plutonij i uranij odvajaju od visoko radioaktivnih fisijskih produkata i ostalih transuranijskih elemenata. Odvajanje se može postići različitim tehničkim postupcima. Međutim, purex je tijekom godina postao najčešće upotrebljavan i prihvaćen postupak. Purex uključuje otapanje ozračenog nuklearnoga goriva u dušičnoj kiselini, nakon čega ekstrakcijom otapala uz upotrebu mješavina tributil fosfata u nekom organskom sredstvu za razrjeđivanje dolazi do odvajanja uranija, plutonija i fisijskih produkata.

Purex postrojenja imaju međusobno slične procesne funkcije, uključujući: usitnjavanje ozračenoga gorivnog elementa, otapanje goriva, ekstrakciju otapala i skladištenje procesne tekućine. Također mogu sadržavati opremu za toplinsku denitraciju uranijevog nitrata, pretvorbu plutonijevog nitrata u oksid ili metal i obradu otpadnih tekućih fisijskih produkata u oblik pogodan za dugotrajno skladištenje ili odlaganje. Međutim, specifična se vrsta i konfiguracija opreme za izvođenje tih funkcija u Purex postrojenjima može razlikovati iz nekoliko razloga, kao što su tip i količina ozračenog nuklearnoga goriva namijenjenog preradi, planirano raspolaganje uporabljenih materijala te filozofija sigurnosti i održavanja ugrađena u nacrt postrojenja.

»Postrojenje za ponovnu preradu ozračenih gorivnih elemenata« uključuje opremu i komponente koje uobičajeno dolaze u izravan dodir s ozračenim gorivom, glavnim tokovima obrade nuklearnog materijala i fisijskih produkata te njima izravno upravljaju.

Navedeni procesi, uključujući cjelovite sustave za pretvorbu plutonija i proizvodnju metala plutonija mogu se utvrditi mjerama poduzetima radi izbjegavanja kritičnosti (npr. geometrijom), izloženosti zračenju (npr. štitovima) i opasnosti od toksičnosti (npr. kontejnmentom).

Stavke opreme za koje se smatra da su obuhvaćene izrazom »i oprema posebno projektirana ili izrađena« za ponovnu preradu ozračenih gorivnih elemenata obuhvaćaju:

3.1. Strojevi za usitnjavanje ozračenih gorivnih elemenata

UVODNA NAPOMENA

Ova oprema reže košuljicu gorivnog elementa kako bi se ozračeni nuklearni materijal izložio otapanju. Za to se najčešće upotrebljavaju posebno projektirane škare za rezanje metala, premda se može rabiti i suvremena oprema, kao primjerice laseri.

Daljinski upravljana oprema koja je posebno projektirana ili izrađena za upotrebu u gore navedenom postrojenju za ponovnu preradu i namijenjena rezanju, usitnjavanju ili sjeckanju ozračenih nuklearnih gorivnih sklopova, snopova ili šipki.

3.2. Posude za otapanje

UVODNA NAPOMENA

U posude za otapanje obično se unosi usitnjeno istrošeno gorivo. U tim se posudama, koje su sigurne od kritičnosti, ozračeni nuklearni materijal otapa u dušičnoj kiselini, dok se preostale ljuske uklanjaju iz procesa.

Spremnici sigurni od kritičnosti (npr. posude malog promjera, prstenasti ili pločasti spremnici) posebno projektirani ili izrađeni za upotrebu u postrojenju za preradu, na gore navedeni način, namijenjeni su otapanju ozračenog nuklearnoga goriva, otporni su na vruću, visoko korozivnu tekućinu te se također mogu daljinski puniti i održavati.

3.3. Ekstraktori s otapalom i oprema za ekstrakciju otapala

UVODNA NAPOMENA

Ekstraktori s otapalom primaju otopinu ozračenoga goriva iz posuda za otapanje i organsku otopinu koja odvaja uranij, plutonij i fisijske produkte. Oprema za ekstrakciju otapala je obično projektirana tako da ispunjava stroge radne parametre, kao što su dugi radni vijek bez zahtjeva za održavanjem ili mogućnost prilagodbe radi jednostavne zamjene, zatim jednostavnost rada i upravljanja te prilagodljivost promjenama u uvjetima samog procesa.

Posebno projektirani ili izrađeni ekstraktori s otapalom, kao što su punjene ili pulsirajuće kolone, taložne mješalice ili centrifugalni kontaktori za upotrebu u postrojenju za ponovnu preradu ozračenoga goriva. Ekstraktori s otapalom moraju biti otporni na korozivno djelovanje dušične kiseline. Ekstraktori s otapalom su uobičajeno izrađeni po krajnje visokim standardima (uključujući posebne tehnike zavarivanja i inspekcije, osiguranja kvalitete i kontrole kvalitete) od nehrđajućeg čelika s niskim postotkom ugljika, titana, cirkonija ili drugih materijala visoke kakvoće.

3.4. Posude za držanje ili skladištenje kemikalija

UVODNA NAPOMENA

Iz faze ekstrakcije otapala proizlaze tri glavna toka procesa tekućine. Pri daljnjoj se preradi u sva tri toka upotrebljavaju posude za držanje ili skladištenje, kako slijedi:

(a) otopina čistog uranijevog nitrata se koncentrira isparavanjem i prelazi u postupak denitracije gdje se pretvara u uranijev oksid. Taj se oksid ponovo upotrebljava u nuklearnom gorivnom ciklusu;

(b) otopina visoko radioaktivnih fisijskih produkata se obično koncentrira isparavanjem i skladišti kao tekući koncentrat. Taj koncentrat kasnije može ispariti i pretvoriti se u oblik prikladan za skladištenje ili odlaganje;

(c) otopina se čistog plutonijevog nitrata koncentrira i skladišti do njezinog prijenosa u daljnje faze postupka. Posebno, posude za držanje i skladištenje plutonijevih otopina su projektirane da sprečavaju probleme kritičnosti, koji proizlaze iz promjena u koncentraciji i obliku tog toka.

Posebno projektirane i izrađene posude za držanje i skladištenje koje se upotrebljavaju u postrojenju za ponovnu preradu ozračenoga goriva. Posude za držanje i skladištenje moraju biti otporne na korozivno djelovanje dušične kiseline. Posude za držanje i skladištenje su obično izrađene od materijala kao što su nehrđajući čelici s niskim postotkom ugljika, titan ili cirkonij, ili drugih materijala visoke kakvoće. Posude za držanje i skladištenje mogu biti projektirane za daljinsko upravljanje i održavanje, te mogu imati sljedeće karakteristike za kontrolu nuklearne kritičnosti:

1) stijenke ili unutarnje strukture s bor-ekvivalentom najmanje 2%, ili

2) maksimalni promjer od 175 mm (7") za cilindrične posude ili

3) maksimalnu širinu od 75 mm (3") za pločastu ili prstenastu posudu.

3.5. Sustav za pretvorbu plutonijevog nitrata u oksid

UVODNA NAPOMENA

U većini postrojenja za ponovnu preradu, ovaj završni postupak uključuje pretvorbu otopine plutonijevog nitrata u plutonijev dioksid. Glavne zadaće u tom postupku su: skladištenje i prilagodbu materijala za napajanje procesa, taloženje i odvajanje krute/tekuće frakcije, oksidacija, rukovanje proizvodom, provjetravanje, zbrinjavanje otpada i kontrola procesa.

Potpuni sustavi posebno projektirani ili izrađeni za pretvorbu plutonijevog nitrata u plutonijev oksid, posebno su prilagođeni izbjegavanju učinaka kritičnosti i zračenja te minimaliziraju opasnosti od toksičnosti.

3.6. Sustav za pretvorbu plutonijevog oksida u metal plutonija

UVODNA NAPOMENA

Ovaj postupak, koji može biti povezan s postrojenjem za ponovnu preradu, uključuje fluoriranje plutonijevog dioksida, u pravilu s visoko korozivnim fluorovodikom, pri čemu nastaje plutonijev fluorid, koji se naknadno uporabom metala kalcija visoke čistoće reducira, stvarajući metalni plutonij i šljaku kalcijevog fluorida. Glavne funkcije uključene u taj postupak su: fluoriranje (npr. uključujući opremu proizvedenu od plemenitog metala ili njime obloženu), reduciranje metala (npr. upotrebom keramičkih lonaca za taljenje), dobivanje šljake, rukovanje proizvodom, provjetravanje, zbrinjavanje otpada i kontrola postupka.

Potpuni sustavi posebno projektirani ili izrađeni za proizvodnju metala plutonija, posebno su prilagođeni tako da omogućuju izbjegavanje učinaka kritičnosti i zračenja, te minimaliziraju opasnosti od toksičnosti.

4. POSTROJENJE ZA PROIZVODNJU GORIVNIH ELEMENATA

»Postrojenje za proizvodnju gorivnih elemenata« uključuje opremu:

(a) koja obično dolazi u izravan dodir s nuklearnim materijalom, ili ga izravno prerađuje ili upravlja tijekom proizvodnje nuklearnog materijala; ili

(b) koja hermetički zatvara nuklearni materijal unutar košuljice.

5. POSTROJENJA ZA SEPARACIJU IZOTOPA URANIJA I OPREMA, OSIM ANALITIČKIH INSTRUMENATA, POSEBNO PROJEKTIRANA ILI IZRAĐENA U TE SVRHE

Stavke opreme za koje se smatra da su obuhvaćene izrazom »oprema, osim analitičkih instrumenata, koja je posebno projektirana ili izrađena« te koje služe za odvajanje izotopa uranija, uključuju:

5.1. Plinske centrifuge te sklopove i komponente posebno projektirane ili izrađene za uporabu u plinskim centrifugama

UVODNA NAPOMENA

Plinska se centrifuga obično sastoji od cilindra (cilindara) tankih stijenki promjera između 75 mm (3") i 400 mm (16"), koji se nalazi u vakuumskom okruženju i vrti velikom obodnom brzinom od otprilike 300 m/s ili više oko svoje okomite osi. Da bi se postigla velika brzina, materijali za izradu rotirajućih komponenti moraju biti visoke čvrstoće u odnosu na gustoću, a radi minimiziranja neuravnoteženosti rotorski sklop i njegove pojedinačne komponente moraju biti izrađene s vrlo malim tolerancijama. Za razliku od drugih centrifuga, za plinsku je centrifugu za obogaćivanje uranija karakteristično da unutar komore rotora ima rotirajuću(-e) skretnu(-e) pregradu(-e) u obliku diska i uređaj stacionarnih cijevi za dovođenje i odvođenje plina UF6 i koji se sastoji od najmanje tri odvojena kanala, od kojih su dva spojena na lopatice što se protežu od osi rotora prema periferiji komore rotora. U vakuumskom se okruženju također nalazi niz kritičnih elemenata koji ne rotiraju i koje, iako su posebno projektirani, nije teško proizvesti niti se proizvode iz posebnih materijala. Međutim, centrifugalno postrojenje zahtijeva veći broj tih komponenti, tako da količine mogu dati važnu naznaku krajnje uporabe.

5.1.1. Rotirajuće komponente

(a) Potpuni rotorski sklopovi

Cilindri s tankim stijenkama ili nekoliko međusobno spojenih cilindara s tankim stijenkama, izrađenih od jednog ili više materijala visoke čvrstoće u odnosu na gustoću, opisanih u NAPOMENI ZA POJAŠNJENJE u ovom odsjeku. Ako su međusobno povezani, tada su cilindri spojeni fleksibilnim mjehovima ili prstenima, kako je opisano u dolje navedenom odjeljku 5.1.1. točki (c). Rotor je u konačnom obliku opremljen unutarnjom (unutarnjim) skretnom(-im) pregradom(-ama) i poklopcem(-ima) kako je opisano u sljedećem odjeljku 5.1.1. točkama (d) i (e). Međutim, čitav se sklop može isporučiti samo djelomično sastavljen.

(b) Rotorske cijevi

Posebno projektirani ili izrađeni cilindri tankih stijenki debljine 12 mm (0,5") ili manje, promjera između 75 mm (3") i 400 mm (16") i proizvedeni od jednog ili više materijala visoke čvrstoće u odnosu na gustoću, opisanih u NAPOMENI ZA POJAŠNJENJE u ovom odsjeku.

(c) Prsteni ili mjehovi

Komponente posebno projektirane ili izrađene tako da lokalno podupiru rotorske cijevi ili spoje nekoliko rotorskih cijevi. Mijeh je kratki cilindar sa stijenkom debljine 3 mm (0,12") ili manje, promjera između 75 mm (3") i 400 mm (16"), s naborima i izrađen od materijala visoke čvrstoće u odnosu na gustoću, opisanog u NAPOMENI ZA POJAŠNJENJE u ovom odsjeku.

(d) Skretne pregrade

Komponente u obliku diska s promjerom između 75 mm (3") i 400 mm (16") posebno projektirane ili izrađene za ugradnju u centrifugalne rotorske cijevi, kako bi polazne komore izolirale od glavne separacijske komore te kako bi, u nekim slučajevima, potpomogle cirkulaciju plina UF6 unutar glavne separacijske komore rotorske cijevi, te proizvedene od materijala visoke čvrstoće u odnosu na gustoću, opisanog u NAPOMENI ZA POJAŠNJENJE u ovom odsjeku.

(e) Gornji poklopci/donji poklopci

Komponente u obliku diska s promjerom između 75 mm (3") i 400 mm (16"), posebno projektirane ili izrađene da pristaju krajevima rotorske cijevi i tako zadržavaju UF6 unutar rotorske cijevi, te da u nekim slučajevima kao sastavni dio podupiru, zadržavaju ili sadrže element gornjeg ležaja (gornji poklopac) ili nose rotirajuće elemente motora i donjeg ležaja (donji poklopac), a izrađene su od materijala visoke čvrstoće u odnosu na gustoću, opisanog u NAPOMENI ZA POJAŠNJENJE u ovom odsjeku.

NAPOMENA ZA POJAŠNJENJE

Materijali, koji se upotrebljavaju za izradu rotirajuće komponente centrifuge su:

(a) legirani čelik maksimalne vlačne čvrstoće od 2,05 x 109 N/m2 (300 000 psi) ili više,

(b) legure aluminija maksimalne vlačne čvrstoće od 0,46 x 109 N/m2 (67 000 psi) ili više,

(c) vlaknasti materijali pogodni za upotrebu u složenim konstrukcijama, koji imaju specifičan modul od 12,3 x 106 m ili veći, te specifičnu maksimalnu vlačnu čvrstoću od 0,3 x 106 m ili veću (»specifični modul« je Youngov modul u N/m2 podijeljen sa specifičnom težinom u N/m3; »specifična maksimalna vlačna čvrstoća« je maksimalna vlačna čvrstoća u N/m2 podijeljena sa specifičnom težinom u N/m3).

5.1.2. Statičke komponente

(a) Magnetski ovjesni ležajevi

Posebno projektirani ili izrađeni sklopovi ležajeva, koji se sastoje od prstenastog magneta ovješenog u kućištu koje sadrži prigušujuće sredstvo. Kućište se izrađuje od materijala otpornog na UF6 (vidjeti NAPOMENU ZA POJAŠNJENJE u odjeljku 5.2.). Magnet je spojen s polnim nastavkom ili drugim magnetom pričvršćenim na gornjem poklopcu, opisanog u odjeljku 5.1.1. točki (e). Magnet može imati oblik prstena s omjerom između vanjskog i unutarnjeg promjera manjim ili jednakim 1,6:1. Magnet može biti u stanju da je početna permeabilnost 0,15 H/m (120 000 u CGS jedinicama) ili veća, ili remanencija 98,5% ili više, ili energetski produkt veći od 80 kJ/m3 (107 gauss-oersteda). Osim uobičajenih svojstava materijala preduvjet je, da je odstupanje magnetskih osi od geometrijskih osi ograničeno na vrlo male tolerancije (manje od 0,1 mm ili 0,004 in) ili da se posebno zahtijeva homogenost materijala magneta.

(b) Ležajevi/prigušivači

Posebno projektirani ili izrađeni ležajevi koji sadrže sklop rukavac/blazinica ugrađen na prigušivaču. Rukavac je uobičajeno osovina od kaljenog čelika s polukuglom na jednom kraju te s pričvršćenjem za donji poklopac na drugom kraju, opisanom u odjeljku 5.1.1. točki (e). Međutim, osovina također može imati ugrađen hidrodinamički ležaj. Blazinica ima oblik kuglice s polu-kuglastim udubljenjem na jednoj strani. Te komponente se često isporučuju odvojeno od prigušivača.

(c) Molekularne crpke

Posebno projektirani ili izrađeni cilindri, koji imaju unutarnje strojno obrađene ili izdubljene spiralne utore i unutarnje strojno obrađene provrte. Karakteristične dimenzije su: unutarnji promjer od 75 mm (3") do 400 mm (16"), debljina stijenke od 10 mm (0,4") ili više, s duljinom jednakom ili većom od promjera. Utori su obično pravokutnog presjeka i duboki 2 mm (0,08") ili više.

(d) Statori motora

Posebno projektirani ili izrađeni statori prstenastog oblika za višefazne izmjenične motore velike brzine s histerezom (ili magnetnim otporom) za sinkroni rad u vakuumu, u području frekvencije od 600-2 000 Hz i području snage od 50-1 000 VA. Statori se sastoje od višefaznih namota na slojevitoj željeznoj jezgri malih gubitaka sastavljenoj od tankih slojeva uobičajene debljine 2,0 mm (0,08") ili manje.

(e) Kućište centrifuge/spremnici

Komponente posebno projektirane ili izrađene za ugradnju sklopa rotorskih cijevi plinske centrifuge. Kućište se sastoji od nepomičnog cilindra s debljinom stijenki do 30 mm (1,2") s preciznim strojno obrađenim krajevima za smještaj ležajeva, te s jednom ili više prirubnica za ugradnju. Strojno obrađeni krajevi su međusobno paralelni i okomiti na uzdužnu os cilindra s odstupanjem unutar 0,05° ili manje. Kućište također može imati saćastu strukturu za smještaj nekoliko rotorskih cijevi. Kućišta su izrađena od materijala otpornih na korozivno djelovanje UF6 ili zaštićena takvim materijalima.

(f) Lopatice

Posebno projektirane ili izrađene cijevi s unutarnjim promjerom do 12 mm (0,5") za ekstrakciju plina UF6 iz rotorske cijevi pomoću pilot cijevi (tj. s otvorom usmjerenim prema obodnom toku plina u rotorskoj cijevi, na primjer savijanjem kraja radijalno postavljene cijevi), a koje se mogu pričvrstiti na središnji sustav za ekstrakciju plina. Cijevi su izrađene od materijala otpornih na korozivno djelovanje UF6 ili su zaštićene takvim materijalima.

5.2. Posebno projektirani ili izrađeni pomoćni sustavi, oprema i komponente za postrojenja za obogaćivanje s plinskim centrifugama

UVODNA NAPOMENA

Pomoćni sustavi, oprema i komponente za postrojenje za obogaćivanje s plinskim centrifugama su sustavi potrebni za napajanje centrifuga s UF6, za međusobno povezivanje pojedinačnih centrifuga tako da oblikuju kaskade (ili stupnjeve) te na taj način omogućuju postupno sve veće obogaćivanje, te za odvajanje »produkta« i »ostataka« UF6 iz centrifuga, zajedno s opremom potrebnom za pogon centrifuga ili upravljanje postrojenjem.

UF6 obično isparava iz krutog agregatnog stanja uz primjenu zagrijanih autoklava te se pomoću kaskadnog cjevovodnog kolektora u plinovitom stanju dovodi u centrifuge. Plinski tokovi »produkta« i »ostataka« UF6 iz centrifuga se također kaskadnim cjevovodnim kolektorom dovode u hladne stupice (koje rade na otprilike 203 K (−70 °C)) gdje se kondenziraju prije daljnjeg prijenosa u pogodne spremnike za prijevoz ili skladištenje. Budući da se postrojenje za obogaćivanje sastoji od više tisuća centrifuga poredanih u kaskade, dužina kaskadnog razvodnog cjevovoda iznosi nekoliko kilometara povezanih s nekoliko tisuća zavara i višekratnim ponavljanjem strukture. Oprema, komponente i cjevovodni sustavi se izrađuju po vrlo visokim standardima postavljenima za vakuum i čistoću.

5.2.1 Sustavi za napajanje/sustavi za odvođenje produkta i ostataka

Posebno projektirani ili izrađeni procesni sustavi uključuju:

– napojne autoklave (ili stanice), koji se rabe za dovođenje UF6 u kaskade centrifuga pri tlaku do 100 kPa (15 psi) i protokom od 1 kg/h ili više,

– desublimatore (ili hladne stupice), koji se upotrebljavaju za uklanjanje UF6 iz kaskada pri tlaku do 3 kPa (0,5 psi). Desublimatori se mogu hladiti do 203 K (−70 °C) i zagrijavati do 343 K (70 °C),

– stanice za »produkt« i »ostatke«, koje se rabe za pretakanje UF6 u spremnike.

Postrojenje, oprema i cjevovod su u potpunosti izrađeni od materijala otpornih na UF6 ili su njima obloženi (vidjeti NAPOMENU ZA POJAŠNJENJE u ovom odsjeku) te proizvedeni prema vrlo visokim standardima postavljenima za vakuum i čistoću.

5.2.2. Strojno obrađeni sustavi cjevovodnih kolektora

Posebno projektirani ili izrađeni cjevovodni sustavi i sustavi cjevovodnih kolektora za rukovanje UF6 u centrifugalnim kaskadama. Mreža se cjevovoda obično sastoji od »trostrukog« sustava cjevovodnih kolektora, pri čemu je svaka centrifuga priključena na svaki cjevovodni kolektor. Na taj se način njegov oblik višekratno ponavlja. U cijelosti je izrađena od materijala otpornih na UF6 (vidjeti NAPOMENU ZA POJAŠNJENJE u ovom odsjeku) te izvedena po vrlo visokim standardima postavljenima za vakuum i čistoću.

5.2.3. UF6 maseni spektrometri/ionski izvori

Posebno projektirani ili izrađeni magnetski ili četveropolni maseni spektrometri za »neposredno« uzorkovanje napajanja, produkta i ostataka iz protoka plina UF6 koji imaju sljedeće karakteristike:

1. jedinično razlučivanje za jedinicu atomske mase veće od 320;

2. ionske izvore izrađene od ili obložene nikromom ili monelom ili platirane niklom;

3. ionizacijske izvore za bombardiranje elektronima;

4. kolektorski sustav prikladan za analizu izotopa.

5.2.4. Pretvarači frekvencije

Pretvarači frekvencije (poznati i kao konverteri ili inverteri) posebno projektirani ili izrađeni za napajanje statora motora, kako je definirano u 5.1.2. točki (d) ili dijelovi, komponente i podsklopovi takvih pretvarača frekvencije, koji imaju sljedeće karakteristike:

1. višefazni izlaz od 600 do 2 000 Hz;

2. visoku stabilnost (s kontrolom frekvencije boljom od 0,1%);

3. nisko harmonično odstupanje (manje od 2%); i

4. učinkovitost veću od 80%.

NAPOMENA ZA POJAŠNJENJE

Gore navedene stavke dolaze u izravan dodir s procesnim plinom UF6 ili izravno upravljaju centrifugama i protokom plina iz centrifuge u centrifugu, te iz kaskade u kaskadu.

Materijali otporni na korozivno djelovanje UF6 uključuju nehrđajući čelik, aluminij, legure aluminija, nikal ili legure koje sadrže 60% ili više nikla.

5.3. Posebno projektirani ili izrađeni sklopovi i komponente za primjenu u procesu obogaćivanja plinskom difuzijom

UVODNA NAPOMENA

Kod metode razdvajanja izotopa uranija plinskom difuzijom, glavni je tehnološki sklop posebna porozna barijera za plinsku difuziju, izmjenjivač topline za hlađenje plina (plin se zagrijava postupkom tlačenja), brtveni i regulacijski ventili i cjevovodi. Budući da tehnologija plinske difuzije rabi uranijev heksafluorid (UF6) sve površine opreme, cjevovoda i instrumentacije (koje dolaze u dodir s plinom) moraju biti izrađene od materijala, koji u dodiru s UF6 ostaju stabilni. Postrojenje za plinsku difuziju zahtijeva više takvih sklopova, tako da količine mogu biti značajan pokazatelj krajnje uporabe.

5.3.1. Barijere za plinsku difuziju

(a) Posebno projektirani ili izrađeni tanki, porozni filtri s veličinom pora od 100-1 000 Å (angstrema), debljine 5 mm (0,2") ili manje, a za cjevaste oblike, promjera 25 mm (1") ili manje, izrađeni od metalnih, polimernih ili keramičkih materijala otpornih na korozivno djelovanje UF6, i

(b) Posebno izrađeni spojevi ili prašci za izradu takvih filtara. Takvi spojevi ili prašci uključuju nikal ili legure, koje sadrže 60% ili više nikla, aluminijev oksid ili potpuno fluorirane ugljikovodikove polimere otporne na UF6 s čistoćom od 99,9% ili većom, veličinom čestica manjom od 10 mikrona i visokim stupnjem jednolikosti veličine čestica, koji su posebno pripremljeni za izradu barijera za plinsku difuziju.

5.3.2. Kućište difuzora

Posebno projektirane ili izrađene hermetički zatvorene cilindrične posude promjera većeg od 300 mm (12") i dužine veće od 900 mm (35") ili pravokutne posude sličnih dimenzija, koje imaju jedan ulazni i dva izlazna priključka, pri čemu svi imaju promjer veći od 50 mm (2"), za ugradnju barijere za plinsku difuziju, izrađene od materijala otpornih na UF6 ili njima obložene te projektirane za vodoravnu ili okomitu ugradnju.

5.3.3. Kompresori i plinska puhala

Posebno projektirani ili izrađeni aksijalni, centrifugalni ili potisni kompresori ili plinska puhala s kapacitetom usisa UF6 od 1 m3/min, ili više i tlakom ispuha jačine do nekoliko stotina kPa (100 psi), projektirani za dugotrajan rad u UF6 okruženju sa ili bez elektromotora odgovarajuće snage, kao i zasebni sklopovi takvih kompresora i plinskih puhala. Navedeni kompresori i plinska puhala imaju kompresioni omjer između 2:1 i 6:1 te su izrađeni od materijala otpornih na UF6 ili njima obloženi.

5.3.4. Brtve rotacijske osovine

Posebno projektirane ili izrađene vakuumske brtve s priključcima za napajanje i ispuhivanje brtve, za brtvljenje osovine, koja spaja rotor kompresora ili plinskog puhala s pogonskim motorom, tako da osigura pouzdano brtvljenje protiv prodiranja zraka u unutarnju komoru kompresora ili plinskog puhala napunjenog s UF6. Takve su brtve obično projektirane tako da sprečavaju prodiranje plina u unutrašnjost u količini većoj od 1 000 cm3/min (60 in3/min).

5.3.5. Izmjenjivači topline za hlađenje UF6

Posebno projektirani ili izrađeni izmjenjivači topline izrađeni od materijala otpornih na UF6 ili njima obloženi (osim nehrđajućeg čelika) ili bakrom ili bilo kojom kombinacijom tih metala, te koji su namijenjeni za veličinu promjene tlaka kod propuštanja manju od 10 Pa (0,0015 psi) po satu, pri tlačnoj razlici od 100 kPa (15 psi).

5.4. Posebno projektirani ili izrađeni pomoćni sustavi, oprema i komponente za uporabu u procesu obogaćivanja plinskom difuzijom

UVODNA NAPOMENA

Pomoćni sustavi, oprema i komponente za postrojenja za obogaćivanje s plinskom difuzijom predstavljaju sustave postrojenja potrebne za dodavanje UF6 u sklop za plinsku difuziju, za međusobno povezivanje pojedinačnih sklopova u kaskade (ili stupnjeve) kako bi omogućili postupno sve veće obogaćivanje i odvajanje »produkta« i »ostataka« UF6 iz difuzijskih kaskada. Zbog visokih inercijskih svojstava difuzijskih kaskada, svaki prekid njihovog rada, a posebno njihovo zaustavljanje, ima ozbiljne posljedice. Stoga je od velike važnosti u postrojenju za plinsku difuziju strogo i trajno održavati vakuum u svim tehnološkim sustavima, automatski zaštititi od nezgoda i precizno automatski regulirati tok plina. Sve to zahtijeva opremanje postrojenja velikim brojem mjernih, regulacijskih i kontrolnih sustava.

Plin UF6 obično isparava iz cilindara smještenih u autoklavima, te se u plinovitom stanju kaskadnim cjevovodnim kolektorom dovodi do ulaznog mjesta. Plinoviti tokovi »produkta« i »ostataka« UF6 vode se kaskadnim cjevovodnim kolektorom od izlaznih točaka do hladnih stupica ili kompresorskih stanica gdje se plin UF6 prije daljnjeg prijenosa u odgovarajuće spremnike za prijevoz ili skladištenje, pretvara u tekuće stanje. Budući da se postrojenje za obogaćivanje plinskom difuzijom sastoji od velikog broja sklopova za plinsku difuziju raspoređenih u kaskade, dužina kaskadnog cijevnog kolektora iznosi nekoliko kilometara, s nekoliko tisuća zavara i višekratnim ponavljanjem strukture. Oprema, komponente i cjevovodni sustavi izrađuju se po vrlo visokim standardima postavljenima za vakuum i čistoću.

5.4.1. Sustavi za napajanje/sustavi za odvođenje produkta i ostataka

Posebno projektirani ili izrađeni procesni sustavi za rad pri tlaku od 300 kPa (45 psi) ili manje, koji obuhvaćaju:

– napojne autoklave (ili sustave) za dovođenje UF6 u kaskade za plinsku difuziju,

– desublimatore (ili hladne stupice), koji se upotrebljavaju za uklanjanje UF6 iz difuzijskih kaskada,

– stanice za ukapljivanje u kojima se plin UF6 iz kaskada tlačenjem i hlađenjem pretvara u tekući UF6,

– stanice za »produkt« ili »ostatke«, koje se upotrebljavaju za pretakanje UF6 u spremnike.

5.4.2. Sustavi cjevovodnih kolektora

Posebno projektirani ili izrađeni cjevovodni sustavi i sustavi cjevovodnih kolektora za rukovanje UF6 u kaskadama za plinsku difuziju. Cjevovodna je mreža obično »dvostruki« sustav cjevovodnih kolektora, pri čemu je svaka ćelija spojena na svaki od cjevovodnih kolektora.

5.4.3. Vakuumski sustavi

(a) Posebno projektirani ili izrađeni veliki vakuumski razvodnici, vakuumski cjevovodni kolektori i vakuumske crpke usisnog kapaciteta od 5 m3/min (175 ft3/min) ili više.

(b) Vakuumske crpke posebno projektirane za rad u atmosferi koja sadrži UF6, izrađene od aluminija, nikla ili legura, koje sadrže više od 60% nikla ili su njima obložene. Te crpke mogu biti rotacijske ili nadtlačne, te mogu imati nadtlačne i fluorougljične brtve, kao i posebne radne fluide.

5.4.4. Posebni zaporni i regulacijski ventili

Posebno projektirani ili izrađeni ručni ili automatski zaporni i regulacijski ventili s mjehom, izrađeni od materijala otpornih na UF6, promjera od 40 do 1 500 mm (1,5 do 59") za ugradnju u glavne i pomoćne sustave postrojenja za obogaćivanje plinskom difuzijom.

5.4.5. UF6 maseni spektrometri/ionski izvori

Posebno projektirani ili izrađeni magnetski ili četveropolni maseni spektrometri za »neposredno« uzorkovanje napajanja, produkta i ostataka iz protoka plina UF6 koji imaju sljedeće karakteristike:

1. jedinično razlučivanje za jedinicu atomske mase veću od 320;

2. ionske izvore, koji su izrađeni od ili obloženi nikromom ili monelom ili su platirani niklom;

3. ionizacijske izvore za bombardiranje elektronima;

4. kolektorski sustav prikladan za analizu izotopa.

NAPOMENA ZA POJAŠNJENJE

Gore navedene stavke dolaze u izravan dodir s procesnim plinom UF6 ili izravno upravljaju protokom unutar kaskada. Sve površine koje dolaze u dodir s procesnim plinom u potpunosti su izrađene od materijala otpornih na UF6 ili su njima obložene. U smislu odsjeka koji se odnose na stavke plinske difuzije, materijali koji su otporni na korozivno djelovanje UF6 uključuju nehrđajući čelik, aluminij, legure aluminija, aluminijev oksid, nikal ili legure koje sadrže 60% ili više nikla, te potpuno fluorirane polimere ugljikovodika otporne na UF6.

5.5. Posebno projektirani ili izrađeni sustavi, oprema i komponente za uporabu u postrojenjima za aerodinamičko obogaćivanje

UVODNA NAPOMENA

U procesu aerodinamičkog obogaćivanja mješavina plinovitog UF6 i lakog plina (vodik ili helij) se tlači, a zatim propušta kroz odvajajuće elemente u kojima se, zbog jakih centrifugalnih sila, koje nastaju zbog geometrije zakrivljenih stijenki, odvajaju izotopi. Uspješno su razvijena dva postupka ovog tipa: postupak sa separacijskim mlaznicama i proces s vrtložnim cijevima. Kod oba postupka glavne komponente stupnja separacije uključuju cilindrične posude koje čine kućište za posebne elemente za separaciju (mlaznice i vrtložne cijevi), plinske kompresore i izmjenjivače topline za uklanjanje topline nastale pri tlačenju. U aerodinamičkom je postrojenju potrebno više takvih stupnjeva, tako da količine mogu biti značajan pokazatelj krajnje uporabe. Budući da se kod aerodinamičnih postupaka rabi UF6, sve površine opreme, cjevovoda i instrumentacije (koje dolaze u dodir s plinom) moraju biti od materijala koji u dodiru s UF6 ostaju stabilni.

NAPOMENA ZA POJAŠNJENJE

Gore navedene stavke dolaze u izravan dodir s procesnim plinom UF6 ili izravno upravljaju protokom unutar kaskada. Sve površine koje dolaze u dodir s procesnim plinom u potpunosti su izrađene od materijala otpornih na UF6 ili zaštićene njima. U smislu odsjeka koji se odnose na stavke aerodiamičkog obogaćivanja, materijali otporni na korozivno djelovanje UF6 uključuju bakar, nehrđajući čelik, aluminij, legure aluminija, aluminijev oksid, nikal ili legure koje sadrže 60% ili više nikla i potpuno fluorirane polimere ugljikovodika otporne na UF6.

5.5.1. Mlaznice za separaciju

Posebno projektirane ili izrađene mlaznice za separaciju i njihovi sklopovi. Mlaznice za separaciju sastoje se od zakrivljenih kanala u obliku žlijeba, polumjera zakrivljenosti manjeg od 1 mm (obično 0,1 do 0,05 mm), otpornih na korozivno djelovanje UF6, te imaju oštar rub unutar mlaznice, koji odvaja tok plina što struji mlaznicom u dva sustrujanja.

5.5.2. Vrtložne cijevi

Posebno projektirane ili izrađene vrtložne cijevi i njihovi sklopovi. Vrtložne cijevi su cilindrične ili konusne, izrađene od materijala otpornih na korozivno djelovanje UF6 ili zaštićene njima, promjera između 0,5 cm i 4 cm, odnosom dužine i promjera 20:1 ili manje, te s jednim ili više tangencijalnih ulaza. Cijevi mogu biti, na jednom ili oba kraja, opremljene dodacima tipa mlaznice.

NAPOMENA ZA POJAŠNJENJE

Napojni plin u vrtložnu cijev ulazi tangencijalno na jednom kraju ili kroz vrtložne lopatice ili na brojnim tangencijalnim mjestima duž oboda cijevi.

5.5.3. Kompresori i plinska puhala

Posebno projektirani ili izrađeni aksijalni, centrifugalni ili nadtlačni kompresori ili plinska puhala, izrađeni od materijala otpornih na korozivno djelovanje UF6 ili zaštićeni njima te s kapacitetom usisa od 2 m3/min ili više mješavine UF6/plina nositelja (vodika ili helija).

NAPOMENA ZA POJAŠNJENJE

Navedeni kompresori i plinska puhala imaju uobičajeno omjer kompresije između 1,2:1 do 6:1.

5.5.4. Brtve rotacijske osovine

Posebno projektirane ili izrađene brtve rotacijske osovine s priključcima za napajanje i ispuhivanje brtve, za brtvljenje osovine koja spaja rotor kompresora ili plinskog puhala s pogonskim motorom, tako da osigurava pouzdano brtvljenje protiv propuštanja procesnog plina ili prodiranja zraka ili brtvenog plina u unutarnju komoru kompresora ili plinskog puhala napunjenog mješavinom UF6/plina nositelja.

5.5.5. Izmjenjivač topline za hlađenje plina

Posebno projektirani ili izrađeni izmjenjivači topline koji su izrađeni od materijala otpornih na korozivno djelovanje UF6 ili su njima zaštićeni.

5.5.6. Kućišta elemenata za separaciju

Posebno projektirana ili izrađena kućišta elemenata za separaciju, izrađena su od materijala otpornih na korozivno djelovanje UF6 ili njima zaštićena, za smještaj vrtložnih cijevi ili mlaznica za separaciju.

NAPOMENA ZA POJAŠNJENJE

Navedena kućišta mogu biti cilindrične posude promjera većeg od 300 mm i dužine veće od 900 mm ili mogu biti pravokutne posude sličnih dimenzija te mogu biti projektirane za vodoravnu ili okomitu ugradnju.

5.5.7. Sustavi za napajanje/sustavi za odvođenje produkta i ostataka

Posebno projektirani ili izrađeni procesni sustavi ili oprema za postrojenja za obogaćivanje, izrađeni od materijala otpornih na korozivno djelovanje UF6 ili njima zaštićeni, koji uključuju:

(a) napojne autoklave, peći ili sustave, koji se rabe za dovođenje UF6 u proces obogaćivanja;

(b) desublimatore (ili hladne stupice), koji se rabe za uklanjanje UF6 iz procesa obogaćivanja radi daljnjeg prijenosa nakon zagrijavanja;

(c) stanice za skrućivanje ili ukapljivanje, koje se rabe za uklanjanje UF6 iz procesa obogaćivanja stlačivanjem i pretvaranjem UF6 u tekuće ili kruto stanje;

(d) stanice za »produkt« ili »ostatke«, koje se rabe za prijenos UF6 u spremnike.

5.5.8. Sustavi cjevovodnih kolektora

Posebno projektirani ili izrađeni sustavi cjevovodnih kolektora, izrađeni od materijala otpornih na korozivno djelovanje UF6 ili njima zaštićeni, za potrebe rukovanja UF6 u aerodinamičkim kaskadama. Mreža cjevovoda je obično projektirana kao »dvostruki« cjevovodni kolektor pri čemu su svaki stupanj ili svaka grupa spojeni na svaki cjevovodni kolektor.

5.5.9. Vakuumski sustavi i crpke

(a) Posebno projektirani ili izrađeni vakuumski sustavi usisnog kapaciteta od 5 m3/min ili većeg, koji se sastoje od vakuumskih razvodnika, vakuumskih kolektora i vakuumskih crpki, te koji su projektirani za rad u atmosferama koje sadrže UF6.

(b) Vakuumske crpke posebno projektirane za rad u atmosferama koje sadrže UF6 izrađene od materijala otpornih na korozivno djelovanje UF6 ili njima zaštićene. Za te se crpke mogu rabiti fluorougljične brtve i posebni radni fluidi.

5.5.10. Posebni zaporni i regulacijski ventili

Posebno projektirani ili izrađeni ručni ili automatski zaporni i regulacijski ventili s mijehom, izrađeni od materijala otpornih na korozivno djelovanje UF6 ili njima zaštićeni, promjera od 40 do 1 500 mm za ugradnju u glavne i pomoćne sustave postrojenja za aerodinamično obogaćivanje.

5.5.11. UF6 maseni spektrometri/ionski izvori

Posebno projektirani ili izrađeni magnetski ili četveropolni maseni spektrometri za »neposredno« uzorkovanje napajanja, produkta i ostataka iz protoka plina UF6 koji imaju sljedeće karakteristike:

1. jedinično razlučivanje za masu veću od 320;

2. ionske izvore, koji su izrađeni od ili obloženi nikromom ili monelom ili su platirani niklom;

3. ionizacijske izvore za bombardiranje elektronima;

4. kolektorski sustav prikladan za analizu izotopa.

5.5.12. Sustavi za odvajanje UF6/plina nositelja

Posebno projektirani ili izrađeni sustavi za odvajanje UF6 iz plina nositelja (vodika ili helija).

NAPOMENA ZA POJAŠNJENJE

Navedeni su sustavi projektirani tako da smanjuju sadržaj UF6 u plinu nositelju na 1 ppm ili manje, te mnogi od njih mogu uključivati opremu, kao što su:

(a) kriogeni izmjenjivači topline i kriogeni separatori za temperature od −120 °C ili niže; ili

(b) kriogene rashladne jedinice za temperature od −120 °C ili niže; ili

(c) jedinice s mlaznicama za odvajanje ili vrtložnim cijevima za odvajanje UF6 iz plina nositelja; ili

(d) hladne stupice za UF6 za temperature od −20 °C ili niže.

5.6. Posebno projektirani ili izrađeni sustavi, oprema i komponente za uporabu u postrojenjima za obogaćivanje kemijskom ili ionskom izmjenom

UVODNA NAPOMENA

Neznatna razlika u masi između više izotopa uranija uzrokuje male promjene u ravnoteži kemijskih reakcija, što se može upotrijebiti kao osnova za odvajanje izotopa. Uspješno su razvijena dva postupka: kemijska izmjena tekuće-tekuće i ionska izmjena kruto-tekuće.

U postupku kemijske izmjene tekuće-tekuće, tekuće faze (vodena i organska), koje se ne miješaju, protustrujno se vode, pri čemu nastaje kaskadni učinak od nekoliko tisuća stupnjeva odvajanja. Vodena se faza sastoji od uranijevog klorida u otopini klorovodične kiseline; organska se faza sastoji od ekstraktanta koji sadrži uranijev klorid u organskom otapalu. Kontaktori koji se rabe u separacijskoj kaskadi mogu biti kolone za izmjenu tekuće-tekuće (kao pulsirajuće kolone sa sitastim pločama) ili tekući centrifugalni kontaktori. Radi omogućavanja povratnog toka na svakom kraju, kemijske se pretvorbe (oksidacija i redukcija) trebaju odvijati na oba kraja separacijske kaskade. Glavna je zadaća projekta izbjeći kontaminaciju procesnih tokova s određenim metalnim ionima. U tu se svrhu rabe plastične, plastikom obložene (uključujući uporabu fluorougljičnih polimera) i/ili staklom obložene kolone i cjevovodi.

U postupku kruto-tekuće ionske izmjene, obogaćivanje se postiže adsorpcijom/desorpcijom uranija na posebnoj, visoko aktivnoj smoli za ionsku izmjenu, ili na adsorbentu. Otopina uranija u klorovodičnoj kiselini ili drugim kemijskim agensima prolazi kroz cilindrične kolone za obogaćivanje napunjene slojevima adsorbenta. Za neprekidan je postupak potreban sustav povratnog toka za oslobađanje uranija iz adsorbenta natrag u tekuću fazu tako da se »produkt« i »ostaci« mogu prikupiti. To se provodi upotrebom odgovarajućih kemijskih agensa za redukciju/oksidaciju, koji se potpuno regeneriraju u odvojenim vanjskim kružnim tokovima i koji se djelomično mogu regenerirati unutar samih kolona za separaciju izotopa. Prisutnost vrućih koncentriranih otopina klorovodične kiseline u procesu, zahtijeva da je oprema izrađena od materijala otpornih na koroziju ili njima zaštićena.

5.6.1. Kolone za izmjenu tekuće-tekuće (kemijska izmjena)

Protustrujne kolone za izmjenu tekuće-tekuće s ulaznom mehaničkom snagom (tj. pulsirajuće kolone sa sitastim pločama, stapne pločaste kolone i kolone s unutarnjim turbinskim miješalicama), posebno projektirane ili izrađene za obogaćivanje uranija postupkom kemijske izmjene. Zbog otpornosti na korozivno djelovanje koncentrirane otopine klorovodične kiseline, navedene su kolone i njihovi unutarnji dijelovi izrađene od prikladnih plastičnih materijala (kao fluorougljični polimeri) ili stakla ili su njima zaštićeni. Kolone su projektirane tako da je vrijeme zadržavanja u kolonama kratko (30 sekundi ili kraće).

5.6.2. Centrifugalni kontaktori tekuće-tekuće (kemijska izmjena)

Centrifugalni kontaktori tekuće-tekuće koji su posebno projektirani ili izrađeni za obogaćivanje uranija postupkom kemijske izmjene. Takvi kontaktori rabe rotaciju za disperziranje organskih i vodenih struja, a zatim centrifugalnu silu za odvajanje faza. Kako bi bili otporni na korozivno djelovanje koncentrirane otopine klorovodične kiseline, kontaktori su izrađeni od prikladnih plastičnih materijala (kao npr. fluorougljični polimeri) ili stakla ili njima zaštićeni. Vrijeme faze zadržavanja u centrifugalnim kontaktorima je projektirano tako da traje kratko (30 sekundi ili kraće).

5.6.3. Sustavi i oprema za redukciju uranija (kemijska izmjena)

(a) Posebno projektirane ili izrađene ćelije za elektrokemijsku redukciju uranija iz jednog valentnog stanja u drugi pri obogaćivanju uranija postupkom kemijske izmjene. Materijali ćelija, koji dolaze u dodir s procesnim otopinama, moraju biti otporni na korozivno djelovanje koncentriranih otopina klorovodične kiseline.

NAPOMENA ZA POJAŠNJENJE

Katodni odjeljak ćelije mora biti projektiran tako da spriječi ponovnu oksidaciju uranija u njegovo više valentno stanje. Da bi se uranij zadržao u katodnom odjeljku, ćelija može imati nepropusnu membransku dijafragmu izrađenu od posebnog materijala za izmjenu kationa. Katoda se sastoji od odgovarajućeg tvrdog vodiča, kao što je grafit.

(b) Posebno projektirani ili izrađeni sustavi na kraju kaskade za izdvajanje U4 + iz organske struje, prilagođavanje koncentracije kiseline i napajanje elektrokemijskih redukcijskih ćelija.

NAPOMENA ZA POJAŠNJENJE

Navedeni se sustavi sastoje od opreme za ekstrakciju otapala i izdvajanje U4 + iz organske struje u vodenu otopinu, za isparavanje i/ili druge opreme za podešavanje i kontrolu pH otopine te crpki ili drugih prijenosnih uređaja za napajanje ćelija za elektrokemijsku redukciju. Glavni je zadaća projekta izbjeći kontaminaciju vodene struje s određenim metalnim ionima. Zbog takvih je dijelova, koji dolaze u dodir s procesnim tokom, u sustav ugrađena oprema izrađena od odgovarajućih materijala (kao npr. staklo, flourougljični polimeri, polifenilni sulfat, polieter sulfon i smolom impregnirani grafit) ili njima zaštićena.

5.6.4. Sustavi za pripremu napajanja (kemijska izmjena)

Posebno projektirani ili izrađeni sustavi za proizvodnju otopina uranijevog klorida visoke čistoće za napajanje postrojenja za odvajanje izotopa uranija kemijskom izmjenom.

NAPOMENA ZA POJAŠNJENJE

Navedeni se sustavi sastoje od opreme za otapanje, ekstrakciju otapala i/ili ionsku izmjenu za pročišćavanje, te od elektrolitičkih ćelija za redukciju uranija U6 + ili U4 + u U3+. Ti sustavi proizvode otopine uranijevog klorida, koje sadrže samo nekoliko čestica na milijun metalnih nečistoća kao primjerice krom, željezo, vanadij, molidben ili drugi dvovalentni ili viševalentni kationi. Konstrukcijski materijali dijelova sustava za obradu U3 + visoke čistoće su staklo, fluorougljični polimeri, polifenil sulfat ili polieter sulfon obloženi plastikom, te smolom impregnirani grafit.

5.6.5. Sustavi za oksidaciju uranija (kemijska izmjena)

Posebno projektirani ili izrađeni sustavi za oksidaciju U3 + u U4 + za povratak u kaskadu za odvajanje izotopa uranija u postupku obogaćivanja kemijskom izmjenom.

NAPOMENA ZA POJAŠNJENJE

Ti sustavi mogu uključivati opremu, kao što je:

(a) oprema za vezanje klora i kisika s vodenim izljevom iz opreme za odvajanje izotopa, te za ekstrakciju dobivenog U4 + u odstranjenu organsku struju koja se vraća iz proizvodnog kraja kaskade,

(b) oprema koja odvaja vodu od klorovodične kiseline, tako da se voda i koncentrirana klorovodična kiselina na prikladnim mjestima ponovo mogu vratiti u proces.

5.6.6. Brzo reagirajuće smole/adsorbenti za ionsku izmjenu (ionska izmjena)

Brzo reagirajuće smole ili adsorbenti za ionsku izmjenu su posebno projektirane ili izrađene za obogaćivanje uranija postupkom ionske izmjene, uključujući porozne makromrežaste smole i/ili opnaste strukture u kojima su aktivne grupe za kemijsku izmjenu ograničene na površinski sloj neaktivne porozne potporne strukture, te druge složene strukture u bilo kojem odgovarajućem obliku, uključujući čestice ili vlakna. Te smole/adsorbenti za ionsku izmjenu imaju promjer od 0,2 mm ili manje i moraju biti kemijski otporni na koncentrirane otopine klorovodične kiseline te fizički dovoljno čvrsti da se ne raspadaju u kolonama za izmjenu. Smole/adsorbenti su posebno projektirani za omogućavanje vrlo brzih kinetika izotopa uranija (poluvrijeme brzine izmjene je manje od 10 sekundi) te mogu raditi na temperaturama u rasponu od 100 °C do 200 °C.

5.6.7. Kolone za ionsku izmjenu (ionska izmjena)

Cilindrične kolone promjera većeg od 1 000 mm za držanje i podupiranje nosača ispunjenih smolom/adsorbentom za ionsku izmjenu, posebno projektirane ili izrađene za obogaćivanje uranija postupkom ionske izmjene. Kolone su izrađene od materijala (kao npr. titan ili fluorougljična plastika) otpornih na korozivno djelovanje otopina koncentrirane klorovodične kiseline, ili su njima zaštićene i mogu raditi pri temperaturama u rasponu od 100 °C do 200 °C te tlakovima iznad 0,7 MPa (102 psi).

5.6.8. Sustavi ionske izmjene povratnog toka (ionska izmjena)

(a) Posebno projektirani ili izrađeni kemijski ili elektrokemijski redukcijski sustavi za regeneriranje kemijskog(-ih) redukcijskog-(ih) agensa(-asa), koji se rabi(-e) u kaskadama za obogaćivanje uranija ionskom izmjenom.

(b) Posebno projektirani ili izrađeni kemijski ili elektrokemijski oksidacijski sustavi za regeneriranje kemijskog(-ih) oksidacijskog(-ih) agensa(-asa), koji se rabi(-e) u kaskadama za obogaćivanje uranija ionskom izmjenom.

NAPOMENA ZA POJAŠNJENJE

Kod postupka obogaćivanja ionskom izmjenom se primjerice može rabiti trovalentni titan (Ti3+) kao redukcijski kation u kojem slučaju redukcijski sustav redukcijom Ti4 + regenerira Ti3+. U postupku se primjerice može rabiti trovalentno željezo (Fe3+) kao oksidant, u kojem slučaju oksidacijski sustav oksidacijom Fe2 + regenerira Fe3+.

5.7. Posebno projektirani ili izrađeni sustavi, oprema i komponente za upotrebu u postrojenjima za lasersko obogaćivanje

UVODNA NAPOMENA

Postojeći sustavi za obogaćivanje uz primjenu lasera dijele se u dvije kategorije: one u kojima je procesni medij para atomarnog uranija i one u kojima je procesni medij para uranijevog spoja. Uobičajeno nazivlje za takve postupke uključuje: prva kategorija, lasersko odvajanje izotopa u atomskoj pari (ALVIS ili SILVA); druga kategorija, molekularno lasersko odvajanje izotopa (MLIS ili MOLIS) i kemijska reakcija sa selektivnim laserskim aktiviranjem izotopa (CRISLA). Ti sustavi, oprema i komponente za postrojenja za lasersko obogaćivanje obuhvaćaju:

(a) uređaje za napajanje parom metala uranija (za selektivnu fotoionizaciju) ili uređaje za napajanje parom uranijevog spoja (za fotodisocijaciju ili kemijsku aktivaciju);

(b) uređaje za prikupljanje obogaćenog i osiromašenog metalnog uranija kao »produkt« ili »ostaci« u prvoj kategoriji te uređaje za prikupljanje disociranih ili izreagiranih spojeva kao »produkt« i nepromijenjenih materijala kao »ostaci« u drugoj kategoriji;

(c) sustave za laserski postupak za selektivnu pobudu izotopa uranija-235; i

(d) opremu za pripremu napajanja i pretvorbu produkta. Složenost spektroskopije atoma uranija i njegovih spojeva može zahtijevati primjenu bilo koje od brojnih laserskih tehnologija koje su na raspolaganju.

NAPOMENA ZA POJAŠNJENJE

Mnoge stavke navedene u ovom odsjeku dolaze u izravan dodir s parama ili tekućinom metala uranija ili procesnim plinom, koji sadrži UF6 ili mješavinom UF6 i drugih plinova. Sve površine, koje dolaze u dodir s uranijem ili UF6, u potpunosti su izrađene od materijala otpornih na koroziju ili su njima zaštićene. U smislu ovog odsjeka, koji se odnosi na stavke laserskog obogaćivanja, materijali otporni na korozivno djelovanje para ili tekućinu metala uranija ili uranijevih legura uključuju grafite obložene itrijem i tantal, a materijali otporni na korozivno djelovanje UF6 uključuju bakar, nehrđajući čelik, aluminij, legure aluminija, nikal ili legure koje sadrže 60% ili više nikla te potpuno fluorirane polimere ugljikovodika otporne na UF6.

5.7.1. Sustavi za isparavanje uranija (AVLIS)

Posebno projektirani ili izrađeni sustavi za isparavanje uranija, koji se sastoje od topa za proizvodnju trake velike snage ili skenirajućeg elektronskog snopa sa snagom predanom na cilju većom od 2,5 kW/cm.

5.7.2. Sustavi za rukovanje tekućim metalom uranija (AVLIS)

Specijalno projektirani ili izrađeni sustavi za rukovanje tekućim metalom za rastaljeni uranij ili uranijeve legure, koji se sastoje od lonaca za taljenje i opreme za hlađenje lonaca za taljenje.

NAPOMENA ZA POJAŠNJENJE

Lonci za taljenje i ostali dijelovi tog sustava, koji dolaze u dodir s rastaljenim uranijem i uranijevim legurama, izrađeni su od materijala odgovarajuće otpornosti na koroziju i toplinu ili su njima zaštićeni. Odgovarajući materijali su tantal, grafit obložen itrijem, grafit obložen ostalim oksidima rijetkih zemalja ili njihovim mješavinama.

5.7.3. Kolektorski sklopovi za »produkt« i »ostatke« metala uranija (AVLIS)

Posebno projektirani ili izrađeni kolektorski sklopovi za »produkt« i »ostatke« metala uranija u tekućem ili krutom stanju.

NAPOMENA ZA POJAŠNJENJE

Komponente za te sklopove izrađene su od materijala otpornih na toplinu i korozivno djelovanje pare ili tekućeg metala uranija (kao što je grafit obložen itrijem ili tantal) ili su njima zaštićene, te mogu uključivati cijevi, ventile, armature, »žljebove«, provodnike, izmjenjivače topline i kolektorske ploče za magnetske, elektrostatičke i druge metode separacije.

5.7.4. Kućišta modula separatora (AVLIS)

Posebno projektirane ili izrađene cilindrične ili pravokutne posude za držanje izvora pare metala uranija, topa s elektronskim snopom i kolektora »produkta« i »ostataka«.

NAPOMENA ZA POJAŠNJENJE

Navedena kućišta imaju brojne ulaze za električno napajanje ili napajanje vodom, otvore za laserski snop, priključke za vakuumsku crpku te instrumentaciju za dijagnostiku i nadzor. Imaju mogućnost otvaranja i zatvaranja u svrhu obnavljanja unutarnjih komponenti.

5.7.5. Nadzvučne ekspanzijske mlaznice (MLIS)

Posebno projektirane ili izrađene nadzvučne ekspanzijske mlaznice za hlađenje mješavina UF6 i plina nositelja do 150 K ili manje te koje su otporne na korozivno djelovanje UF6.

5.7.6. Kolektori produkta uranijevog pentafluorida (MLIS)

Posebno projektirani ili izrađeni kolektori produkta uranijevog pentafluorida (UF5) u krutom stanju, koji se sastoje od filtarskih, udarnih ili ciklonskih kolektora ili njihove kombinacije, te koji su otporni na korozivno djelovanje UF5/UF6.

5.7.7. Kompresori za UF6/plin nositelj (MLIS)

Posebno projektirani i izrađeni kompresori za mješavine UF6/plina nositelja, projektirani za dugotrajan rad u UF6 okruženju. Komponente tih kompresora, a koje dolaze u dodir s procesnim plinom, izrađene su od materijala otpornih na UF6 ili su njima zaštićene.

5.7.8. Brtve rotacijske osovine (MLIS)

Posebno projektirane ili izrađene brtve rotacijske osovine s priključcima za napajanje i ispuhivanje brtve, za brtvljenje osovine koja spaja rotor kompresora s pogonskim motorom, tako da osigurava pouzdano brtvljenje protiv izlaženja procesnog plina ili prodiranja zraka ili brtvenog plina u unutarnju komoru kompresora, ispunjenu mješavinom UF6/plina nositelja.

5.7.9. Sustavi za fluoriranje (MLIS)

Posebno projektirani i izrađeni sustavi za fluoriranje UF5 (kruto stanje) u UF6 (plin).

NAPOMENA ZA POJAŠNJENJE

Navedeni su sustavi projektirani za fluoriranje prikupljenog praška UF5 u UF6 radi kasnijeg prikupljanja u spremnike za produkt ili radi dovođenja u jedinice MLIS u svrhu dodatnog obogaćivanja. Po jednoj se metodi reakcija fluoriranja može izvesti u okviru sustava za odvajanje izotopa, gdje dolazi do reakcije i uporabe izravno iz kolektora »produkta«. Po drugoj se metodi prašak UF5 može odstraniti/prenijeti iz kolektora »produkta« u odgovarajuću reakcijsku posudu (npr. reaktor s fluidiziranim slojem, vijčani reaktor ili plameni toranj) za fluoriranje. Kod obje se metode upotrebljava oprema za skladištenje i prijenos fluora (ili drugih odgovarajućih agenasa za fluoriranje) te za prikupljanje i prijenos UF6.

5.7.10. UF6 maseni spektrometri/ionski izvori (MLIS)

Posebno projektirani ili izrađeni magnetski ili četveropolni maseni spektrometri za »neposredno« uzorkovanje napajanja, produkta i ostataka iz protoka plina UF6 koji imaju sljedeće karakteristike:

1. jedinično razlučivanje za masu veću od 320;

2. ionske izvore, koji su izrađeni od ili obloženi nikromom ili monelom ili su platirani niklom;

3. ionizacijske izvore za bombardiranje elektronima;

4. kolektorski sustav prikladan za analizu izotopa.

5.7.11. Sustavi za napajanje/sustavi za odvajanje produkta i ostataka (MLIS)

Posebno projektirani ili izrađeni procesni sustavi ili oprema za postrojenja za obogaćivanje, izrađeni od materijala otpornih na korozivno djelovanje UF6 ili njima zaštićeni, koji obuhvaćaju:

(a) napojne autoklave, peći ili sustave, koji se rabe za dovođenje UF6 u proces obogaćivanja;

(b) desublimatore (ili hladne stupice), koji se rabe za uklanjanje UF6 iz procesa obogaćivanja radi daljnjeg prijenosa nakon zagrijavanja;

(c) stanice za skrućivanje ili ukapljivanje, koje se rabe za uklanjanje UF6 iz procesa obogaćivanja, stlačivanjem i pretvaranjem UF6 u tekuće ili kruto stanje;

(d) stanice za »produkt« ili »ostatke«, koje se rabe za prijenos UF6 u spremnike.

5.7.12. Sustavi za odvajanje UF6/plina nositelja (MLIS)

Posebno projektirani ili izrađeni sustavi za odvajanje UF6 iz plina nositelja. Plin nositelj može biti dušik, argon ili neki drugi plin.

NAPOMENA ZA POJAŠNJENJE

Ti sustavi mogu uključivati opremu, kao što su:

(a) kriogeni izmjenjivači topline i kriogeni separatori za temperature od −120 °C ili niže; ili

(b) kriogene rashladne jedinice za temperature od −120 °C ili niže; ili

(c) hladne stupice za UF6 za temperature od −20 °C ili niže.

5.7.13. Laserski sustavi (AVLIS, MLIS i CRISLA)

Laseri ili laserski sustavi posebno projektirani ili izrađeni za odvajanje izotopa uranija.

NAPOMENA ZA POJAŠNJENJE

Laserski se sustav za postupak AVLIS obično sastoji od dva lasera: laser s parom bakra i laser s bojom. Laserski sustav za MLIS se obično sastoji od CO2 ili eksimerskog lasera i višestruke optičke ćelije s rotirajućim zrcalima na oba kraja. Laseri i laserski sustavi za oba postupka zahtijevaju stabilizator frekvencijskog spektra za rad u dužem vremenskom razdoblju.

5.8. Posebno projektirani ili izrađeni sustavi, oprema i komponente za uporabu u postrojenjima za obogaćivanje odvajanjem plazmom

UVODNA NAPOMENA

U postupku odvajanja plazmom, plazma iona uranija prolazi električnim poljem podešenim na rezonantnu frekvenciju iona U-235 tako da oni u prvom redu apsorbiraju energiju i povećavaju promjer svojih spiralnih putanja. Ioni koji imaju putanju velikog promjera presreću se radi stvaranja produkta obogaćenog s U-235. Plazma, koja nastaje ionizacijom uranijevih para zadržava se u vakuumskoj komori s magnetskim poljem velike jakosti, kojeg stvara supervodljivi magnet. Glavni tehnološki sustavi postupka uključuju sustav za stvaranje uranijeve plazme, modul separatora sa supervodljivim magnetom i sustave za uklanjanje metala za prikupljanje »produkta« i »ostataka«.

5.8.1. Mikrovalni izvori snage i antene

Posebno projektirani ili izrađeni mikrovalni izvori snage i antene za stvaranje ili ubrzavanje iona sa sljedećim karakteristikama: frekvencija veća od 30 GHz i srednja izlazna snaga za proizvodnju iona veća od 50 kW.

5.8.2. Zavojnice za uzbuđivanje iona

Posebno projektirane ili izrađene radiofrekvencijske zavojnice za uzbuđivanje iona za frekvencije od i iznad 100 kHz, te koje se mogu rabiti pri srednjoj snazi većoj od 40 kW.

5.8.3. Sustavi za stvaranje uranijeve plazme

Posebno projektirani ili izrađeni sustavi za stvaranje uranijeve plazme, koji mogu sadržavati topove za proizvodnju trake velike snage ili skenirajućeg elektronskog snopa, s isporučenom snagom na cilju većom od 2,5 kW/cm.

5.8.4. Sustavi za rukovanje tekućim metalom uranija

Posebno projektirani ili izrađeni sustavi za rukovanje rastaljenim uranijem ili uranijevim legurama, koji se sastoje od lonaca za taljenje i opreme za njihovo hlađenje.

NAPOMENA ZA POJAŠNJENJE

Lonci za taljenje i ostali dijelovi tog sustava, koji dolaze u dodir s rastaljenim uranijem ili uranijevim legurama, izrađeni su od materijala odgovarajuće otpornosti na koroziju i toplinu ili su njima zaštićeni. Odgovarajući materijali uključuju tantal, grafit obložen itrijem, grafit obložen ostalim oksidima rijetkih zemalja ili njihovim mješavinama.

5.8.5. Kolektorski sklopovi za »produkt« i »ostatke« metala uranija

Posebno projektirani ili izrađeni kolektorski sklopovi za »produkt« i »ostatke« metala uranija u krutom stanju. Navedeni su kolektorski sklopovi izrađeni od materijala otpornih na toplinu i korozivno djelovanje pare metala uranija, kao što su grafit obložen itrijem ili tantal, ili su njima zaštićeni.

5.8.6. Kućišta modula separatora

Cilindrične posude posebno projektirane ili izrađene za uporabu u postrojenjima za obogaćivanje odvajanjem plazmom, za potrebe držanja izvora plazme uranija, zavojnice za pobudu radio frekvencije i kolektore »produkta« i »ostataka«.

NAPOMENA ZA POJAŠNJENJE

Ta kućišta imaju nekoliko ulaza za električno napajanje, priključke za difuzijsku crpku te instrumentaciju za dijagnostiku i nadzor. Imaju mogućnost otvaranja i zatvaranja radi obnavljanja unutarnjih komponenti, te su izrađena od odgovarajućeg nemagnetskog materijala, kao što je nehrđajući čelik.

5.9. Posebno projektirani ili izrađeni sustavi, oprema i komponente za uporabu u postrojenjima za elektromagnetsko obogaćivanje

UVODNA NAPOMENA

U elektromagnetskom se postupku ioni metala uranija koji su nastali ionizacijom soli dopremljenog materijala (obično UCl4) ubrzavaju i prolaze kroz magnetsko polje što dovodi do toga da se ioni različitih izotopa kreću različitim putanjama. Glavne komponente elektromagnetskog separatora izotopa uključuju: magnetsko polje za skretanje/odvajanje izotopa u ionskom snopu, ionski izvor sa sustavom za ubrzanje i sustavom za prikupljanje odvojenih iona. Pomoćni sustavi za taj postupak uključuju sustav energetskog napajanja magneta, visokonaponski sustav napajanja izvora iona, vakuumski sustav i opsežne sustave za postupanje kemikalijama za uporabu produkta te čišćenje/recikliranje komponenata.

5.9.1. Elektromagnetski separatori izotopa

Elektromagnetski separatori izotopa posebno projektirani i izrađeni za odvajanje izotopa uranija, te njihova oprema i komponente, uključujući:

(a) ionske izvore

Posebno projektirani ili izrađeni pojedinačni ili višestruki izvori iona uranija, koji se sastoje od izvora pare, ionizatora i ubrzivača snopa, te koji su izgrađeni od odgovarajućih materijala kao što su grafit, nehrđajući čelik ili bakar i s kojima je moguće osigurati ukupnu struju snopa iona od 50 mA ili više;

(b) kolektore iona

Kolektorske ploče koje se sastoje od dva ili više proreza i džepova posebno projektiranih ili izrađenih za prikupljanje ionskih snopova obogaćenog i osiromašenog uranija, te izrađene od odgovarajućih materijala kao što su grafit ili nehrđajući čelik;

(c) vakuumska kućišta

Posebno projektirana i izrađena vakuumska kućišta za elektromagnetske separatore uranija, izrađena od odgovarajućih nemagnetskih materijala, kao što je nehrđajući čelik, te projektirana za rad pod tlakom od 0,1 Pa ili nižim.

NAPOMENA ZA POJAŠNJENJE

Kućišta su posebno projektirana za ugradnju ionskih izvora, kolektorskih ploča i vodom hlađenih obloga te su opremljena priključcima za difuzijsku crpku, kao i otvorom te poklopcem za uklanjanje i ponovnu ugradnju tih komponenata.

(d) Magnetni polni dijelovi

Posebno projektirani i izrađeni magnetni polni dijelovi promjera većeg od 2 m, koji se rabe za održavanje stalnog magnetskog polja u elektromagnetskom separatoru izotopa, te za prijenos magnetskog polja između susjednih separatora.

5.9.2. Visokonaponsko napajanje

Posebno projektirano i izrađeno visokonaponsko napajanje za ionske izvore sa svim sljedećim karakteristikama: sposobnost neprekidnog rada, izlazni napon od 20 000 V ili više, izlazna struja 1 A ili veća i stabilizacija napona bolja od 0,01% tijekom razdoblja od osam sati.

5.9.3. Izvor energije za magnete

Posebno projektirano i izrađeno energetsko napajanje magneta istosmjernom strujom velike snage sa svim sljedećim karakteristikama: sposobnost neprekidne proizvodnje izlazne struje od 500 A ili više pri naponu od 100 V ili više i stabilizacija struje ili napona bolja od 0,01% tijekom razdoblja od osam sati.

6. POSTROJENJA ZA PROIZVODNJU TEŠKE VODE, DEUTERIJA I SPOJEVA DEUTERIJA I OPREMA POSEBNO PROJEKTIRANA ILI IZRAĐENA U TU SVRHU

UVODNA NAPOMENA

Tešku je vodu moguće proizvesti različitim postupcima. Međutim, dva postupka za koja je dokazano da su komercijalno isplativa su postupak izmjene vode-vodikovog sulfida (GS postupak) i postupak izmjene amonijaka-vodika.

GS postupak se temelji na izmjeni vodika i deuterija između vode i vodikovog sulfida preko niza tornjeva, koji rade s hladnom sekcijom na vrhu i toplom sekcijom na dnu. Voda teče niz tornjeve, dok plin vodikovog sulfida kruži od dna prema vrhu tornjeva. Niz se sitastih ploča rabi za pospješivanje miješanja plina i vode. Deuterij pri niskim temperaturama ulazi u vodu, a pri visokim temperaturama u vodikov sulfid. Plin ili voda, obogaćeni deuterijem, se odvode iz tornjeva prvog stupnja na spoju tople i hladne sekcije, nakon čega se postupak ponavlja u tornjevima sljedećeg stupnja. Produkt posljednjeg stupnja, odnosno voda obogaćena deuterijem do 30%, šalje se u destilacijsku jedinicu gdje se dobiva teška voda reaktorske kakvoće, tj. s 99,75% deuterijevog oksida.

Postupkom izmjene amonijaka-vodika moguće je izdvojiti deuterij iz sinteznog plina kontaktom s tekućim amonijakom u prisutnosti katalizatora. Sintezni se plin dovodi u tornjeve za izmjenu i pretvarač amonijaka. U tornjevima plin struji od dna prema vrhu, dok tekući amonijak struji od vrha prema dnu. Deuterij se odvaja od vodika u sinteznom plinu i koncentrira u amonijak. Zatim amonijak struji u uređaj za razgrađivanje amonijaka na dnu tornja, dok plin struji u pretvarač amonijaka na vrhu. Daljnje obogaćivanje se odvija u sljedećim stupnjevima, a konačnom destilacijom se dobiva teška voda reaktorske kakvoće. Sintezni plin se može dovoditi iz postrojenja za amonijak, koje se može izgraditi zajedno s postrojenjem za tešku vodu postupkom izmjene amonijaka-vodika. Za postupak izmjene amonijaka-vodika se kao izvor deuterija može rabiti i obična voda.

Većina je ključnih elemenata opreme u postrojenjima za proizvodnju teške vode, kod kojih se primjenjuje GS postupak ili postupak izmjene amonijaka-vodika, zajednička nekolicini segmenata kemijske i naftne industrije. To se posebno odnosi na mala postrojenja u kojima se primjenjuje GS postupak. Međutim, u »slobodnoj prodaji« se na raspolaganju nalazi samo mali broj elemenata. GS postupak i postupak amonijak-vodik zahtijevaju rukovanje velikom količinom zapaljivih, korozivnih i toksičnih fluida pri povišenim tlakom. Prema tomu, kod utvrđivanja projektnih i radnih standarda za postrojenja i opremu namijenjenih tim postupcima, posebnu pozornost treba posvetiti izboru materijala i specifikacijama, kako bi se osigurao dugi vijek trajanja s visokim faktorima sigurnosti i pouzdanosti. Izbor veličine u prvom redu ovisi o ekonomičnosti i potrebi. Zbog toga se većina elemenata opreme izrađuje prema zahtjevima kupca.

Također treba napomenuti, da se, kako u GS postupku tako i u postupku izmjene amonijak-vodik, elementi opreme, koji pojedinačno nisu posebno projektirani ili izrađeni za proizvodnju teške vode, mogu sastaviti u sustave koji su posebno projektirani ili izrađeni za proizvodnju teške vode. Primjeri takvih sustava su sustav za proizvodnju katalizatora koji se rabi u postupku izmjene amonijaka-vodika i sustavi za destilaciju vode, koji se kod oba postupka rabe za konačnu koncentraciju teške vode do reaktorske kakvoće.

Elementi opreme, koji su posebno projektirani ili izrađeni za proizvodnju teške vode uz primjenu postupka izmjene vode-vodikovog sulfida ili postupka izmjene amonijaka-vodika uključuju sljedeće:

6.1. Tornjeve za izmjenu vode-vodikovog sulfida

Tornjevi za izmjenu proizvedeni od kvalitetnog ugljičnog čelika (kao primjerice ASTM A516) s promjerima od 6 m (20’) do 9 m (39’), s mogućnošću rada pod tlakom jednakim ili većim od 2 MPa (300 psi) te s dozvoljenom korozijom od 6 mm ili većom, posebno projektirani ili izrađeni za proizvodnju teške vode postupkom izmjene vode-vodikovog sulfida.

6.2. Puhala i kompresori

Jednostupanjska, niskotlačna (tj. 0,2 MPa ili 30 psi) centrifugalna puhala ili kompresori za cirkulaciju plina vodikovog sulfida (tj. plina, koji sadrži više od 70% H2S) posebno projektirani ili izrađeni za proizvodnju teške vode postupkom izmjene vode-vodikovog sulfida. Ta puhala i kompresori imaju propusni kapacitet jednak ili veći od 56 m3/sekundi (120 000 SCFM), pri radnom tlaku jednakom ili većem od 1,8 MPa (260 psi) usisne moći, te brtve projektirane za rad u okruženju s mokrim H2S.

6.3. Tornjeve za izmjenu amonijaka-vodika

Tornjevi za izmjenu amonijaka-vodika visine jednake ili veće od 35 m (114,3’) s promjerima od 1,5 m (4,9’) do 2,5 m (8,2’) s mogućnošću rada pod tlakom većim od 15 MPa (2 225 psi), posebno projektirani ili izrađeni za proizvodnju teške vode postupkom izmjene amonijaka-vodika. Navedeni tornjevi također imaju najmanje jedan aksijalni otvor s prirubnicom istog promjera, te cilindrični dio kroz koji se mogu umetnuti ili izvaditi unutarnji dijelovi tornja.

6.4. Unutarnji dijelovi tornjeva i stupanjske crpke

Unutarnji dijelovi tornja i stupanjske crpke posebno projektirani i izrađeni za tornjeve za proizvodnju teške vode postupkom izmjene amonijaka-vodika. Unutarnji dijelovi su posebno projektirani stupanjski kontaktori koji omogućuju neposredni kontakt plina/tekućine. Stupanjske crpke su posebno projektirane uronjive crpke za cirkulaciju tekućeg amonijaka u kontaktnom stupnju unutar stupanjskih tornjeva.

6.5. Uređaji za razgrađivanje amonijaka

Uređaji za razgrađivanje amonijaka s radnim tlakom jednakim ili većim od 3 MPa (450 psi) su posebno projektirani ili izrađeni za proizvodnju teške vode postupkom izmjene amonijak-vodik.

6.6. Analizatori apsorpcije infracrvenim zrakama

Analizatori apsorpcije infracrvenim zrakama za neposrednu analizu omjera vodika/deuterija gdje su koncentracije deuterija jednake ili veće od 90%.

6.7. Katalitički plamenici

Katalitički plamenici za pretvorbu obogaćenog plina deuterija u tešku vodu su posebno projektirani ili izrađeni za proizvodnju teške vode postupkom izmjene amonijaka-vodika.

7. POSTROJENJA ZA PRETVORBU URANIJA I OPREMA POSEBNO PROJEKTIRANA ILI IZRAĐENA ZA TU SVRHU

UVODNA NAPOMENA

U postrojenjima i sustavima za pretvorbu uranija mogu se izvesti jedna ili više pretvorbi iz jedne kemijske vrste uranija u drugu uključujući: pretvorbu koncentrata uranijeve rude u UO3, pretvorbu UO3 u UO2, pretvorbu uranijevih oksida u UF4 ili UF6, pretvorbu UF4 u UF6, pretvorbu UF6 u UF4, pretvorbu UF4 u metal uranija i pretvorbu uranijevog fluorida u UO2. Veliki je broj ključnih elemenata opreme za postrojenja za pretvorbu uranija zajednički većem broju segmenata kemijske procesne industrije. Na primjer, vrste opreme, koja se rabi u tim postupcima mogu uključivati: peći, rotacijske peći, reaktore s fluidiziranim slojem, reaktore s plamenim tornjem, centrifuge za tekućinu, destilacijske kolone i kolone za ekstrakciju tekuće-tekuće. Međutim, u »slobodnoj prodaji« je na raspolaganju samo mali broj tih elemenata, dok se većina njih izrađuje prema zahtjevima i specifikacijama kupca. U nekim je slučajevima potreban poseban projekt i konstrukcijske izvedbe kako bi se utvrdila korozivna svojstva nekih kemikalija s kojima se postupa (HF, F2, CIF3 i uranijevi fluoridi). Konačno treba napomenuti da se elementi opreme, koji pojedinačno nisu posebno projektirani ili izrađeni za pretvorbu uranija, mogu sklapati u sustave, koji su posebno projektirani ili izrađeni za uporabu pri pretvaranju uranija.

7.1. Posebno projektirani ili izrađeni sustavi za pretvorbu koncentrata uranijeve rude u UO3

NAPOMENA ZA POJAŠNJENJE

Pretvorbu koncentrata uranijeve rude u UO3 moguće je provesti tako da se ruda najprije otopi u dušičnoj kiselini i ekstrahira pročišćeni uranil nitrat, pri čemu se upotrebljava otapalo, kao što je tributil fosfat. Zatim se uranil nitrat pretvara u UO3 koncentracijom i denitracijom ili neutralizacijom s plinovitim amonijakom, pri čemu nastaje amonijev diuranat, nakon čega slijedi filtriranje, sušenje i kalciniranje.

7.2. Posebno projektirani ili izrađeni sustavi za pretvorbu UO3 u UF6

NAPOMENA ZA POJAŠNJENJE

Pretvorbu UO3 u UF6 moguće je provesti izravno fluoriranjem. Za postupak je potreban izvor fluora u plinovitom stanju ili klor-trifluorida.

7.3. Posebno projektirani ili izrađeni sustavi za pretvorbu UO3 u UO2

NAPOMENA ZA POJAŠNJENJE

Pretvorbu UO3 u UO2 moguće je provesti redukcijom UO3 s razgrađenim amonijakom u plinovitom stanju ili vodikom.

7.4. Posebno projektirani ili izrađeni sustavi za pretvorbu UO2 u UF4

NAPOMENA ZA POJAŠNJENJE

Pretvorbu UO2 u UF4 moguće je provesti reakcijom UO2 s plinovitim fluorovodikom (HF) pri temperaturi od 300-500 °C.

7.5. Posebno projektirani ili izrađeni sustavi za pretvorbu UF4 u UF6

NAPOMENA ZA POJAŠNJENJE

Pretvorba UF4 u UF6 se provodi egzotermičkom reakcijom s fluorom u tornju reaktora. UF6 se kondenzira iz vrućeg toka, koji istječe kroz hladnu stupicu hlađenu na -10 °C. Za postupak je potreban izvor fluora u plinovitom stanju.

7.6. Posebno projektirani ili izrađeni sustavi za pretvorbu UF4 u metal uranij

NAPOMENA ZA POJAŠNJENJE

Pretvorba UF4 u metal uranij se provodi redukcijom s magnezijem (za velike šarže) ili kalcijem (za male šarže). Reakcija se provodi pri temperaturi iznad točke taljenja uranija (1 130 °C).

7.7. Posebno projektirani ili izrađeni sustavi za pretvorbu UF6 u UO2

NAPOMENA ZA POJAŠNJENJE

Pretvorbu UF6 u UO2 moguće je provesti jednim od tri postupka. U prvom se postupku UF6 reducira i hidrolizira u UO2 uporabom vodika i pare. U drugom se postupku UF6 hidrolizira u vodenoj otopini, dodaje se amonijak radi taloženja amonijevog diuranata, zatim se diuranat reducira u UO2 s vodikom pri 820 °C. U trećem se postupku plinoviti UF6, CO2 i NH3 miješaju u vodi, pri čemu kao talog nastaje amonijev uranil karbonat. Amonijev uranil karbonat se miješa s parom i vodikom na 500-600 °C, pri čemu nastaje UO2.

Pretvorba UF6 u UO2 često se provodi kao prvi stupanj u postrojenju za proizvodnju goriva.

7.8. Posebno projektirani ili izrađeni sustavi za pretvorbu UF6 u UF4

NAPOMENA ZA POJAŠNJENJE

Pretvorba UF6 u UF4 se provodi redukcijom s vodikom.

PRILOG III.

Ako mjere iz ovog Protokola uključuju nuklearni materijal, koji je deklarirala Zajednica i ne dovode u pitanje članak 1. ovog Protokola, Agencija i Zajednica međusobno surađuju kako bi olakšale provedbu tih mjera i izbjegle nepotrebno udvostručavanje aktivnosti.

Zajednica dostavlja Agenciji informacije koje se odnose na prijenose u nuklearne i nenuklearne svrhe, iz svake države u drugu državu članicu Zajednice i na prijenose u svaku državu iz druge države članice Zajednice, koje odgovaraju informacijama, a koje je potrebno dostavljati na temelju članka 2. točke a. podtočke (vi) alineje (b) i članka 2. točke a. podtočke (vi) alineje (c) o izvozu i uvozu izvornog materijala koji nije dosegao sastav i čistoću pogodnu za proizvodnju goriva ili za izotopsko obogaćivanje.

Svaka država dostavlja Agenciji informacije koje se odnose na prijenose u ili iz druge države članice Zajednice, a koje odgovaraju informacijama o posebnoj opremi i nenuklearnom materijalu navedenom u Prilogu II. ovom Protokolu, a koje je potrebno dostavljati na temelju članka 2. točke a. podtočke (ix) alineje (a) u vezi s izvozima, te na poseban zahtjev Agencije, na temelju članka 2. točke a. podtočke (ix) alineje (b) u vezi s uvozima.

Što se tiče Zajedničkog istraživačkog centra Zajednice, Zajednica također, u uskoj suradnji s državom u čijem se području nalazi ustanova centra, prema potrebi provodi mjere koje su u ovom Protokolu utvrđene za države.

Odbor za vezu osnovan na temelju članka 25. točke (a) Protokola, naveden u članku 26. Sporazuma o zaštitnim mjerama se proširuje, kako bi se omogućilo sudjelovanje predstavnika država i prilagođavanje novim okolnostima koje proizlaze iz ovog Protokola.

Isključivo u svrhu provedbe ovog Protokola te ne dovodeći u pitanje nadležnosti i odgovornosti Zajednice i njezinih država članica, svaka je država, koja odluči Komisiju Europskih zajednica ovlastiti za provedbu određenih odredbi, koje su na temelju ovog Protokola postale odgovornost država, obvezna obavijestiti o tom druge stranke iz Protokola popratnim pismom. Komisija je Europskih zajednica obvezna druge stranke iz Protokola obavijestiti o prihvaćanju svih takvih odluka.

Članak 4.

Provedba ovoga Zakona u djelokrugu je središnjeg tijela državne uprave nadležnog za poslove radiološke i nuklearne sigurnosti.

Članak 5.

Na dan stupanja na snagu ovoga Zakona Sporazum i Dodatni protokol iz članka 1. ovoga Zakona nisu na snazi u odnosu na Republiku Hrvatsku te će se podaci o njihovu stupanju na snagu objaviti sukladno odredbi članka 30. stavka 3. Zakona o sklapanju i izvršavanju međunarodnih ugovora (»Narodne novine« br. 28/96.).

Članak 6.

Ovaj Zakon stupa na snagu osmoga dana od dana objave u »Narodnim novinama«.

Klasa: 022-03/16-01/33

Zagreb, 18. svibnja 2016.

HRVATSKI SABOR

Predsjednik

Hrvatskoga sabora

akademik Željko Reiner, v. r.